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The subject matter of this thesis are some aspects of the expression of 
explanations in spoken discourse. The study of explanations has occupied the 
attention of many researchers in ý social psychology and -' in neighbouring 
disciplines; the study of talk has occupied an even greater number. In the thesis 
I try to integrate certain areas of these two fields. Chapter one sketches the 
history of the concern with language which has characterised* developments in 
the social sciences this century. This chapter is incidentally' an introduction to 
some of the key themes of the thesis and to why I think research based on 
naturally occurring discourse is important. 
Research on explanations in social psychology has been dominated by' research 
which has gone on under the heading of attribution theory. In chapter two I 
address a controversy in the application of concepts drawn from attribution 
theory to clinical psychology, namely whether or not people have fixed styles in 
the way that they attribute causes for outcomes. Studying family therapy 
sessions and interviews with parents with a coding procedure I show that the 
variety of possible styles is broader than has been suggested previously. Chapter 
three further pursues causal expressions as cases of explanations by asking what 
a causal statement is. The chapter opens with a discussion of how causes relate 
to reasons concluding that reasons are a species of cause. I then go on to use 
data from earlier work to study what expressions speakers use to make causal 
utterances. 
The direction of enquiry has been to suggest that rather than studying causal 
beliefs it is causal utterances that are under study. An utterance is, if you like, 
"situated", that is to say, what a speaker says is context-bound. I talk of 
"communicative constraints" operating here. Chapter four reviews some work in 
the study of conversation with an eye to elucidating the sense in which a 
speaker's utterances are a product of the situation in which they occur and to 
look at the researchability of this intuition. Practical and conceptual reasons 
suggest that the approach generally known as conversation analysis stemming 
from the study of ethnomethodology is the most interesting and fruitful way to 
proceed (in this context). Chapters five and six report studies of a computing 
advisory centre showing 1, the range of accounting procedures which occur as 
part of the business-at-hand in these sessions, 2, how speakers' utterances, can 
change within a single conversation. Chapter six looks at the integration of 
non-vocal behaviour and by considering data on this argues that the idea of 
normativity, rather than a quasi-grammatical notion, is the appropriate level of 
explanation for the regularities which we find in human interaction. 
In moving away from beliefs as the object of analysis I could be accused of 
taking an anti-cognitive stance. Chapter seven explores cognitive versus 
interactional perspectives in communication. 
Chapter eight reflects on the approach which I have adopted and suggests how 
inspite, indeed through, its focus on situational' events ý an account of the 
capacities drawn on in offering explanations can itself illuminate phenomena 
seen as beyond its grasp. 
In carrying out the research discussed here I have incurred debts to many 
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INTRODUCTION: SPOKEN EXPLANATIONS 
1.0 Outline 
This work has been motivated by an interest in communication and interaction. 
I am fascinated by the commonplace human capacity to make sense of new 
situations, to produce and communicate explanations. Here my focus is on 
explanations which occur in talk. I have used the term "discourse" in preference 
to "conversation" because despite the currency of this as a general term for 
stretches of people talking to each other, I feel that outside sociological work 
the term connotes a specifically casual kind of interaction. "Discourse" on the 
other hand, has the disadvantage, for me here, of covering spoken and-written 
stretches of language -I restrict myself to spoken discourse. The term does 
have connotations of argument (in the sense of reasoning), as comes out in the 
adjective "discursive". This is convivial, since as I hope to show, it is the 
rational basis of talk which makes communication, and analysis of it, possible. 
I shall not attempt to defend explanation as a, research topic in its own right 
and I shall not be concerned with developing a typology of explanations 
(blamings, excuses, defences, warrants and so on). 
An explanation, if it is successful, makes something plain. In the case of 
someone explaining something to another this implies both the presence and 
absence of intersubjectivity. Absence because some party can see something 
another can't, or at least thinks they can. Explanations deserve attention 
because in them a speaker attempts to lead a recipient to see something in a 
certain way. To accomplish this a speaker must have command of a capacity 
which is as specific in its operation as it is difficult to describe. Ethno- 
methodologists gloss it as "practical reasoning". An emphasis on practical, 
situated reasoning is the hallmark of a variety of approaches to the problem of 
social order in sociology and anthropology. Studying the social. structure of 
conversation and studying speech patterns in relation to social relations make up 
part of an identifiable set of research interests. These approaches, together with 
others concerned with, studying the meaning that people assign to the objects and 
events in their worlds, have been glossed as "micro-sociologies". Such work 
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shows a concern with human behaviour as a situated phenomenon. In chapter 
one I review such approaches, trying to show how they differ from each other 
and from social psychology. The idea of "rule following" occurs as a controver- 
sial topic in these accounts. I try to distinguish the different ways in which this 
idea has been invoked and the sense that can be made of its application to the 
analysis of social behaviour. 
Part of the business of chapter one is to introduce the Leeds Attributional 
Coding System (LACS) (a way of describing causal explanations) and attribution 
theory in general. This was the starting point for the research discussed here. 
In keeping with the dominant tradition in psychology, and in social psychology 
in particular, attribution theory has been explored overwhelmingly through 
experimental procedures. I draw a sharp distinction within empirical work 
between observational and experimental research. By empirical work I mean 
research based on experience, as opposed to theoretical or conceptual work. 
An experiment is a procedure whereby a situation is contrived where things are 
played about with so that the effects of different things can be distinguished. 
Observational research lacks the element of manipulation. The LACS was 
designed specifically to research causal beliefs in naturally occurring discourse 
and to this end used some of the concepts developed in attribution theory 
independently of some of the models which have been proposed. In fact there 
is a tradition of using such concepts in clinical psychology from which the LACS 
takes its lead. The significant difference is that the LACS takes naturally 
occurring discourse as its subject matter. 
The rationale for the LACS and the research based on it here at Leeds is that 
causal beliefs are manifestly an important topic but that research based on them 
in the clinical area has generally been carried out by indirect means, that is by 
questionnaire, and has been carried out on undergraduate students. An interest 
in naturally occurring discourse is a natural development of a preoccupation 
with the beliefs that caregivers, parents and family members have about each 
other, particularly in cases of distress and sexual and physical abuse, -especially 
given that these issues are discussed in therapy sessions. I have deliberately 
presented the LACS in the context of approaches to exploring how people make 
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sense of the world, rather than via a discussion of attribution theory itself or the 
psychology of the family. 
The thesis contains two pairs of chapters reporting empirical work. The first 
pair of these asks simple questions in relation to causal explanations. The three 
studies in chapter two ask whether or not there are attributional styles. Chapter 
three looks at an issue in the methodology used in chapter three: what is it for 
an utterance to be an expression of a causal belief? Both these chapters start 
with introductions which are quite lengthy discussions in `their' own right on 
attributional style and on the cause-reason distinction. Although there is an 
argument for separating out the conceptual and empirical business I have 
presented the two in tandem for two reasons. Firstly this is the way I like to 
work. In each of these chapters the empirical and conceptual work belong 
closely together; each chapter addresses a fairly self contained problem. 
The situated nature of explanations has, so far, not been discussed. One 
objection to the kind of research carried out through an instrument such as the 
LACS is that what people are saying might be affected, or somehow distorted 
by the pressures of the situation. Far from seeing this as a problem I see it as 
something of great interest. Chapter four picks up the issue of how spoken 
discourse itself can be analysed. For my purposes the approach generally known 
as conversation analysis is adopted. It should be pointed out that this approach 
is hardly a methodology, in the sense of a body of methods: it is an orientation 
not a set of procedures. I introduce the idea of a communicative constraint as 
the most general term to describe the sense in which an utterance is tied to its 
context, drawing together various ways in which different writers have used the 
idea of "constraints". 
Chapters five and six study communication conduct in computer advisory 
sessions. Drawing on the conversational analytic literature and on the transcrip- 
tion method developed in it I study talk in these sessions. I show how explana- 
tions of the user's problem and of the advisor's answer are collaborative 
endeavours, how speakers change the expressions that they use, and how account 
elements crop up as part of the business of the session. It is a commonplace 
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that nonverbal behaviours are an important aspect of communication conduct. 
In chapter six I note some body movement and gaze phenomena. This is a 
departure from the topic of explanations but findings are reported because they 
demonstrate the sense in which participants' activity can be described in terms 
of norms and resist a quasi-grammatical account. 
Explanations have commanded the attention of a number of researchers. 
Austin's (1961) philosophical analysis of excuses should be noted as an attempt 
to grasp the logic of excusing. Scott and Lyman (1968) look at explanations of 
untoward behaviour. There has also been interest within social psychological 
work on causal beliefs in particularly in Antaki's work. Antaki (1988) contains 
a dozen approaches to looking at explanations in a number of senses. 
Amongst these is a paper in the tradition of conversation analysis by Heritage. 
Several pieces of work in this tradition have related to explanation, for example, 
Pollner (1979) "Explicative transaction: making and managing meaning in traffic 
court", Twer (1972) "Tactics for determining person's resources for depicting, 
contriving and describing behavioral episodes", Pomerantz (1978b) "attributions 
of responsibility blamings". 
The closing chapters address problems and issues that seem to me to be of 
special interest. I want to close this introduction with some preliminary remarks 
explaining some of the relevant terminology. 
2.0 Conventional distinctions in analysing language in use 
2.1 Utterances and inscriptions 
There are clearly important and obvious similarities between the analysis of 
stretches of written language and of spoken language. At the same time there 
are equally clear and important differences. At one level, the analysis of 
utterances becomes the analysis of texts as it is transcribed material that is 
studied. Wetherell (1986) and Parker (1988) are examples of the value of a 
literary critical approach to social psychological issues. Mulkay (1985) has 
suggested ways in which ideas from the analysis of conversation can be related 
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to textually mediated communication, such as letter writing. As I briefly 
mention in chapter eight, Freud suggested a theory of interpretation which 
although primarily drawn on in analysing talk in the psychoanalytic situation, 
claims application to a variety of artifacts and behaviours, such as dream reports 
and parapraxes. Here I shall restrict myself to approaches developed primarily 
with an interest in analysing talk. 
2.2 "discourse analysis" 
The history of this term could itself be the subject of an interesting study of the 
emergence of standards amongst groups of researchers. I have already discussed 
my use of the term "discourse", and I use "discourse analysis" to mean the 
analysis of that phenomenon in general. This is the line taken by van Dijk in 
the title of his Handbook of Discourse Analysis. Potter and Wetherell (1987), 
remark that it is possible to find two books on discourse analysis with no 
overlapping content. They follow Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) in representing 
discourse analysis as something delimited, and in practice meaning something 
quite narrow. As far as I know the term was originally used by Zellig Harris: 
One can approach discourse analysis from two types of problem, 
which turn out to be related. The first is the problem of continu- 
ing descriptive linguistics beyond the limits of a single sentence at 
a time. The other is the question of correlating 'culture' and 
language (ie non-linguistic and linguistic behavior). (1959, p. 1) 
Harris's parenthetical gloss of the second problem seems to be a third issue, in 
any case, Harris had very little to say on non-linguistic behaviour or on culture, 
and most discussions (for example Taylor and Cameron, 1987) omit that Harris 
had an ambition apart from the extra-sentential one. As Taylor and Cameron 
show, a version of the application of linguistics to speech beyond the level of the 
sentence remains the intellectual motivation of several of the accounts of 
conversation that we will consider. But it is generative linguistics, and the 
model that instances of language are generated by rules, that such analysts turn 
to. 
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2.3 Pragmatics 
Although this term has a much older history it is convenient to raise Charles 
Morris's use of it. In defining "semiotics" as the study of sign systems, which is 
more comprehensive still than even the broadest sense of "discourse analysis" 
(since it would include non-human communication as well as pictorial 
communication) Morris (1938) suggested a three fold distinction, syntactics (or 
more usually syntax) semantics and pragmatics. Whilst syntax would study the 
relationships between signs and semantics the relationships between the, signs 
and the things that they apply to pragmatics took as its concern "the relations 
of signs to interpreters". Although Morris later modified this definition to relate 
to "the origins, uses and effects of signs" (Morris, 1946), Carnap's use of the 
earlier position promoted the idea of pragmatics as the study of language with 
explicit reference to its users (Carnap, 1942). 
In most English language texts pragmatics thereby assumes a fairly narrow, 
though not necessarily precise meaning, namely, the study of utterance 
interpretation. In this sense, speech act theory, with its conceptual analysis of 
what conditions need be met for a certain utterance to be successful, and by 
extension, what is implied by the performance of such an utterance, is a 
paradigm pragmatic line of enquiry. Although as Searle, Kiefer and Bierwisch 
(1980) point out, the leading theorists in the field, Austin, Grice and Searle 
himself do not use the term. In a tradition associated with Wittgenstein the 
meaning of some expression is analysed in terms of its use, thus eroding the 
distinction between pragmatics and semantics. For Searle the illocutionary force 
of an utterance is part of its meaning, a pragmatic component cannot be 
separated out from one of literal meaning, so there is no autonomous concern 
for the label "pragmatics" to attach to. 
Generally, however, pragmatics has a vague meaning, inevitably perhaps since 
however broad the spectrum of human activity language reflects it. As Levinson 
(1983) notes in the introductory chapter of his classic book, this breadth is 
drawn on in the communication theories of psychopathology emblematically 
represented by Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1967), The pragmatics of 
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human communication. In looking at spoken explanations I shall, of course, be 
concerned with the use and effects of signs. I shall leave the issue of how 
discourse itself may be analysed until chapter four, where I will pick up 
discussion of Searle's work. First I want to look at some of the ways in which 
discourse has struck certain social scientist as a research topic. I will then focus 
on one way in which explanations have been conceptualised and researched. 
Given the ubiquity of speech as concern it is not surprising that there are many 
different approaches to the analysis of it. I don't feel that any overview of the 
whole field is helpful. Taylor and Cameron, who present their study of the field 
as the first critical one achieve economy and cohesion by showing that 
the six approaches that they consider all invoke the same fundamental idea of 
conversational units organised by rules. I think that their insightful and bold 
discussion places great strain of the notion of a rule. I do however agree that 
the search for units in talk is riddled with insurmountable problems. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE STUDY OF DISCOURSE AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
A number of disciplines in the social sciences have made day-to-day things and 
processes of social life their principle interest. This has, perhaps inevitably, 
involved -a significant orientation to considering the medium through which 
meaning is expressed: language. Particularly, stretches of language use - 
discourse - has been a research topic of fundamental importance. Reviewing 
such approaches I find a number of ideas which have occurred elsewhere in the 
study of language, for example, the idea of rule-following is thematic. Diversity 
in methods and theory are also to be found. I attempt to apply issues emerging 
from a discussion of these approaches, their formulations of human 
understanding, the construction of a social reality, to inform non-experimental 
research in the social psychology of explanations. 
1.0 Introduction 
Since using language is an important human activity it would be surprising if a 
lot of effort in the humanities and the social sciences had not been given up to 
exploring, describing, puzzling over and studying it. Looking at these disciplines 
today, there seem to me to be three themes which characterise their orientation 
to language: language as a topic of study; language as a resource -an index to 
something else; and language, or the fruits of other studies of language, as a 
model for understanding some area of human experience. As examples of these, 
I have in mind, respectively, such diverse things as: Chomsky's work on syntax; 
anthropological studies of family organization through the study of kinship terms; 
and Levi-Strauss's approach to anthropology inspired by de Saussure's structural- 
ist linguistics. 
A mixture of these themes can be found in the approaches to exploring the 
meaning which people attach to the phenomena that they encounter. Knorr- 
Cetina (1981) lists a number of approaches to studying what she calls the 
"micro-processes" of social life. By this she means issues such as: 1, face-to- 
face interaction; 2, everyday routines and classifications; 3, strips of conversations 
and 4, definitions of self and situations. Since these phenomena which these 
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refer are, I guess, for most members of society the processes of social life the 
"micro" prefix requires explanation. Of course it is in contrast to the traditional 
business of sociology, analysing and explaining at the level of aggregate action, 
that these phenomena are "micro" ones. The approaches, together with the 
representative texts offered by Knorr-Cetina, are: 
symbolic interactionism: Blumer (1969), with a book of that title; 
cognitive sociology: Cicourel (1973), with a book of that title; 
ethnomethodology: Garfinkel (1967), Studies in ethnomethodology; 
social phenomenology: Berger and Luckmann (1967), The social construction of 
realit ; 
ethogenics: Harre and Secord (1972), The explanation of social behaviour; 
the ethnography of speaking: Hymes (1974), Foundations in sociolinguistics: an 
ethnographic approach; 
and ethnoscience: Sturtevant (1964), "Studies in Ethnoscience". 
Knorr-Cetina refers to these approaches as "micro-sociologies". A convenient 
label, but one that I have reservations about. Firstly, the term rather begs the 
question that sociology has a certain subject matter, of which these are 
specialisations. This has been resisted by students of ethnomethodology 
(Sharrock and Atkinson, 1986, p. 118). Secondly, the term masks the difference 
between these approaches. Furthermore the approaches are on different 
footings. Whilst "ethogenics", "ethnoscience" and "the ethnography of speaking" 
present themselves as new ways of doing research, symbolic interactionism and 
particularly, social phenomenology attempt theoretical formulations of basic 
features of social life. For this reason I shall not say much about these 
approaches. Ethnomethodology draws on ideas from social phenomenology or 
more generally, phenomenological sociology, and I will not discuss this approach 
independently. To be sure, Knorr-Cetina is doubtless aware of all this, and 
indeed what these research endeavours arguably do have in common is that they 
can be construed as positions which are as antagonistic to methodological 
collectivism as they are to methodological individualism. 
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Methodological individualism holds that the elements of a social theory should 
be the beliefs and desires of individuals that make up society. Against this, 
methodological collectivism appeals to aggregate phenomena for its level of 
explanation. In fact Durkheim was keen to develop an autonomous area for 
sociology as a new science to operate at this level. His study of suicide is a 
classic piece of work in this tradition. The "micro-sociologies" are antagonistic 
to both positions in so far as they stress situated interactions as places of prime 
importance: not isolated individuals nor survey data (at a distance from the time 
and place and procedures where it was collected) but individuals in interaction. 
Ethnomethodologists, who to anticipate my discussion are the most theoretically 
refined, have been quick to point out how their work differs from other 
approaches to "the sociology of everyday life". (I have reservations about the 
term "everyday life" partly because the data which I'll consider in chapters two, 
three, five and six, wouldn't be considered "everyday" by most people. Moreover, 
the term appears to be question begging: what is everyday life? For whom and 
when? ) Thus Heritage (1984), in his study of Garfinkel and ethnomethodology, 
(p. 2-3), views the fact that Studies in ethnomethodology appeared at a time 
when dissatisfaction with structural sociology was commonplace meant that the 
theoretically distinctive character of the work was lost. Certainly, though these 
approaches are all fundamentally concerned with 'meaning. I think the 
differences between them are highly informative and that they merit analysis. 
Unlike Knorr-Cetina I am not concerned here with the relationship between 
these approaches and what she calls macro-sociology, but more on this in 
chapter eight. 
In this chapter I propose to 1, discuss some ideas, drawn from linguistic and 
philosophical work on language, which are important themes in the work which 
I shall be examining; 2, develop an account of the approaches which Knorr- 
Cetina calls "microsociologies" in order to 3, contrast their orientation to 
language with a dominant social psychological approach to people's 
understanding of everyday phenomena. 
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2.0 Ideas about language as a source for ideas about human action,, 
I want to start with a consideration of some important conceptual ideas derived 
from consideration of language; the "etic-emic" distinction and the concept of a 
rule. 
2.1 The "etic" - "emic" distinction 
A convenient distinction which occurs in the literature on studying ways of 
understanding, and in the analysis of conversation (see Chapter 4 below) is the 
emic - etic distinction drawn by Pike (1964) to refer to two standpoints for 
describing behaviour. An emic approach is one that studies behaviour within the 
"system", as Pike calls it, under study. The etic viewpoint studies behaviour. "as 
from outside of a particular system, and as an essential initial approach to an 
alien system. " (p. 37). The origin of the terms is in the suffixes of the two 
approaches in phonology, the study of the sounds in a language, namely 
phonetics and phonemics. Whereas the study of phonemes is the study of 
significant sounds in a given language, phonetics is the study of all speech 
sounds prior to their interpretation in a system. The idea here is something like 
this: Due to physiological constraints on the human vocal apparatus all possible 
speech sounds can be described and identified by a phonologist. This yields 
an, in principle, exhaustive scheme onto which the limited range of speech 
sounds contingently occurring in a natural language can be mapped. 
2.2 Chomsky and Wittgenstein on Rules } 
The idea that language, behaviour, and even emotions , are in some sense rule 
governed, or involve the use of rules, or can be explained or described in terms 
of rules is a pervasive one. It is an idea that requires careful understanding. 
The hegemony of the rule idea is undoubtedly attributable to two hugely 
influential books: Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and Chomsky's. 
Syntactic Structures. These two writers, however, use the term in different 
senses. 
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Chomsky's problem is to explain how a speaker of a language knows whether 
or not an expression is grammatically well-formed. The problem clearly cannot 
be answered by any notion of recognising a grammatical sentence from a finite 
stock because there are uncountably many possible sentences. Chomsky's 
solution is to show that a finite set of rules can generate a variety of grammatic- 
al forms. 
In what sense do speakers know these rules? Well clearly they can't articulate 
them - describing them was an immense intellectual endeavour that had to await 
Chomsky. The point is rather that these rules are a model of -how speakers do 
what they do. The situation is analogous to the relationship between a theory 
of distance-perception based on the angle subtended on the retina of the eyes 
and road crossing. Modelling distance judgement in this way might lead us to 
talk of pedestrians, or their brains, carrying out trigonometric calculations, but 
we would distinguish this from the formal ability to cope with trigonometric 
problems in a school mathematics lesson. In fact it is worth remarking that a 
whole discipline, psycholinguistics, developed taking as its rationale the 
exploration of the psychological reality of Chomsky's grammar. 
We may talk of such rules as licensing certain configurations of words. In an 
analogous way the rules of chess permit certain, but not any, configurations of 
pieces on the board. 
Wittgenstein's idea of following a rule is related in so far as a person said to 
be following a rule in his sense, as in Chomsky's sense, would be unable to state 
what the rule was. Moreover, the rules in question may not be stateable at all, 
and whereas the proof of the pudding for Chomsky is in stating the rules in 
question this is in no way Wittgenstein's ambition. It is important to emphasise 
this because some approaches (eg Harre's ethogenics) which have their origin 
in the idea that social life is rule governed seek to uncover and state such rules. 
What then is the point of a rule in Wittgenstein's analysis? A deep concern 
of the Philosophical Investigations is with what it is for words to have meanings. 
As is well known Wittgenstein sets up the idea that we can consider the use to 
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which words are put by speakers and that we do not need to appeal to any kind 
of mental phenomena in doing this. To get a purchase on how words can have 
a meaning in this sense Wittgenstein suggests that we consider language as 
analogous to a game. Within a game actions, movements, noises and sundry 
goings-on have an importance which is closely bound up with the systemic nature 
of that game. Certain things are integral to a game and outside that game 
could be meaningless or mean something else altogether. This analogy, between 
a language and game, is explored through the development of the idea of a 
language game. In connection with a game it is pertinent, indeed fundamental, 
to think of the significance of moves in terms of the rules of the game and to 
say that a competent player has mastered the rules. Wittgenstein presses the 
analogy: in a language too, let us consider the significance of words, that is their 
meaning, as being connected with rules. Wittgenstein interrogates this idea with 
immense subtlety. What I think is important for our purpose is the following. 
The rules are followed blindly. We do not know the rules in the sense that we 
cannot articulate them. We simply (simply! ) have the capacity to grasp the 
meaning of words, definitions are not exhaustive. If the rules were not followed 
blindly we would need other rules to interpret them. 
2.2.1 Regulative and constitutive rules 
Another important distinction to be drawn in connection with the concept of a 
rule is the distinction between constitutive rules and regulative 'rules. Searle 
emphasises the distinction in connection with speech acts (Searle, 1969, p. ' 33- 
42). To anticipate a more detailed discussion below, (see chapter 4) in uttering 
something a speaker performs a speech act: If I say "I promise I'll come 
tomorrow" then over and above saying it, through saying it I bring something 
about: I place myself under an obligation. Searle wants to analyse such an 
utterance by pointing to the things which need to be the case for it to be a 
satisfactory promise. For it to be a promise certain conditions need to be 
satisfied. Searle wants to call such conditions rules and to say that fulfilling 
such rules makes up, or constitutes, promising. He calls such rules constitutive 
rules. 
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Rules in this sense are to be contrasted with the more familiar sense of rules 
in the sense of do's and dont's that constitute rule books. Searle calls these 
regulative rules. 
2.2.2 Controversy about rules 
The principal controversy about rules which I want to identify is the idea that 
when something is appealed to as rule governed there exists a fixed rule which 
is brought into play. Clearly this is what happens when, literally, during a game 
a disagreement arises about play and the rules of the game are consulted. 
However, reflection on for example, the legal process shows how difficult it 
would be to legislate on every possible eventuality. 
Inspired by the position in the philosophy of mathematics from which it takes 
its name, some sociologists refer to the limited nature of rules as "finitism": 
... proper usage 
is developed step by step, in processes involving 
successions of on-the-spot judgements. Every instance of use, or 
of proper use of a concept must in the last analysis be accounted 
for separately, by reference to specific, local, contingent deter- 
minants. (Barnes, 1982, p. 30) 
Taylor and Cameron (1987) offer a sustained attack on the idea that we can 
appeal to rules in explaining the structure of conversation. But they do not 
appear to have grasped the finitist sense of rules which is adopted by, for 
example, Garfinkel. A thoroughgoing Garfinkelian position on rules would be 
to hold that rules only enter into an ethnomethodological study in so far as 
members invoke them in making sense of their world. Unlike Harre and 
Secord, rules are not assumed to underlie what members do.., The professional 
stance of the student of ethnomethodology is a scepticism about how the world 
is experienced as orderly and events as reportable. 
In offering an example of the confusion over the idea of rule following Taylor 
and Cameron do little to help matters with their choice of Goffman as an 
example. 
Goffman says enthusiastically of Garfinkel, for instance, that he 
... extended the argument by going on to look for rules which, when followed, allow us to generate a world of a given kind. To 
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uncover the informing, constitutive rules of everyday life would be 
to perform the sociologist's alchemy (Goffman, 1974, p. 5). 
On one level, what a confusion like this demonstrates is the 
confusion and eclecticism in social scientists' responses: 'constitutive 
rules' are a concept familiar from speech act theory, rule following 
is a Wittgensteinian concept, foreign to generative linguistics. But 
there is a clear general approval for some kind of rule-based 
model, and that approval frequently finds support from the specific 
example of generative grammar. (4) 
lt is not at all clear to me that Goffman has speech act theory in mind when 
he talks of constitutive rules. Although Searle uses this idea and although 
Cameron and Taylor may be familiar with the concept through this source, I do 
not see that speech act theory has a monopoly on the idea. Secondly whilst I 
agree that the Wittgensteinian concept of rule following is foreign to generative 
linguistics I do not see that this remark has any relevance in connection with the 
bit quoted from Goffman. Is the- warrant for this that Goffman talks of rules 
which "generate a world of a given kind"? Thirdly, the quoted passage continues 
to the effect that the sociologists alchemy would be the transputation of everyday 
events into publications. Far from showing clear approval, this seems to me to 
indicate scepticism. 
Rules for turn taking -a paradox? 
Given this scepticism about rules why is it then that the seminal paper in 
conversation analysis, which Sharrock and Anderson (1986, p. 61) say many 
students of the discipline see as the most polished area of ethnomethodological 
work, is geared to describing rules for turn taking? The answer is, presumably, 
that Sacks and his colleagues did not set out with an a priori committment to 
there being rules, rather that procedures turn out to be visible in conversation, 
thus the rules are discovered in conduct, and are not projected. onto it by the 
analyst. To be sure, Sacks went into the analysis of conversation talking in 
terms of discovering the "mechanism of conversation", but this does not imply 
that he saw the project as committed to assuming that a rule based model 
underlies what speakers do. 
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3.0 Studying meaning - the "micro-sociologies" 
3.1 Symbolic interactionism 
The term is due to Blumer (1969, p. 1) although the basic ideas originate with 
Mead. In an essay entitled "Society as symbolic interaction" Blumer claims that 
none of the members of the discipline, nor Mead himself, gave a systematic 
account of the methodological consequences of symbolic interaction for the study 
of what he calls "group life". In this paper the main themes of symbolic 
interactionism, interaction mediated by symbols and Mead's analysis of the self, 
are arranged to deliver a critical account of "the conventional procedures of 
sociologists". In Blumer's expression of it, the application of symbolic interaction 
to research entails a kind of ethnography: 
For it means the need for an enriching of experience which will 
make it possible for observers to form more dependable judgment 
in those observations which give us our trouble. I don't think that 
there is any short-cut way of arriving at the formation of such 
judgements; it has to be done in the slow and tedious manner of 
developing a rich and intimate familiarity with the kind of conduct 
that is being studied and in employing whatever relevant imagina- 
tion observers may fortunately possess. 
3.2 Ethogenics 
This is the name given to a research project which holds that human social 
behaviour is the result of rules known by people and which aims at discovering 
such rules by examining people's explanations, or accounts, for their actions. 
The idea has been pursued by the U. K. based philosopher of science Rom 
Harre and has its most complete, and original, exposition in the book mentioned 
above cowritten with the American social psychologist, Paul Secord (Harre and 
Secord, 1972). The aim of this book is to claim that an analysis of accounts is 
the business of a scientifically secure approach to psychology. The book is part 
of a movement which aimed to usher in,. in its own terms, a "new paradigm" in 
the study of social behaviour. The old paradigm being positivistic, behaviouris- 
tic psychology. The idea is ingenious and seems to me to be as follows: 
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Winch (1958) argues that no social science is possible on the model of the 
physical sciences for whereas the business of these sciences is to produce laws 
based on observation of the causal phenomena giving rise to physical goings on 
no such analysis is possible in the realm of studying people for, following 
Wittgenstein, human behaviour is rule governed. However, against Winch, 
describing those very rules is to give a scientifically adequate account of the 
behaviour under examination. Furthermore, since the rules in question are 
known by people we can ask them why they did it, and we thereby have a 
scientific explanation. 
The term "ethogenics" itself refers to the generation of behaviour. The unit of 
the ethogenist's analysis is the rule and the methodology is the analysis of 
participant's accounts. A large part of the endeavour of The explanation of 
social behaviour is in attempting to secure the position that Harre and Secord 
want to adopt. The ideas behind ethogenics, rather than how the research is to 
be done is the business of the book. A classic study aiming to follow the 
ethogenic approach was carried out by Marsh, Rosser and Harre (1978) on 
football violence. The aim of the study is, of course, to describe the rule 
governed nature of fans' activities. They argue, against the "the moral outrage" 
which describes fans' behaviour as anarchic, like animals or savages, that it is 
actually highly organised. They do this by researching the constitutive rules of 
the fans' behaviour. 
In discussing this study Potter and Wetherell (1987, chap. 3) point to what they 
call "damaging inconsistencies" in the way discourse is handled. They point out 
that fans' accounts are treated as genuine but that newspaper reports are treated 
as rhetoric. The point is that what we actually have here are two competing 
accounts. 
Potter and Wetherell point out that ethogenics is unable to discriminate real 
rules from bogus ones, it cannot deal with the inconsistencies which occur in 
accounts. They go on to show that the variability in accounts reveals something 
of great importance - rules are negotiated. The business of the discourse analyst, 
Potter and Wetherell suggest, is to focus on this very process. 
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What this discussion masks is the principled objection to rule following as an 
explanatory resource. My problem is with the very idea that this can be 
possible. Potter and Wetherell do not address the cogency of the rule idea, for 
them it is meaningful to talk of rules, but then their data are very different: 
They are not in the business of inferring rules from accounts because the 
accounts actually contain rule descriptions. 
What Potter and Wetherell go on to look at are the very -inconsistencies in 
scientists discourse about rules. A point that they don't comment on is that in 
this discourse the accounts are rule-accounts: the scientists are debating the 
procedures which they see as being constitutive of science, to give one of the 
fragments that they provide (p. 66): 
[A] means of testing your explanation -[] of course that is the 
absolute, cardinal feature of scientific work, scientific explanations. 
And that's not just pointing to something that you say is important. 
It has the following critical value: it allows us to make progress; 
we can discard theories which have proved useless. 
So in this criticism the rule-idea itself goes unchallenged. Rules here emerged 
in what I earlier called the Garfinkelian position: the mandate for talking about 
rules is that members do. 
I consider the ethogenic rule-based account to be fundamentally defective. 
Although Wittgenstein does introduce the idea of rule following in his account 
for reasons that I have given he offers nothing to suggest that people can 
articulate the rules that he considers them to be following. Indeed it is clear 
that he thinks that this is not possible, see my discussion of finitism. 
The works of Garfinkel (see "ethnomethodology" below) and Gumperz (see 
"ethnography of speaking") contain imminent criticisms of this appeal to the 
place of the everyday capacity to offer accounts. 
The member of the society uses background expectancies as a 
scheme of interpretation. With their use actual appearances are 
for him recognizable and intelligible as the appearances-of- 
familiar-events. Demonstrably he is responsive to this background, 
while at the same time he is at a loss to tell us specifically of 
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what the expectancies consist. When we ask him about them he 
has little or nothing to say. (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 37). 
If asked, participants could probably supply evaluations such as are 
cited in sociolinguistic surveys, but this does not mean that 
speakers rely of such verbalizations in conversation. As we have 
pointed out, member's situated interpretations take the forms of 
judgement of intent. All such interpretations presuppose shared 
social knowledge yet this knowledge is not usually overtly verbal- 
ized. Rather it serves as the input for judgements of what the 
speakers want to achieve. What at the level of survey analysis 
appear as distributional fact here take the form of typified 
characteristics of signalling process. It is the fact that it implicitly 
relies on the everyday knowledge which is acquired through 
common tradition and shared communicative experience that 
makes it of interest for the study of social symbolism. (Gumperz, 
1982a, p. 36) 
(On the theme of survey data versus member's situated reasoning compare with 
the discussion of Cicourel below. ) 
Ethogenics starts from an unwarranted assumption about how people behave, an 
assumption about which there must be considerable doubt. 
3.3 Ethnoscience 
Sturtevant uses "ethnoscience" as a name for a new approach to ethnography. 
He tells us that the "ethno" prefix here is not meant to imply that ethnoscience 
is another branch of ethnography: "The prefix is to be understood here in a 
special sense: it refers to the system of knowledge and cognition typical of a 
given culture. " (p. 99) Of course grasping the viewpoint of the 'people being 
studied is the traditional goal of ethnography but the proposal-that culture can 
be thought of as a conceptual system is novel, Sturtevant tells us. This, together 
with an attempt to improve the ethnographic method, are put forward as the 
distinctive features of ethnoscience. 
Sturtevant offers six principles of this method. Firstly, the emic etic distinction, 
discussed above is invoked. He introduces the idea of looking at classification 
systems in different cultures, and points out that we can't expect the same 
distinctions to be drawn in different cultures. Secondly with respect to what he 
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calls "domains" ethnoscience takes a more radical stance than earlier ethno- 
graphy. "Domain" refers to some category such as "kinship" or "colour". The 
assumption that there are universal domains is resisted by ethnoscience. 
Presumably the point is that one prestructures what is going on in a community 
if one arrives at it with a priori categories. Thirdly, terminological systems is 
the issue on which students of ethnoscience have concentrated. He quotes 
Frake: 
The analysis of a culture's terminological systems will not, of 
course exhaustively reveal the cognitive world of its members, but 
it will certainly tap a central portion of it. Culturally significant 
cognitive features must be communicable between persons in one 
of the standard symbolic systems of the culture. A major share of 
these features will undoubtedly be codable in a society's most 
flexible and productive communication device, its language. 
Some of the ideas used are explicitly drawn from linguistics. Under the heading 
of "paradigms and componential analysis" Sturtevant discusses the idea of 
"contrast set". "This is a class of mutually exclusive segregates which occur in 
the same culturally relevant environment (setting, context, substitution frame, 
surroundings, situation, etc. ). " (p. 107) 
So, taking examples from English speaking culture, ` "apple" and "sky" do not form 
a contrast set, but "apple" and "orange" do. These elements are called 
"segregates". The term "paradigm" (or "paradigmatic set", the two terms appear 
to be used interchangeably) is applied to a set of segregates which it is 
meaningful to lump together, thus "apple" and "orange" can be classified as 
"fruit". A contrast set` is a 'paradigm, although not all paradigms' are contrast 
sets. Presumably this is because a paradigm might not exhaust all the relevant 
distinctions. 
"Componential analysis" is the study of the ways in which the elements in a 
paradigm differ. The defining features of the segregates are referred to as 
"dimensions of contrast" or "criterial attributes". The goal of a componential 
analysis is then to find out what features differentiate the segregates and to then 
see what components of these features are present or absent in a" given 
segregate. Sturtevant points out that any classification system can be treated in 
this way. What is distinctive about an ethnoscientific application is that the 
a 
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paradigm under analysis is a contrast set and that the analysis reflects 
discriminations meaningful to the members. of the community being studied. 
Fifthly, another classification of interest is the taxonomy. A taxonomy is one 
way in which segregates may be related to each other. A taxonomy is conceived 
of here as a hierarchical structure with segregates appearing at one level only. 
Sturtevant remarks that a given level of a taxonomy is formed from a contrast 
set (presumably in the case of a branching hierarchy a contrast set would make 
up one level of a given branch) and that this may be subjected to componential 
analysis. 
How are these idea to be applied? Sturtevant discusses discovery procedures 
as his sixth principle. He remarks: 
If an ethnography is to reflect the cognitive system of the bearers 
of a culture, the validity of the description depends, on the 
discovery procedures. Hypotheses must be checked in the field 
situation, and revised if they turn out not to fit the data. 
Thus analysis of previously recorded data is avoided. An appeal is made instead 
to procedures of questioning. The model envisaged is very. much that of the 
idea of working with an informant so conversation is appealed to as a medium 
of communication with the community but also as data itself in so far as the 
ethnoscientist watches what goes on in spontaneous speech episodes. 
Examples of ethnoscientific work are presented on pronominal and case 
paradigms, kinship terminologies, colour terminologies as well as taste, zoology 
and disease. Briefly, I want to consider Frake's study of disease diagnosis 
amongst the Subanun (Frake 1961), to illustrate the ideas behind ethnoscience. 
The Subanun have been studied extensively by Frake, and, because of his 
contributions to linguistic anthropology, they frequently occur in this literature. 
Frake's study of disease diagnosis took place amongst the Subanun of Mindanoa, 
an island in the southern Philippines. Frake's initial interest was in the social 
structure of this community, on which I make some remarks below, under 
"ethnography of speaking". Apparently, to take part in day to day conversations 
Frake had to investigate terminology relating to folk botany and folk medicine. 
Amongst his Subanun acquaintances Frake tells us that disease, after litigation 
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and botany, is the most common topic of conversation. (p. 114) No one has the 
formal status of being a diagnostician. The Subanun patient "... solicits the 
readily proffered advice of kin, neighbors, friends, specialists, deities, and 
ethnographers. " (p. 114) 
After a discussion of disease names, Frake turns to the issue of diagnostic 
criteria. "Given a set of contrasting disease names, the problem remains of 
determining the rules which govern the assigning of one name rather than 
another in a particular diagnostic situation. " (p. 122) He canvassed three ways 
of deriving rules: analytic, perceptual or explicit. By analytic he means the 
investigator's establishment of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions to 
decided whether or not a new instance is a member of a certain category. Such 
criteria are called "distinctive features". 
The investigator classifies his data into types of his own formulation, 
then compares "types" as though they were instances of a concept. 
From information already coded in the definitions of his "types" he 
derives the necessary and sufficient conditions of class membership. 
Frake rejects this procedure since he was not equipped to use the putative etic 
units of western medicine and in any case not enough illnesses occurred during 
his period of study for this to be practical. Furthermore, we cannot assume a 
correspondence between the categories of the two systems, a point made by 
Sturtevant. For example, even a Subanun child will distinguish buni from 
buyayag, two fungal skin infections which, as far as Frake knows, western 
medicine does not distinguish. (p. 114) 
Looking at the perceptual discriminations drawn by the Subanun is also rejected 
because 1, some disease entities, such as 'headache' are not observable and 2, 
stimulus attributes, though the overriding considerations, are not the only 
relevant features for making a diagnosis - situational factors such as the "current 
social or ecological role demands on the patient" may be important. 
Presumably, the perceptual investigative procedure, like the analytic one, is 
impractical being limited by the number 'Of diseases happening in a given time. 
Frake points to the limited exposure to different diseases amongst the Subanun 
themselves and contrasts native learning of plant names with disease categories: 
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... since no one 
individual ever personally experiences but a fraction 
of the total number of diseases he can, in fact, differentiate, the 
Subanun themselves must learn to diagnose disease through verbal 
description of their significant attributes. 
Frake therefore proposes to collect answers to the questions which the Subanun 
themselves ask when diagnosing disease. This is done by: 1, asking informants 
to describe particular diseases; 2, asking why diseases were classified in one way 
and not in another; 3, by following diagnostic discussions and 4; by having a go 
at diagnosis and receiving corrections. (p. 125) 
Frake offers a classification of diagnostic criteria based on the kinds of questions 
that elicit them: 
Pathogenic criteria produced in response to questions about the 'pathogen' 
(meksamet) producing or exacerbating the disease. Prodromal criteria are 
relevant for enquiries about a prior, distinct condition called a 'prodrome' 
(puunan en). The response to such a question is either another disease name 
or the declaration that the present disease has no prodrome, that is it is 
spontaneous. Symptomatic criteria follow enquiries about attributes of the 
disease. Apparently, judgements of severity can be influenced by obligations 
which the patient may be under. Etiological criteria are to be distinguished 
from pathogenic criteria in that the questions that are relevant to ask concern 
why the disease happened to that person. 
Despite frequent reference to the place of. diagnosis; talk about disease; and 
disease itself in the community, Frake's presentation of diagnostic criteria focuses 
on an abstract conceptual system. His account hints that the Subanun 
themselves treat their knowledge in this way. For example, if one of them 
cannot name a disease, this will be attributed to ignorance, not to there being 
no name. Thus the realm of disease is exhaustively classified. 
3.4 Cognitive sociology 
Cicourel's comments on Frake's procedure give a clear view of the direction 
which he advocates: 
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The outputs of the contrastive analysis described by Frake are 
levels of terminological contrast, and the resulting tables are cross- 
tabulated outcomes obtained by running diagnostic questions (in 
the particular examples discussed here) against a range of 
contrasting answers. Neither the elicitation strategies nor the 
terminology contrasts, however, specify procedures used by 
members of the culture or society. (Cicourel, 1973, p. 68) 
We are dealing, of course, with the ethnographer's methods, not with the 
methods used by the Subanun themselves. 
"Cognitive sociology" can hardly be viewed as an approach in the sense in which 
ethogenics and ethnoscience represent themselves as new methods. There are 
close affinities between ethnomethodology and the work discussed by Cicourel 
in his book, particularly the central place given to member's methods. In fact, 
Turner (1974) includes a section from Cicourel's study of juvenile justice (see 
below) in a reader on ethnomethodology and Garfinkel includes Cicourel in the 
preface to Studies in Ethnomethodology where he says "Over the last ten years 
a group of increasing size has been doing ethnomethodological studies as day to 
day concerns... " (Garfinkel, 1967, p. viii). In his own preface Cicourel writes: 
For the past eight years my interests have included a deep 
preoccupation with how language and meaning are constitutive of 
the way in which everyday social interaction is assembled and 
represented. 
He goes on to explain the sense in which such issues are antagonistic to 
methodological collectivism. 
Rather than use notions like role theory, I have tried to substitute 
terms like 'interactional competence' to indicate a broader idea 
that would help pinpoint the relations between cognitive processes, 
contextual emergence, and accounting vocabularies. Social 
structure remains an accountable illusion of the sociologists 
common sense knowledge unless we can reveal .a connection between the cognitive processes that contribute to the emergence 
of contextual activities, and the normative accounting schemes we 
use for claiming knowledge as laymen and researchers. 
The approach is eclectic, drawing on phenomenology, ethnomethodology, 
ethnoscience, ethnography of speaking, "cognitive anthropology" and even 
cognitive psychology. 
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Cicourel appeals to the idea of rules, but he differs markedly from the position 
adopted by Harre and Secord. He sees rules as having a negotiated quality, 
worked out in the course of an interaction. 
Discussion of normative rules in sociology also tend to be divorced 
from the interactional settings in which meanings are attributed to 
objects and events. Research instruments like questionnaires 
invariably pose hypothetical events or conditions for subjects in the 
same way as linguists propose sentences as candidates for gram- 
maticality under a system of rules; both situations are divorced 
from the negotiated interaction scenes in which social organization 
is produced. The social conditions or sentences studied are given 
an ideal-type character because they are stripped of the features 
or particulars and interpretative procedures members use to make 
general (normative, syntactic) rules creatively relevant to concrete 
settings. The production of concrete social settings is an on-going 
accomplishment of the participants. (p. 81) 
To get a better glimpse of how Cicourel's ideas inform research I want to turn 
briefly to his study of The social organisation of juvenile justice. First appearing 
in 1968 this classic study is based on several years field work in two Californian 
cities. Through getting into close contact with the people concerned with 
juvenile crime Cicourel was able to study the day-to-day workings of schools, 
courts, police and probation departments. In fact he worked for a while as an 
unpaid probation " officer. The thesis is, of course, that an account of 
delinquency should pay attention to the concrete day to day processes involved 
in dealing with juvenile crime, which, on this account are seen as constituting 
"juvenile crime" as a recognized social problem. The first empirical chapter of 
the book takes statistics rates and types of offenses and asks how these materials 
(on which conventional sociological research rests) are put together. - On the 
basis of talking to people involved in categorising the data Cicourel concludes 
that: 
The entire set of procedures for coding police and probation 
records constituted a continuous improvised set of decisions, whose 
primary purpose was to achieve practical solutions to problems 
whose outcomes or resolutions could not be decided according to 
explicit criteria based upon an explicit theoretical position vis-a- 
vis the intended meaning of the data. (p. 107) 
He goes on to say that methods such as codings and the like are not irrelevant 
but that what they miss out is the "actor's conception of the operative social 
structures and the observer's description of the actual scenes". 
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Subsequent chapters focus on how practical, routine methods produce decisions 
from concrete situations, on how social organization is depicted in conversations, 
on routine practices of law enforcement agencies, and the negotiation of 
dispositions in court hearings. 
Language is then fundamental to Cicourel's project of studying how people find 
sense and structure in their worlds and in his criticism of conventional sociology. 
His method of analysis, at least in the social organisation on juvenile justice, is 
interpretative. Apparently the possibility of tape recording conversations was 
severely limited and so meant that field notes were an important resource. 
3.5 The ethnography of speaking 
Ethnography refers to the anthropological method of research of going along and 
observing a group of people over quite a length of time, and getting to know 
why the participants in that group do what they do.. The keeping of field notes 
and the development of an understanding are the key issues. What has been 
called the "ethnography of speaking" is then the ethnographer taking a special 
interest in the talk of groups and situations observed, or the analysis of speech 
episodes through the application of, or an interest in, an understanding of how 
speech fulfils social functions. Leading names in the field are Dell Hymes and 
John Gumperz. The term itself appears to be due to Hymes. He used the 
expression "ethnography of communication" in a paper appearing in print in 
1962. He appears to use the terms interchangeably. Clearly not all communica- 
tion is spoken (for example sign language of native Australians) and arguably 
not all speech is communicative. Gumperz also uses the ' term "linguistic 
anthropology". Hymes construes the approach as an area within sociolinguistics 
(1977, p. 83). Note that the title of the book is Foundations in sociolinguistics: 
an ethnographic approach and that of , 
Gumperz and Hymes (1972) is Directions 
in sociolinguistics: the ethnography of communication. This book incidentally 
includes exemplary papers in ethnoscience (Frake) and ethnomethodology 
(Garfinkel, Sacks, Schegloff). I will say more about the ideas that have come' 
out of this approach to studying communicative behaviour' in social contexts in 
I 
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chapter four. Here I want to sketch what the approach is about and what role 
attention to language has in it. 
In his programmatic papers Hymes emphasises the need for an autonomous 
discipline oriented to looking at speech practices in communities: 
In short, "ethnography of communication" implies two characterist- 
ics that an adequate approach to the problems of language which 
engage anthropologists must have. Firstly, such an approach 
cannot simply take separate results from linguistics, psychology, 
sociology, ethnology, as given, and seek to correlate them, however 
partially useful such work is. It must call attention to the need for 
fresh kinds of data, to the need to investigate directly the use of 
language in contexts of situation so as to discern patterns proper 
to speech activity, patterns which escape separate studies of 
grammar, of personality, of religion, of kinship and the like, each 
abstracting from the patterning of speech activity as such into some 
other frame of reference. Secondly, such an approach cannot take 
linguistic form, a given code, or speech itself, as frame of 
reverence. It must take as context a community, investigating its 
communicative habits as whole, so that any given use of channel 
and code takes its place as but part of the resources upon which 
the members of the community draw. (1964, p. 2-3) 
I want to illustrate this approach with two examples, one on a specific kind of 
event occurring in the Subanun of the Philippines, the other Norway. 
In his paper "How to ask for a drink in Subanun" Frake (1964) opens with the 
suggestion that ethnography would specify what a stranger would need to know 
in order to participate appropriately in "any scene staged by the society". He 
uses the case of drinking gasi, a rice=yeast fermented beverage which he glosses 
as "beer", to illustrate that taking part in gasi drinking involves knowing more 
than how to construct a grammatical sentence. In fact he remarks that some 
speech-play situations require nonsense to be spoken! 
Frake's brief paper describes what happens at the festive occasions where gasi 
drinking happens. He says that these drinking situations divide into three 
"encounter stages" and four "discourse stages", the middle encounter stage having 
two discourse stages. In each discourse stage Frake tells us that we can talk of 
the speech acts which occur as having a specific focus and that each stage has 
a determinate function. The first encounter stage is tasting of the brew. The 
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corresponding discourse stage Frake calls "invitation-permission" where the focus 
of speech acts is the expression of roles. Here relations of authority are 
assigned to the participants. The holder of the jar designates someone to take 
the next drink. The nominee asks permission to drink of the others and in 
doing makes a choice from a range of possible forms of address. As the jar 
goes round the group drinking turns become fewer and longer with certain 
people dropping out of the round. The encounter stage moves onto "competitive 
drinking" where the participants pay attention to how much is consumed on each 
turn. Talk shifts from permission to talk about the quality of the beer. The 
amount of drinking and talking allocated to a drinker depends on the amount 
and quality of the verbal responses elicited from the others. On the basis of 
this encouragement people remain or drop out, until "the encounter is reduced 
to less that half-a-dozen persons, who can thereby intensify their interaction with 
each other and with the beer straw. " (p. 130). Discussion shifts to topics outside 
the drinking situation, often to litigation and arbitration. In these cases issues 
are decided on the basis of cogency of argument. Frake remarks that in this 
society with no "juro-political offices" not only the litigants but those wishing to 
assume legal authority have to debate effectively. 
In cases where drinking continues long enough display of verbal art becomes the 
focus of speech acts. Songs and verses are improvised and unresolved litigation 
may continue in this way. Game drinking may accompany this verbal artistry, 
'Together they help assure that the festivity will end with good feelings among 
all participants, a goal which is explicitly stated by the Subanan. " (p. 131) 
Blom and Gumperz (1972) report a study of an important linguistic 
phenomenon: code switching. According to Gumperz (1982, p. 59), 
Conversational code switching can be defined as the juxtaposition 
within the same speech exchange of passages of speech belonging 
to two different grammatical systems or subsystems. 
(Compare discussion of frames and schema in chapter 7) 
Blom and Gumperz (1972) report that in Norway two languages are officially 
recognised, Nynorsk and BokmAl, which is spoken in the north. They went to 
a community in northern Norway where in addition to BokmAl one of Norway's 
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northern dialects, Ranamal, is spoken. Their paper uses data from three 
sources: a, formal use of standard elicitation procedures, that is where 
informants are interviewed and tape recorded, b, unstructured ethnographic study 
of the community and c, the main part, of the paper, recordings of group 
discussions. During these discussions use of both codes was observed. In fact 
when sections of the recordings were played back to other residents of the 
community they thought that the speakers were from some other part of Norway, 
and when they recognised their voices, expressed disapproval. Some participants 
showed a similar reaction and offered not to switch in future sessions. Despite 
this, Blom and Gumperz report that in future sessions, the speaker would tend 
to use the standard forms when required to "validate his status as an intellec- 
tual". 
Blom and Gumperz hold that language and society cannot be taken as 
independent phenomena that can be correlated, "Behavioural regularities are no 
longer to be regarded as reflections of independently social norms; on the 
contrary, these norms are themselves seen as communicative behaviour. " (p. 432) 
On the basis of their observations they argue that setting, social situation and 
social event are ways of trying to explain the speakers' understanding of their 
behavioural environment "ih terms of an ordered set of constraints which operate 
to transform alternative lines of behaviour into particular social meanings. " (p. 
433) 
These two examples illustrate, in different ways the importance of aspects of 
discourse in speech situations. I shall discuss this further, and draw on some 
terms coined in this approach in chapter four. 
3.6 Ethnomethodology 
Ethnomethodology is an orientation originating within sociology but which, 
particularly through its approach to studying language, has had a profound 
impact on other disciplines. In chapter four I will discuss ethnomethodological 
work on conversation: - conversation analysis. Ethnomethodology goes back to 
Harold Garfinkel and his reaction to orthodox sociology, particulaý, Talcott 
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Parson's structural functionalism. The relationship between ethnomethodology 
and mainstream sociology has often been antagonistic with representatives of 
ethnomethodology claiming to have no axe to grind about mainstream 
approaches, but nevertheless implicity claiming that their approach is epis- 
temologically prior. (It would, in fact be interesting to carry out a textual 
analysis of such issues as the maintenance of disciplinary boundaries in these 
exchanges). The term comes about as a reflection on tape recordings of jurors' 
deliberations in a study that Garfinkel was taking part in. 
I was interested in the jurors' use of some kind of knowledge of 
the way in which the organized affairs of the society operated - 
knowledge that they drew on easily, - that they required of each 
other. (in Turner, 1974, p. 15) 
Inspired by the anthropological terms such as "ethnobotany" to describe folk 
knowledge of plants, Garfinkel coined the term "ethnomethodology" to refer 
to the availability to a member of common-sense knowledge of his 
society as common-sense knowledge of the 'whatever'. (p. 16), 
It seems to me to be an error to say, as some authors have, that Garfinkel sees 
the knowledge in question to be social knowledge and that his subjects were lay 
sociologists. The idea of people producing reportable accounts in the course of 
practical dealings with one another, if you like, producing, or managing, reality 
certainly involves social know-how but it is not restricted to it. Thus ethno- 
methodology was the subject matter of Garfinkel's enquiries but the term 
generally now means doing sociology in a certain way. Of course, reflexively, 
Garfinkel's studying of ethnomethodology, of the practices of the members of 
society, is itself ethnomethodology for what could give it a special status? 
(I Take up this issue, and the charge of absolutism versus relativism in chapter 
eight. ) I am very much in favour of preserving "ethnomethodology" as. the 
student's name for the folk way of doing things since this keeps in mind that 
the student's interest is in how people make sense of their world. 
An important theme in Garfinkel work is the point that action is accountable. 
This links up the idea of members moving in an intersubjective world which is 
usually perceived as normal and understandable and within and against which 
new events are understood and appraised. Heritage refers to the way in which 
actions are treated by members as normative or morally accountable as the 
31 
"morality of cognition". The following story, reported by Liu Wu-Chi (1955, p. 
172), ' though in another guise, brings out the idea of the routine knowledge of 
moral accountability. 
To prove the existence of such an intuitive faculty, scholars of Master 
Yang-ming's school were fond of telling the following oft-repeated story 
of an unusual encounter between a burglar and a pedant. It seems that 
the latter, having caught a burglar one sultry summer night, tries to 
reform him by appealing to his intuitive knowledge of what is good and 
evil. 'I'm sure; says the scholar, 'your intuitive goodness will tell you not 
to commit further trespasses. ' But, instead of being convinced the 
burglar laughs and says mockingly, 'Please tell me sir, where is my good 
conscience? ' At that, the weather being extremely oppressive, the kindly 
scholar asks his exited visitor to take off his jacket. But still the heat 
seems to be too much for him. So the host suggests, 'Why not take off 
your pants too? ' To this the burglar protests vigorously, 'That won't be 
quite proper! ' Thereupon the scholar shouts triumphantly, 'Ah! Here 
is your intuitive goodness! ' 
How is ethnomethodology to be investigated? Garfinkel offers several ways into 
explicating the "seen but unnoticed" background of daily life. Chapter two of 
the Studies reports an assignment of ten tasks set for students where norms were 
discovered by querying or inverting what are usually taken for granted. For 
example, students were asked to behave as if they were lodgers in their own 
homes for one hour, or were asked to haggle over fixed-price goods. Chapter 
three discusses the "documentary method". This is a process which people carry 
out but which is not restricted to informal reasoning. It is the incorporation of 
events into a story which in turn conditions the interpretation of events. 
Garfinkel makes a theme of its occurrence in sociological research but not as 
a research topic. 
The method consists of treating an actual appearance as "the 
document of, " as "pointing to, " as "standing on behalf of' a 
presupposed underlying pattern. Not only is the underlying pattern 
derived from its individual documentary evidences, but the 
individual documentary evidences, in their turn, are interpreted on 
the basis of "what is known" about the underlying pattern. Each is 
used to elaborate the other. (p. 78) 
In order to "catch the work of 'fact production' in flight" Garfinkel devised an 
experiment. Ten undergraduates, told that they were taking part in an 
evaluation of a psychotherapy technique, talked via an intercom system with a 
'This was brought to my notice by Simon Bradley 
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therapist, in fact an experimenter. The students were told to describe the 
background to a problem'and then ask a yes/no question. After the "therapists" 
response, which was a random "my answer is yes" or "my answer is no" subjects 
were told to disconnect the line out to the counsellor whilst they made remarks 
on the answer. The entire exchange was tape recorded. Garfinkel reproduces 
transcripts of two exchanges and goes on to list a string of findings. The 
fundamental point, it seems to me, is that the students heard the counsellor's 
answers as answers to their questions, answers which, despite being random, the 
students had no trouble incorporating into their account. 
Another chapter of the book is a case study of a young person requesting a sex- 
change. Garfinkel sees "Agnes" as a practical expert in everyday social affairs, 
since, despite her biological sex she has learned how to "pass" as a woman., 
It will be noted that language is the medium through which the objects of these 
studies occur, though clearly physical appearance is a domain of which Agnes 
has explicitly gained command. In chapter four I will continue discussion of 
ethnomethodology through a consideration of conversation analysis. 
3.7 Concluding observations on "micro-sociology" 
In ethogenics we found a position with a clearly articulated rationale for its 
approach and for the research it recommends. I showed that there are 
conceptual problems with the formulation of human behaviour as rule-governed 
and particularly with the idea that people consciously know the rules, and that 
an analyst can grasp them. Symbolic interactionism does not propose a 
methodology, but instead argues for a kind of non-participant observation which 
it is able to ground in terms of its own account of understanding. Anthropologi- 
cal approaches to ethnography considered here were ethnoscience and the 
ethnography of speaking. These both take an interestingly divergent approach 
to language. For ethnoscience the goal is a description of the community's 
conceptual apparatus and language is the medium for its discovery. A problem 
with this approach is that despite its strict avowal of an "emic" approach it 
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seems to me to project a categorial framework onto a community's knowledge. 
Furthermore we know enough from the ethnography of speaking to be aware 
that what people say changes in different instances and as Cicourel pointed out, 
the result of Frake's ethnoscientific study of Subanun diagnosis does not study 
members methods. The ethnography of speaking does, I think introduce some 
valuable formulations to express what it is about and demonstrates the important 
and integral nature of aspects of speech for a community's conduct. I interpret 
ethnomethodology as the most thorough going attempt to take seriously the idea 
that people put reality together and that this process is researchable. I do 
however have some reservations about some of the claims made by students of 
ethnomethodology, but this does not affect my interest in their empirical work 
or the motivation behind it. See chapter four for a more detailed account of 
ethnomethodological work on language and for further discussion of the 
ethnography of speaking. I develop my criticism of ethnomethodology in chapter 
eight. 
4.0 Social psychological approaches to practical understanding 
In looking at how people make sense of their worlds we have, of course been 
dealing with an area that falls within the interest of social psychology, indeed 
Harre and Secord present their book as a text in social psychology. These 
authors, certainly Secord, would be classified by most psychologists as social 
psychologists. Of course Mead described his work as social psychology, although 
he is probably more familiar as a figure in sociology courses. Some authors talk 
of sociological social psychology and psychological social psychology. 
Interestingly, a prominent place for consideration of language as a fundamentally 
social phenomenon in modem psychology are the writings of Vygotsky, in 
particular a collection of pieces subsequently published as Thought and language, 
but originally published posthumously in 1934. In the same year Mead's Mind. 
pelf and society also appeared posthumously. 
A second point of contact with the approaches reviewed above is the fact that 
contemporary social psychology has roots in phenomenology. Psychology has a 
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curious relationship to phenomenology. In an article on phenomenology Gilbert 
Ryle remarked "So 'Phenomenology' only means, as it stands, the science of the 
manifestations of consciousness and might have been used -' though is not - as 
another name for psychology. " If I am not mistaken phenomenology has had its 
deepest impact on social psychology via the Gestalt psychologists in particular 
through Lewin's approach and through Heider. Indeed a dominant approach to 
social psychology, attribution theory, has its origins in Heider's work. 
4.1 attribution theory 
Heider's suggestion that psychology should take as its subject matter lay 
psychology has proved to have considerable popularity in social psychology and 
has adapted well the fashionable project of advancing a psychology of the social 
world which links up with the prestigious development of cognitive science. 
At its heart attribution theory deals with the causes that people hold for why 
things happen, indeed it is not really a theory at all but a corpus of literature 
exploring causality in various ways. Heider's suggestion is of course a vague one 
and I hope the earlier discussion of micro-sociology reveals some of the issues 
which confront an attempt to study everyday sense-making procedures, mundane 
reasoning, lay psychology or however whatever it is that people do is to be 
glossed. 
Despite his respect for everyday psychological language Heider holds that it is 
defective as a scientific account of human psychology. Here attribution theory 
would part company with most of the approaches discussed above. The most 
dramatic difference, however, is in its research methods. Attribution theory has 
been widely explored through laboratory studies. The mandate for this 
presupposes that the assigning of causes involves fundamental principles which 
can be teased out experimentally. Such a perspective side-steps studying the 
construction of explanations as a naturally occurring phenomenon. Although 
Heider's ideas have been developed in different ways getting at how explaining 
is done as a routine concern has not been the focus of attention. 
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For Stratton et al (1986,1988) attribution theory is simply a set of ways for 
describing dimensions of causes which have demonstrated their empirical interest. 
I discuss the method that they advance in the next chapter, where I offer a 
description of it, and examine the idea of "attributional style" which has enjoyed 
currency in the application of ideas from attribution theory to clinincal 
psychology. 
This project aims to capture features of explanation in terms of categories 
brought to the data by the analyst which have an independent interest for the 
analyst. The emphasis here is not on the construction of explanations. 
5.0 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have looked at some of the diverse ways in which students 'of 
the social sciences have approached language ` as ä researchable topic. 'I have 
shown the difficulty of adopting the idea of rules in order to explain social 
phenomena and how research takes a moral stance` when it project models of 
conduct onto people. In this thesis I shall be concerned with two specific 
situations, family therapy sessions and interactions in a computer advisory centre, 
I shall also draw on data from some-other sources connected with research on 
families. I want to start with 'a study of causal beliefs which, ' in contrast to the 
majority of earlier social psychological 'work on ' causal beliefs looks at causal 
statements as they occur in naturally occurring discourse. 
.., R 
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CHAPTER 2: DESCRIBING CAUSES AND THE IDEA OF EXPLANATORY 
STYLE 
This chapter uses a method of discourse analysis to illuminate a controversy in 
social and clinical psychology. The method is the Leeds -Attributional Coding 
System (Stratton et al. 1986,1988) developed by my colleagues at the Leeds 
Family Therapy and Research Centre. The controversy is whether or not people 
tend to offer explanations which show a certain kind of pattern, or "attributional 
style". The kind of explanations under consideration are causal statements. 
After an introduction to the concept of attributional style I present a detailed 
account of its relationship to the idea of personality traits and go on to show 
the contribution that a study of causal beliefs in naturally occurring discourse 
can make to the idea that people have styles in the way that they attribute 
cause. I argue that the study of causal beliefs has been arbitrarily constrained 
by the use of questionnaire methods. I develop a general model of attribution 
style which yields a set of hypotheses that I test on data taken from family 
therapy sessions and interviews with parents. I find that certain patterns do 
indeed occur and that a given person can show more than one pattern. A 
portion of the data enables me to test whether or not a style is shown across 
different situations; I do not find any evidence for this. 
1.0 Attributional style 
"I failed the exam because I'm just stupid. " 
"I failed the exam because I had an 'off day. 
It seems intuitively clear that the explanation that a person believes for why an 
unpleasant outcome happened will affect the way that they react to that 
outcome. This intuition has been-developed by social and clinical psychologists 
using a certain model of explanation giving and a behavioural model of 
responding to undesirable events. The seminal paper in this project, Abramson, 
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Seligman and Teasdale (1978), sought to rectify problems encountered by 
Seligman's learned helplessness hypothesis (Seligman 1975). "Learned 
helplessness" refers to the tendency for an organism to fail to make avoidance 
behaviour when in an unpleasant situation as a result of prior exposure to that 
situation where no improvement in the situation followed any behaviour emitted 
by the organism. The claim is that an organism can be trained to , 
be helpless. 
The learned helplessness hypothesis holds that states such as depression can be 
explained through learned helplessness. Now not only might we feel uneasy 
about the cruel animal experiments on which . the learned helplessness 
phenomenon was established, we might wonder how depression can be thought 
of in this way. For example can the general helplessness which a depressed 
person feels result from exposure to specific situations of noncontingency? 
Abramson et al (1978) respond to two problems for the learned helplessness 
hypothesis of depression. Firstly the hypothesis does not distinguish cases where 
a person faced with an aversive stimulus comes to believe that: 1, no solution 
can remove the stimulus, that is that anyone in that situation would be helpless; 
and 2, a solution is possible but that, they lack the ability to provide it. 
Secondly the hypothesis could not explain differences in the severity of 
depression and why a person exposed to noncontingent situations should 
generalise their learning to be helpless to so many situations. 
The solution to these problems was sought in attribution theory, which I 
introduced in chapter one. This is an approach in social psychology to everyday 
explanations stemming from Heider's work, for example Heider (1958), and 
developed by Jones and Davis (1965), Kelley (1967), and Weiner (1972,1974). 
Attribution theory focuses on the explanations which people hold for why things 
happen, that is the causes to which they attribute outcomes. It is clear why such 
an orientation was attractive to defenders of the learned helplessness hypothesis. 
Attribution theory provides a conceptual apparatus to describe the explanations 
that a person offers for why their actions do not ameliorate an unpleasant state 
of affairs. So with respect to the first inadequacy of the hypothesis we can 
distinguish internal and external attributions for noncontingency. With respect 
to the second inadequacy we can use the idea of a person's explanations to 
define attributions for an unpleasant state of affairs which are global or local 
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(specific) or which are stable or unstable. 
Given that some people, but not others, become depressed in the face of 
unpleasant situations it is not surprising that researchers have sought an 
explanation in terms of people's beliefs about the causes of the situations that 
they find themselves in and what they can do about it. Furthermore it is not 
surprising that the attributional reformulation model has been applied in 
describing and researching people's explanations. It is proposed that individual 
differences probably exist in attributional style. Those people who typically tend 
to attribute failure to global, stable, and internal factors should be most prone 
to general and chronic helplessness depressions with low self-esteem. By the 
reformulated hypothesis such a style predisposes depression. Does such a style 
of attributing causes actually exist? . 
This confluence of clinical and social psychological perspectives has lead to a 
great amount of research on the relationship between depression and the kinds 
of things that a person holds to be causes of negative things in their life. 
Although there is a lot of evidence that certain measures of explanation giving 
are associated with depression the literature is contradictory and whether or 
not there is a causal relationship between explanation and vulnerability to 
depression has received detailed attention (Brewin 1985). Robins has recently 
argued (Robins 1988) that studies failing to find a relationship between 
explanations and depression are statistically flawed. He claims that the tests 
used in rejecting the null hypothesis of no relationship are not powerful enough. 
Whatever the explanation for the null results the studies reviewed by Robins are 
remarkably uniform in one respect: they all use the same method for studying 
and conceptualising people's explanations - The Attributional Style Questionnaire 
(ASQ), due to Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky and Seligman 
(1982), or a variant on it. 
1.1 The Attributional Style Questionnaire 
The ASQ instructs subjects to provide explanations for twelve hypothetical 
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situations and then asks them to rate their choice of answer along the 
attributional dimensions, stable/unstable, global/specific and internal/external. 
In addition a judgement on the importance of the situation is also asked for. 
The ratings are achieved by offering definitions which subjects are asked to 
apply by ringing a number between one and seven. The situations are intended 
to represent two kinds of "goal area" achievement and affiliation, and two 
kinds of outcome; good and bad. For example (from p. 291): 
"You become very rich" (good achievement) 
"You meet a friend who compliments you on your appearance" (good affiliation) 
"You can't get all the work done that others expect of you... " (bad achievement) 
"You go out on a date and it goes badly. " (bad affiliation). 
To illustrate this and to show the definitions given here is an example from the 
questionnaire. 
YOU MEET A FRIEND WHO COMPLIMENTS YOU ON YOUR APPEARANCE. 
1) Write down the one major cause 
2) Is the cause of your friend's compliment due to something 
about you or something about the other person or circumstances? 
(Circle one number) 
Totally due 
to the other 
person or Totally due 
circumstances 1234567 to me 
3) In the future when you are with your friends, will this cause 
again be present? (Circle one number) 
Will never 
again be Will always 
present 1234567 be present 
4) Is the cause something that just affects interacting with 
friends or does it also influence other areas of your life? 
(Circle one number) 
Influences 
just this Influences 
particular all situations 
situation 1234567 in my life 
5) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all Extremely 
important 1234567 important 
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Granting that causal explanations can be thought of in terms of the dimensions 
of attribution theory there seem to me to be two major objections to the ASQ. 
Firstly, the questionnaire offers outcomes and elicits explanations. The situations 
portrayed could be meaningless for the person filling in the questionnaire. 
For example some of the situations which it presents, such as "You get a raise" 
may simply be inappropriate for some groups of people. Stratton and Swaffer 
(1988) produce evidence that non-student subjects consistently misinterpret the 
instructions. How can we be sure that the kinds of explanations offered in a 
pen and paper situation represent the kinds of explanations that a person feels 
to be true in a real situation? Perhaps they don't, maybe there is an arbitrary 
but consistent relationship between ASQ scores and symptoms of depression. 
If this is the case then the ASQ can teach us nothing about the development, 
maintenance and communication of explanatory tendencies. Secondly the ASQ 
yields information on only a very small number of the causal beliefs held by the 
person to whom it is given. If we are to be able to talk of consistencies and 
variations in an individual's ways of attributing causes we need many more 
beliefs than the twelve cases studied by the ASQ. Thirdly, the ASQ does not 
study a person's beliefs about why things happen to another person. Fourthly 
it does not study the person's beliefs about the controllability of the outcome in 
the situation, a dimension stressed by Weiner (1979) 
Might there be other ways to analyse causal beliefs? There have been various 
attempts to analyses spontaneous causal beliefs. In his critical review of the 
literature, Munton, (1985-86), refers to two attempts to establish the criterion 
validity of the ASQ by correlating ASQ with written accounts. The work'was 
not published and was inconclusive. Peterson, Bettes & Seligman (1982). A 
second similar study was also carried out (Castellon, Ollove & Seligman 1982) 
this again was unpublished. In the paper on the ASQ we are told that 
In several studies, we have shown that ASQ scores correlate 
positively with actual attributions made by subjects for specific 
events, such as rejection in a dating situation, poor performance 
at laboratory tasks, and the occurrence of stressful life events. 
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When "naturally" occurring attributions are extracted from therapy 
transcripts and rated blindly along our three dimensions, high 
correlations with the therapist's ratings of depression are observed. 
(p. 297) 
We are not shown, however, the contexts in which their subjects made "specific 
attributions" nor how these statements are converted into ratings which yield 
data capable of statistical analysis. So the validity of the ASQ remains doubtful. 
Munton has published results concerning an instrument which was developed at 
the LFTRC, the Leeds Attributional Coding System, ' (LACS). ' 
1.2 The Leeds Attributional Coding System 
The LACS aims to code, that is to categorise and thereby offer a concise 
description of, causal statements in discourse. It appears to be the most detailed 
method yet developed for analysing causal beliefs in natural discourse. It 
consists of a set of definitions, developed in order to establish intersubjective 
agreement of analysers, of each attributional dimension. In chapter three I look 
at what features of expressions lead them to be considered as "attributions" or 
expressions of causal beliefs. I discuss in more detail there some of the issues 
in defining an "attribution". Here I just want to remark that in the LACS a 
causal belief is seen as a belief about a causal chain consisting of a cause, a 
link, and an outcome. Now each of the attributional dimensions could be 
applied to each stage of such a sequence. For example in a statement such as: 
"1 got promoted because I'm lucky. " We could look at the stability of being 
promoted, (outcome) luck as a cause of promotion (link) or being lucky (cause). 
In. practice the LACS codes only one of this triad, see definitions below. In 
addition it redefines some of the dimensions, for example clarifying the 
relationship between the internal/external and the personal/universal dimension. 
It proposes five dimensions which are binary pairs: stable/unstable; global/- 
specific; internal/external; personal/universal and controllable/uncontrollable. 
These are defined in chapter three of the LACS which explains the rationale for 
the choice of these dimensions and where the following definitions are 
elaborated on. I have extracted the following definitions by way of illustration: 
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1. Stable/Unstable 
If the cause is believed by the speaker to be more, likely than not 
to apply in the topic of the outcome in the future, then stable; if 
it would only apply about half of the time or, less, then unstable. 
2. Global/Specific "" 
If the cause is believed to be likely to influence at least ;a 
moderate range of outcomes which are regarded as non-trivial by 
the speaker, then global; if few such links, then specific. 
3. Internal/External 
If the cause is believed to originate in the person being coded, 
then internal. If it originates outside the person, whether a 
characteristic or behaviour of another person, or a circumstance,, 
the external. 
4. Personal/Universal 
If anything in the attribution '(cause, line, or outcome) is' believed 
by the speaker to indicate something particular about that person, 
then code idiosyncratic or personal. If it would apply to any 
normal member of the appropriate reference group (as defined by 
the speaker) then it is universal. 
5. Controllable/Uncontrollable 
If the speaker believes that the person being coded could normally 
manage to significantly influence the outcome in the absence of 
exceptional effort to circumstance, then 'controllable. If the causal 
sequence is believed to be inexorable or the outcome inevitable in 
normal circumstances, then uncontrollable. 
For example (Stratton et al. 1988, p. 84) 
Dad: Because Jean is different from me she gets aggravated. 
Is classified as stable, global, external, universal and uncontrollable. 
The ASQ does not clearly distinguish events where the subject is the agent and 
events where the subject is the target. When looking at real causal beliefs we 
find a variety. The LACS records who the speaker is, and in the case of an 
event caused by a person, who that person is. (This person is termed the 
"agent". ) 1 In addition, in the case of an event which happens to someone, who 
that person is. (This person is called the "target"); The dimensions of internal, 
personal and controllable are coded separately for speaker, agent and target. 
'Note that this term does not imply en in the sense discussed in 
chapter three below. 
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So in the above example the target is Jean, and in addition to the coding 
reported for Dad (the speaker), for Jean the last three dimensions are coded 
internal, personal and uncontrollable. In the study which I report. below I shall, 
however, restrict myself to codings for the speaker alone to keep the calculations 
manageable. Often there I will adopt the practice of labelling an. attributional 
classification by translating the binary coding into a denary number, again again for 
manageability. Thus a classification of "stable, global, internal, personal and 
controllable" would be indicated by "11111". .I- 
In addition to coding for these five attributional - dimensions the LACS also 
describes coding for aspects of the outcome namely its desirability, significance 
and whether or not it is hypothetical or actual. Since I will need to consider 
negative outcomes specifically in the studies -reported below, here is the 
definition used (Stratton et al. 1988): 
Positive/Neutral/Negative Outcome 
If the outcome is felt by the speaker to be desirable or positive 
then [2]. If it is undesirable or negative, then [0]. If neutral then 
[1]. If undecidable but not neutral, score [3]. 
Speakers may produce many utterances which are codable attributions, for 
example in a one hour family therapy session the principal speaker may produce 
about forty attributions. The result of applying the LACS is therefore a table 
of many such codings. 
Clearly the LACS would seem to have great potential in making researchable 
aspects of the giving of causal explanations which the ASQ does not investigate. 
My strategy is this: If individuals do have a tendency to believe explanations 
of a certain kind then this should show up in the LACS codings. By looking at 
the descriptions of explanations yielded by the LACS we have an empirical test 
of whether or not attributional style exists. The idea is that if someone has a 
an above chance proportion of a certain pattern then there are grounds for 
talking of them showing an attributional style. 
Freeing ourselves from the constraints imposed by the ASQ, many variations of 
what attributional style might mean become possible. 
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1.3 Models of attributional style a 
The idea that some people have attributional styles 'is fundamental to the 
application of attribution theoretic ideas in clinical psychology. The explanatory 
power of the learned helplessness theory of depression rests on the, idea that 
depressed people in particular have a specific style for explaining negative 
events. 
Individual differences probably exist in attributional style. Those 
people who typically tend to attribute failure to global, stable and 
internal factors should be most prone to chronic helplessness 
depressions with low self esteem ... Our-model predicts that 
attributional style will produce depression proneness, -perhaps the, depressive personality. (Abramson et al. (1978, p. 68) 
The notion of attributional style due to Seligman and colleagues, that people 
who are taken to be depressed tend to offer causes which are stable, global and 
internal when explaining a negative outcome, emerges as just one model. What 
other models might there be? The basic idea is clear. We are in the business 
of talking about patterns in the causes offered to account for events. But is it 
patterns produced by each person for any kind of event, or patterns produced 
for a certain kind of event by any person? Does the pattern depend on the 
mood of the person, on the situation where the causal belief is expressed? 
Clearly models of differing strengths can be imagined. Other researchers might 
add restrictions concerning the mood of the person being rated to the model, 
others might underplay the style issue as a property of the individual, emphasis- 
ing the situation as the factor. Fundamentally we are talking about a regularity 
or pattern in our data about explanations. A pattern could mean many things 
(for example a tendency to blame a certain child for family upsets). What we 
mean here of course is a pattern in terms of the attributional dimensions and 
the further categories made available by the LACS. 
Rather than survey the literature for diverse notions of the style concept an 
alternative strategy is possible. By including the aspects which can vary in the 
proposal of a model of attributional style we can construct a schema which will 
systematically generate any possible model of attributional style. , 
Anyone 
proposing the existence of attributional style is making a-statement about causes, 
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which quantifies over people, outcomes, topics (issue being discussed), and 
context (the situation in which the expression occurs). For example Seligman 
holds that causes which are global, stable and uncontrollable, tend to be offered 
by people which are "depressed", or are prone to depression, when explaining 
negative outcomes. Is this restricted to major negative outcomes? Compare loss 
of a spouse with loss of a paperclip. 
So we can construct the following sentence frame: 
When talking about {all/certain} topics in {all/certain} contexts {all/certain} 
people produce causal explanations for {all/some} of {all/certain} kinds of 
outcomes, these are {all of the same type/predominantly of one type/from a 
certain range of types}. 
Note that here "type" exhausts the scope "style" in the sense of the ASQ. I hope 
that it is now clear how the ASQ restricts the range of phenomena that may be 
relevant. Concentrating on type alone for the moment (the last set of brackets) 
the "depressive attributional style"; stable, global, internal (for significant negative 
outcomes) is just one type. We can consider, types involving all the attributional 
dimensions, or any combination of these. If we have five dimensions, stability; 
globality; internality (for speaker); universality (for speaker) and controllability 
(for speaker) then there are 31 possible combinations of these as follows: 
5 combinations takings dimensions one at a time S, 
10 to two SG, 
10 it of three SGI, 
5 of to four SGIP, 
1 combination five SGIPC. 
In general for n dimensions the number of combinations are given by the nth 
row of Pascal's triangle (less one since we, do not consider taking no 
dimensions); or °Cr 1 =. n! /r! (n-r)! -1. 
Now for each of these types, the value on each dimension is free to vary. For 
example, considering the combination of SG we have four possibilities namely 
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stable & global; unstable & global; stable & specific and -unstable & specific. 
I propose to call each of these a model. With the LACS each dimension has 
one of two values, so in general we have 2° models, where n is the number of 
dimensions in the combination. I' 
So in the case of five dimensions, for example, we will then have 
5x2+10x4+10x8+5x16+32= 242 types! 
Before looking at the data I want to look more closely at the concept of 
attributional style and the background from- which it emerges. 
2.0 Conceptual analysis of "attributional style" 1 11 i, 
Cutrona, Russell and Dallas Jones (1984) -raise the question: do people have a 
style of making attributions which -endures across different situations? They 
construe "attributional style" as a personality trait, 'and say that the strength of 
the concept should be assessed in terms of the controversy about personality 
traits. I think that a detour through a portion of the debate on personality 
traits to which they refer would be desirable. The justification is firstly, to 
explore what the claim that an individual has a specific and enduring way' of 
making attributions amounts to and secondly, to examine what the consequences 
are for attribution theories and theories dependent on them-if they do not. The 
debate in question is between trait theorists who argue that people have fixed 
characteristics across different situations and others holding that the specific 
situation is more important. The debate implicitly raises some fundamental 
issues. 
1, The role of the intuitive models of personality which individuals hold and how 
these differ in their desiderata from theories in psychology. 2, The 
methodologies used by psychologists in investigating how individuals come to 
make causal and personality judgements. 
These are substantive issues but whilst the appropriateness of statistical 
techniques has received explicit attention in this debate (see Epstein, 1979,1980) 
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little attention has been given to the conditions surrounding the formulation ý of 
personality judgements in the laboratory. (For example the so-called demand 
characteristics of the judgement task). All proponents in the debate seem to be 
aware of this to some extent but it does not seem to emerge as an issue of 
importance. 
The controversy referred to is to be found in a pair of series of exchanges 1, 
From Mischel (1968) to Epstein (1979,1980) and 2, the debate in Psychological 
Review, Mischel and Peake (1982) with replies by Funder, Bern and by Epstein 
(1983), counter reply (1983) and comment by Cowley (1984). 
Epstein (1979) offers a summary of the debate and gives ' arguments for and 
against - not only situationist and trait theories but interactional theories as 
well. Epstein's approach is interesting since he advocates a methodological 
resolution to the debate (indeed the second paper of the pair is a polemic on 
the appropriateness of statistical methods in psychology at large). I have taken 
as a starting point for the debate Mischel's (1968) book - but one could start 
with Cattell, Murray - or Theophrastus. 
In his book Personality and Assessment (1968), Mischel states that: 1, How 
someone acts depends to a large degree on the situation that' 'they'are in. 2, 
Trait theories reify and nominalise processes which we refer to in everyday 
psychological talk. He sees this tendency as dehumanising and asks: 
What would happen if we treated the organism as truly active and 
dynamic rather than as the carrier of a stable dispositional 
character of motives and traits? (1968) 
The relationship of psychological theories of personality to commonsense 
"theories" will be a recurring theme in this chapter. The source of Mischel's 
notoriety amongst personality researchers undoubtedly lies in his hurtful 
suggestion that the coefficient of 0.2 to 0.3, which is apparently invariably found 
when a personality dimension inferred from a questionnaire is correlated with 
a criterion from a different medium, should be called the "personality 
coefficient". Looking at this suggestion in its context, chapter 14 of Personality 
and Assessment, it is clear that the butt of Mischel's argument are personality 
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questionnaires. Nevertheless, Mischel's work, however restricted in its criticism, 
is generally perceived as the stimulus for subsequent papers. 
Alker (1972) replies on a variety of lines which don't cohere closely: 1, 
"situational specificity in responses is itself a personality variable" (see also Bem 
and Allen (1974)). 2, Different statistical designs (factor analysis) would pick 
out interactions between person and situation variables. 3, A Psychodynamic 
model can accommodate the required flexibility. That is, a more dynamic, model 
of what a trait is would rescue the concept from the rigidity which Mischel 
criticises. 
Bowers (1973) replies, not merely to Mischel, but to situationism as a creed. 
He groups together positivism and Skinnerian behaviourism as antecedents of 
situationism. He advises us that it is a necessary and warranted corrective to 
trait psychology, but he sees both perspectives as flawed; and he uses his critique 
of situationism (namely that it rejects the part played by the "organismic and 
intrapsychic determinants of behaviour") to put forward his own resolution: 
"interactionism". (For what is meant by this see the section on Epstein (1979) 
below). 
During 1973 "organismic and intrapsychic" factors appear in Mischel's thinking 
as he unveils a "cognitive social learning theory of personality". Here Mischel 
gives full reign to the role of individual differences by incorporating, or seeking 
to incorporate, thought as a partly situation-free component into his model. 
The issues at stake in using a nomothetic methodology to investigate what is 
after all ideographic looms large in Bem and Allen's (1974) paper. This paper 
is especially interesting because it is here that the clearest equation of trait 
theory with commonsense occurs. One or the other must be wrong, they say, 
research or intuition. I shall argue that this is a ridiculous disjunction; but one 
that pervades both sides of this debate. Epstein (1979) writes: 
A critical issue in personality theory is whether stable behavioural 
dispositions, or traits exist. On the basis of everyday observation, 
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it seems to most people that they ; do. Yet the vast bulk of 
psychological research fails to provide confirmatory evidence. It 
must be concluded that either the lay view is right and that the 
typical methods of research are lacking, or the research findings 
are correct and the lay view itself is a phenomenon worthy of 
study. 
Aren't the beliefs of lay people a core part of the psychologist's subject matter 
anyway? 
Mischel and Peake (1982) tackle three papers which they construe as putative 
resolutions'to the trait - situation debate. 1, Epstein (1979): "multiple behaviour 
aggregation", 2, Bem and Funder (1978): "template matching", 3, Bern and Allen 
(1974): "moderator variable approach" (some-of-the-people-some-of-the-time). 
Each of these is examined; and in the case of 1 and 2 studies are reported 
which failed to replicate the proponent's findings. ' The conclusions' are: 
1, Epstein's method establishes reliability but bypasses the problem of situational 
consistency. 2, The methods of Bern and Funder and Bern and Allen are highly 
restricted in their application. 
Epstein (1983) replies that his goal was precisely to examine the effects of 
aggregation on reliability and validity; not to confront the cross-situational 
consistency issue. He raises an important point: 
Their [Mischel and Peake] view maintains a source of confusion 
that has characterised the person situation debate throughout its 
long history: namely that cross-situational consistency can properly 
be investigated by examining the inter-item correlation of a sample 
of items selected casually by face validity. (p 179) 
As a solution to this Epstein advocates a dose of "whole-test correlation factor 
analysis" (p. 183) to select items. So here Epstein's tack is to argue that he is 
not immersed in the debate, that behaviour is both general and specific. The 
problem is, according to him, how behaviour is to be dissected into items. This 
is a crucial point. I shall argue that this solution, whilst true, is nevertheless 
bankrupt. 
Bern and Funder each reply separately. Bern adopts a methodological theme, 
claiming that the template-matching study which failed to replicate his work with 
Funder focuses on a by-product of the method, not on the method itself. In 
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reference to his study with Allen, Bern adopts the remarkable step of claiming 
that some of the orientations adopted were merely whimsical. Funder's reply 
is important because the first `two points that he makes distinguish his paper 
from the others. The third of his three points concerns the role of aggregation 
in the prediction of behaviour. The two novel points are: 1, The assessment 
of situations, and very importantly 2, The basis of lay impressions of personality. 
The response from Mischel and Peake isolates agreement amongst these papers 
and argues that a clarification of method would be beneficial. They parallel the 
debate in personality theory with the debate in psychotherapy. We should ask 
not "Does Psychotherapy work? " but rather "When does such-and-such a type 
of psychotherapy work? ". So we see that the, resolution advocated is a selective 
refinement of areas of disagreement. No reference is. made to the role of lay 
personality beliefs. This , 
tendency is cemented by, Cowley's "Comment on the 
Mischel-Epstein debate" which looks exclusively at the issue of temporal stability 
or cross-situational consistency issue. 
The bankruptcy which I refer to in Epstein's resolution is that he is seeking to 
resolve a problem which is too fundamental to be rectified by a methodological 
manoeuvre. We would expect that a judicious enough selection of hypothetical 
components. of behaviour can be made, such that those components are to be 
found in behaviour in different situations. That is simply a statistical problem, 
which despite Epstein's murmurings about replacing intuitive behavioural 
categories with statistical ones, still has at its base the awkward insertion of lay 
beliefs into a statistical framework. I would say that the functioning of lay 
personality beliefs has its own logic which cannot be assumed to obey the laws 
developed by statistical theory. 
The situation - personality trait debate. seems to ask the question "what is 
personality, how can it be measured, how can it be studied scientifically? " what 
could instead be asked is: "What do people's personality beliefs enable them 
to do? " or "how does the rhetoric of everyday psychology work? " 
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I think that when Cutrona et al. (1984) write that: 
A new trait concept has been added to our already voluminous 
dictionary of personality characteristics., Although this proposed 
trait is not likely to be incorporated soon into common parlance... 
they unwittingly touch on what for me is the key issue here. Real trait terms 
as used by people in everyday situation are part of a system of rhetoric through 
which experience is structured. 
A trait, however, is not the only model of how an aspect of personality appears 
to be an enduring feature of someone. In fact it is hot to "trait" but to 
"cognitive style" that Peterson et al look in the development of the ASQ. In 
connection with a discussion of the stability of attributional scores they claim 
that the ASQ results are "respectably high" and relate the ASQ scores to other 
measures of "cognitive style", making reference to the review by Goldstein and 
Blackman (1978). The issues are however the same. Attribution theorists have 
not paid detailed attention to causal expressions in their natural habitat. 
3.0 Studies of attributional style 
Application of the LACS . to transcripts of conversation should yield data on 
whether of not styles occur. In this section I describe three studies. Study one 
draws on data from family therapy sessions; studies two and three add data from 
a colleague's study of interviews with parents and assessment interviews with 
families. 
The method used to carry out the analyses is rather detailed. I propose to 
describe this first. 
Application of the LACS to this material creates a few thousand records, each 
of which is a 11 binary number, relating to the five attributional dimensions with 
internal, personal and controllable repeated for agent and -target. In addition 
the identity of speaker, agent and target is also included plus codings for the 
significance and negativity of the outcome. The task is to analyse these to find 
whether a pattern is present. 
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How can the data be analysed to test the attributional style concept? This 
divides into two problems, a theoretical one and astatistical one: 
1, What predictions does attributional style make? What hypotheses does this 
yield in terms of the data available? 2, What statistical technique is required 
to test such hypotheses? 
Recall the sentence frame developed above: 
When talking about {all/certain} topics in {all/certain} contexts {all/certain} 
people produce causal explanations for {all/some} of {all/certain} kinds of 
outcomes, these are {all of the same type/predominantly of one type/from a 
certain range of types). 
Cycling through all the combinations supported -by this schema we can generate 
96 models of what attributional style might mean. Of course some of them will 
probably have no adherents. Taking the first option in each bracket would yield 
an implausibly strong position. How many can be tested by the data available? 
1, The data provide no measure of the topic. 
2, The data are all drawn from therapy sessions, context in the sense of social 
situation cannot be tested. Nevertheless context in the sense of the pragmatics 
of an utterance does of course vary in therapy sessions, from pleas to 
injunctions, however the data provide no measure of this. (I shall argue in 
chapter four that there are principled objections to the possibility of such an 
analysis. ) 
3, The restriction to negative outcome can be tested. As can the uncontrollable 
negative outcome favoured by some researchers. 
4, We have no grounds to pre-classify the people involved. So only the model 
pertaining to "certain" people could be tested here. The limited numbers and 
range of subjects means that this model cannot be -tested in a definitive way 
here. r 
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5, The data also allow us to test hypotheses relating to whether or not the 
speaker is the agent or target. So we can look for the occurrence of pattern 
amongst the dimensions of attributions coded for each speaker in three ways. 
Considering all outcomes, negative outcomes and uncontrollable negative 
outcomes. 
A bifurcation also operates here. We can separate cases where the speaker is 
the target (the outcome happens to them) and cases where the target is 
someone else. This yields six hypotheses. The dependent variable will be a 
measure of pattern. Here I shall only study attributions where the speaker is 
the agent or target. The discrepancy between a speaker's attributions for self 
and others emerges as a key theme in my colleague Jo Silvester's doctoral work 
on parent's and carer's beliefs about their children. The model I shall test is 
therefore restricted in a number of ways. 
Across how many dimensions might a pattern hold? Should a tendency to offer 
a high proportion of stables, a high proportion of globals and a high proportion 
of internals be considered as a pattern or should just the composite stable, 
global internal? 
I discussed above that these choices can be considered as "types", giving a more 
general model of what an attributional style might be in terms of attributional 
dimensions. How can I tell whether or not style is present? 
3.0.1 Criteria for detecting styles 
One way would be to apply a log-linear analysis to the data. This procedure 
generates models of interaction across the dimensions, this corresponds to a 
multidimensional version of a chi-square treatment to find associations between 
two variables. Munton (1987) uses log-lin but with some reservations about the 
independence assumption. 
Another problem for our data is that we must expect many empty cells in the 
multidimensional contingency table. What does this mean? The literature 
discusses the computational problem of expected frequencies of zero and the 
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case of predicted zeros or "structural zeros", for example the expected frequency 
of the category of "pregnant men". I have found no discussion of whether or 
not log-linear modelling can be applied to contingency tables' which are simply 
"sparse". Considering limitations known to apply to chi-square we could reason 
as follows: For a chi-square analysis to be applicable the expected frequency 
per cell should be at least five. Now if we have five dimensions, each having 
two values, then we have a 25,32, cell contingency table. If the chi-square 
criterion applies we would need at least 5x 32 = 160 scores (at least because 
these would need to be uniformly distributed). In the case of individual subjects 
our data does not have as many scores as that, so by this criterion, log-linear 
modelling is not reliable. 
f 
It seems wise to proceed with a simpler form of analysis which makes fewer 
assumptions. We can at least find out the number of each models that occur. 
Looking at the kind of outcomes thavoccur is a computational problem to which 
there may be different solutions. Construing each model as avariable, which 
will be a binary number having as many digits as there are dimensions in the 
model, we can obtain a frequency count, of those outcomes that occur. Each 
outcome may be a style component, if certain outcomes occur beyond a chance 
level then we will have ground for talking about an attributional style. Defining 
the variable itself is a tedious problem since all the combinations need to be 
generated. 2 In practice I shall only consider dimensions three at a time and five 
at a time. Such an analysis could be run for different style hypotheses: 
For different type combinations we could consider all attributions or just those 
where the speaker is the target or where the speaker is the agent and at the 
same time we could consider these three possibilities with different outcome 
conditions: all outcomes, or negative outcomes only. 
2I am grateful to Nicos Drakos of the computing department, University 
of Leeds for writing a programme to do this step. 
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What could we conclude from such an analysis? A measure of the likelihood 
of a certain number of a certain outcome can be reached as follows. ' Say we 
have n observations and find r of a certain outcome. In general, for n 
independent trials of some event with probability p, the probability of that event 
occurring r times is described by a binomial distribution. The probability of 
such an output is given by the expression: 
Pr(p, r, n) = C"(P)r(q)('-r) 
Where (q = (1-p)), the probability of the outcome not occurring 
For large. n and p approximately equal to q the binomial distribution 
approximates to the normal. Unfortunately this-is not the case here: although 
n is large the distribution is highly skewed since p is not close to 0.5. - If the 
probability of either of the two outcomes for each dimension is 1/2 then for two 
dimensions it is 1/4 for three dimensions 1/8. Nevertheless using the above 
equation values of Pr(p, r, n) can be constructed for a range of values of r. Of 
course consulting tables is not feasible because of the large number of enquiries 
that need to be made. Consider a study of style at the level of five dimensions 
and involving ten subjects, each having a different number of attributions. For 
each subject I would need to produce thirty two tables (since. p takes a different 
value for each model). I would therefore need to make, and consult 320 tables. 
I developed a computing routine which both calculates critical values of r and 
decides whether or not the frequencies observed are significant. The values 
reported which I report below were calculated by a program the core of which 
was written by Paul Nicholson (See appendix 1). The program selects numbers 
of different combinations of the attributional dimensions which occur outside the 
frequency -which would be expected by chance. I chose a 1% significance level 
and performed a two tailed test since the combinations could occur at a 
frequency of greater than or less than would be expected by chance. In other 
words, I took combinations which had less than a one in a hundred chance of 
occurring to be cases of attribution style. As I mentioned, the binomial 
3 I'm indebted to my friend Walter Leser for reminding me of this. 
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distribution is highly positively skewed. Considering it graphically, each 
distribution consists of a series of blocks, one for each possible value of r. As 
I am interested in values of r which have a chance of less than 1% of 
occurring I need to consider values of r which have a probability of less than 
0.5% or greater than 99.5%. Selecting values of r during which the area 
beneath the distribution reaches 0.995 is not adequate, the critical value of r 
needs to be wholly in the critical region. The program therefore selects values 
of r such that the cumulative probability of r-1 is greater that 0.995. Below are 
a series of studies where I applied this criterion in order to study 1, whether or 
not people show a style of attributing causes on different occassions, 2, whether 
or not people generally show such styles at all and 3, what kinds of styles are 
shown. The first three studies consider the five dimension of stable, global, 
internal, personal and controllable developed in the LACS; the next three focus 
on the dimensions presented in the learned helplessness theory of depression, 
stable, global and internal for negative, uncontrollable outcomes. 
3.1 Studies of attributional style at the level of five dimensions 
3.1.1 Study 1: Are there cross-situational attributional styles? (i) 
This study aims to test the hypothesis that an attributional style is held across 
different situations. The data for the. study were transcripts of family therapy 
sessions selected from the LFTRC archives. I chose transcripts from the middle 
of therapy, sessions four and five, when change in the subjects' beliefs would not 
be expected to occur. In the case of family 3I studied the transcript from 
session four and six because due to an error in the arrangements for the session, 
session five was very short. The hypothesis is, of course, that any subject 
showing a style in the first session will show the same style in the second one. 
Data 
The transcripts were analysed using the LACS procedure and yielded 483 
codable attributions for twelve people. The families are composed as follows: 
family 1: subjects 1 and 2, family 2: subjects 3,4,5 and 6, family 3: subjects 7,8, 
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and 9 and family 4: subjects 10,11 and 12. A sample of 51 codings were cross- 
coded by an experienced coder as a reliability check and Cohen's kappa 
calculated for these. See table 2.1. 
TABLE 2.1 RELIABILITY OF CODINGS. 
Dimension Kappa standard error z 
stable 0.105 0.144 0.732 NS 
global 0.297 0.123 2.418 
internal 0.960 0.039 24.417 
personal 0.355 0.162 2.185 
universal 0.431 0.136 3.173 
* significant, p<0.01 
A significant kappa was found for all the dimensions except stability. Using the 
binomial procedure described earlier, model decisions were made for all the 
subjects under four cases: 1 taking all attributions, 2, selecting those where the 
outcome was negative, 3 selecting those where the speaker was the target and 
4, selecting those where both the outcome was negative and the speaker was the 
target. 
Results 
Certain speakers do show styles in the sense defined above. The following 
tables show which speakers showed which styles for different kinds of attribu- 
tions, namely whether the speaker is the target in the attribution and whether 
or not the outcome is negative. This information is split into two tables for the 
convenience of layout. In addition the tables show the number of attributions 
of that type were made and the number of attributions that the speaker made. 
Clearly the number of attributions considered may drop as some are excluded 
in the selection. For example speaker 1 in table 2.2a, therapy session II, had 
seven attributions which I didn't rate as having a negative outcome, the number 
dropping from 31 to 24. 
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TABLE 2.2a STYLES SHOWN BY EACH PERSON IN THERAPY SESSIONS 4 
(I) AND 5 OR 6 (II) CONSIDERING ALL ATTRIBUTIONS AND 
ATTRIBUTIONS WHERE THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE. 
speaker attributions considered 
all negative outcome 
I II I II 
1 - 11110 6/31 - 11110 6/24 
2 01110 2/11 - 01110 2/7 - 
3 - 10101 4/17 -- 
4 10110 3/23 10100 6/16 -- 
5 11111 3/9 00101 2/11 -- 
6 11111 2/3 - -- 
7 - - -- 
8 - -. -- 
9 - - -- 
10 01000 8/48 - 01101 3/28 - 
11 11000 16/38 - -- 
12 
TABLE 2.2b STYLES SHOWN BY EACH PERSON IN THERAPY SESSIONS 4 
(I) AND 5 OR 6 (II) CONSIDERING ATTRIBUTIONS WHERE THE SPEAKER 
IS THE TARGET IN THE ATTRIBUTION AND ATTRIBUTIONS WHERE BOTH 
THE SPEAKER IS THE TARGET AND THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE. 
speaker attibutions considered 
speaker is target speaker is target and 
negative outcome 
I II I II 
1 - --- 
2 - --- 
3 - 10101 4/16 -- 
4 10110 3/17 --- 
5 11111 3/6 00101 2/5 -- 
6 11111 2/3 --- 
7 - --- 
8 
9 - --- 
10 01000 5/23 - 01000 5/15 - 
01101 4/23 01101 3/15 
11 - --- 
12 - 
In the cases where all attributions are considered, two people show styles in 
both sessions, namely subjects four and five. But in neither case is it the same 
style. Any temptation to retrieve a style by "factoring", for example selecting 
101-1 from 10110 and 10100 form subject four, should be resisted. The criteria 
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by which these occurrences were selected as significant involved dimensions other 
than those factored out here. So the getting stable, specific, internal, personal, 
uncontrollable and stable, specific, internal, universal, uncontrollable in a test of 
five dimension does not indicate whether or not stable, ' specific, internal 
uncontrollable would be significant in a test of four dimensions. Looking at the 
other selections, in only one case did a speaker show a style in both sessions. 
This is subject five again where the target is the speaker. But it is a 'different 
style in each sessions. 
It is interesting to note that a speaker may show more than one style. Speaker 
10 in table 2.2b holds both unstable, global, external, universal, uncontrollable 
and unstable, global, internal, universal, controllable. The possibility of a person 
holding two styles might seem odd, against the background of the ASQ, but of 
course it might depend on just what is being explained: the person could be 
talking about different classes of events. The ASQ model implies that . 
it only 
applies to uncontrollable outcomes, but as I mentioned when discussing the 
ASQ, it does not attempt to get information. on the subject's perception of 
controllability for. the outcome described. Because subject ten has two 
dimensions going in different directions, the difference on one can remove any 
sense of a contradiction in the change in the other. For example, here the 
person may be interpreted as saying that whilst many uncontrollable, unstable, 
global and external events are universal, controllable unstable, global and 
external events are personal. 
In these data there is evidence that speakers do show attributional styles in the 
sense that they use a causal statement instantiating particular models more than 
would be expect by chance. Consideration of different kinds of explanation, in 
the sense of whether the outcome was negative or whether the speaker was the 
target of the event being explained, make a difference to whether or not a style 
is revealed. With respect to the specific issue of whether or not speakers have 
a cross-situation style, no speakers produced the same pattern in the two sessions 
studied. 
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3.1.1.1 Styles at the level of families 
Munton and Antaki (1988) report that families can show patterns of attributions 
at the level of a group. By collapsing the scores for each member of the four 
families that I studied I obtained the following results. Again, the styles that 
occur are shown under different conditions depending on which attributions were 
considered. The entries in the table can be compared with table 2.2a and 2.2b 
to compare the contribution from each speaker. In the case of one family, 
family four in table 2.3a for all attributions, showed the same style in both 
sessions. This was 11000 or stable, global, external, universal, uncontrollable. 
TABLE 2.3a STYLES SHOWN BY EACH FAMILY IN THERAPY SESSIONS 4 
(I) AND 5 OR 6 (II) CONSIDERING ALL ATTRIBUTIONS AND 
ATTRIBUTIONS WHERE THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE. 
speaker attributions considered 
all negative outcome 
I II I II 
1 - 11110 9/46 - -- 11110 6/31 
2 11111 9/73 00101 3/48 11111 9/50 00101 3/31 
10101 8/48 
10101 5/48 
3 - 11111 4/47 -- 
4 01000 12/89 00000 5/65 01000 6/47 - 
11000 34/89 11000 23/65 01101 5/47 - 
TABLE 2.3b STYLES SHOWN BY EACH FAMILY IN THERAPY SESSIONS 4 
(I) AND 5 OR 6 (II) CONSIDERING ALL ATTRIBUTIONS, ATTRIBUTIONS 
WHERE THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE, WHERE THE SPEAKER IS THE TARGET 
AND WHERE BOTH THE SPEAKER IS THE TARGET AND THE OUTCOME IS 
NEGATIVE. 
speaker attibutions considered 
speaker is target speaker is target, and 
negative outcome 
I II I II 
1- 11110 7/31 - 11110 5/22 
2---- 
3---- 
4 01000 9/43 - 01000 5/25 - 
01101 3/43 - 01101 3/25 - 
3.1.1.2 Styles present when results from both sessions are pooled 
Table 2.4 shows the style which are found when the scores from each subject 
are pooled together. It is interesting to note that styles found earlier may no 
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longer be significant comparing these results with : table 2.2a and 2.2b. For 
example, subject 1 showed 11110 as a style in session II when all outcomes 
were considered; this no longer occurs as a style. In addition, style previously 
held may change. For example subject 2, in table 2.2a held a style of 01110 
(unstable, global; internal; personal, uncontrollable) in session I. In table 2.4, 
pooling the scores from session I with session II, this subject shows a style of 
11110 (stable, global, internal, personal, universal). 
TABLE 2.4 STYLES SHOWN BY EACH PERSON IN THERAPY SESSIONS 4 (I) 
AND 5 OR 6 (II) CONSIDERING ALL ATTRIBUTIONS, ATTRIBUTIONS WHERE 
THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE, WHERE THE SPEAKER IS THE TARGET AND 
WHERE BOTH THE SPEAKER IS THE TARGET AND THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE. 
speaker attributions considered 
all negative- speaker negative 
outcome = target outcome & 
speaker = 
target 
1 - - - - 
2 11110 5/26 - - - 
3 11110 10/86 10101 4/43 - 11110 6/30 
4 10101 9/36 - 10100 6/27 - 
5 00101 2/20 - 00101 2/11 - 
11111 3/20 
6 11111 3/7 - 11111 3/6 - 
7 00000 5/57 - - - 
8 11000 15/35 00101 2/14 - 00101 2/9 
9 - - - - 
10 11000 28/82 01101 3/34 01000 5/40 01000 5/10 
11 11000 24/60 - - 01101 3/20 
12 
In summary subjects who show a style in one of the'sessions separately and in 
both together are: all attributions: 4,5,6,11; negative attributions: 10; where the 
speaker is the target: 6 and 10; where the speaker is the target and the outcome 
is negative: 10. These results are difficult to interpret, in some cases looking at 
the number of each pattern shows that the patterns leading to a style being 
significant all occur in just one of the sessions. Certainly the results do not lend 
any evidence to the hypothesis that people have cross-situational attribution style. 
Table five shows the results obtained when the families are collapse into `an 
aggregate for both sessions together. 
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Table five shows the results obtained when the families are collapse into an 
aggregate for both sessions together. 
TABLE 2.5 STYLES SHOWN BY EACH FAMILY IN THERAPY SESSIONS 4 (I) 
AND 5 OR 6 (II) CONSIDERING ALL ATTRIBUTIONS, ATTRIBUTIONS WHERE 
THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE, WHERE THE SPEAKER IS THE TARGET AND 
WHERE BOTH THE SPEAKER IS THE TARGET AND THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE. 
speaker attibutions considered 
all negative speaker negative 
outcome = target.. outcome & 
speaker = 
target 
1 - 11110 9/81 -- 
11111 6/81 
2 11110 20/178 11110 14/147 11110 15/120 11110 11/47 
11111 12/178 11111 10/147 
3 00000 6/101 00000 6/101 - 00101 2/27 
11111 34/101 11000 34/101 
4 00000 8/154 00000 8/154 - 01101 3/38 
11000 57/154 11000 57/154 
In order to look more closely at how prevalent attributional styles are, and at 
which styles occur, I carried out two further studies. Since carrying out my 
computing procedure is itself a long task, and since a lot of data is required for 
detailed testing I made use of coded data already held within the LFTRC. 
3.1.2 Study 2: Are there attributional styles at the level of five dimensions? 
Aim 
This study pursues the finding, made above that styles do occur, that there is a 
range of possible styles and that an individual may show more than one style. 
Data 
The data for this study come from interviews carried out, and analysed by my 
colleague Jo Silvester in the course of her doctoral work. I am deeply indebted 
to Jo for sharing these data with me. The _ 
interviews are from three sources. 
One, interviews with parents of children attending a, a local Social Services 
Nursery and b, the University's nursery run by the Students' Union. This yielded 
data from nineteen people. Secondly, interviews with mothers of children 
(between the ages of four and a half to five and a half years) attending an 
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Infant School in York (fifteen subjects). Thirdly, interviews with thirteen 
families carried out at the Dept of Psychological Medicine of Great Ormond 
Street Hospital, London, where they had been referred for assessment (nineteen 
subjects). 
Again, reliability of the codings was tested by having aý sample cross-coded by 
another coder. The results are shown in table 2.6: 
TABLE 2.6 RELIABILITY OF CODINGS 
Dimension Kappa Standard Error z 
stable 0.474 0.119 3.969 * 
global 0.425 0.130 3.263 * 
internal 0.595 0.122 4.859 * 
personal 0.532 0.132 4.016 * 
controllable 0.513 0.138 3.719 * 
*p<0.001 
There is a choice about what starting values we use for the calculation of the 
binomial probabilities. I have decided to use mean probabilities across the 
whole data set and have included the data used in study one above, considering 
scores for each session as separate. This means that some of the data are 
drawn from the same people. The reason for doing this is that it, is the 
occurrence of a style in an episode of conversation. Pooling the separate 
sessions together presupposes a consistency across situations. This yields a total 
sample of fifty three subjects. 
Results 
I counted the number of patterns found to be significant at the 1% level for 
each subject for different selections of attributions. The results are summarised 
in table 2.7. 
The occurrence of a style must be counted as common. Considering all 
outcomes, and negative outcomes, more subjects show a style than do not. We 
may also note than in these cases a "compound style" is also found. That is, 
speakers show more than one style. 
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TABLE 2.7 NUMBER OF PEOPLE SHOWING CERTAIN NUMBERS OF STYLES 
Attributions selected 
Number All negative speaker negative 
of outcomes = target outcome & 
styles speaker 
shown -_target 
0 4 22 22 41 
1 15 24 21 11 
2 21 6 10 1 
3 8 1 - - 
4 3 - - - 
5 1 - - - 
6 1 - - - 
Number of 
people 53 53 53 53 
Number of 
Attributio ns 3689 1694 1703 822 
Certain, possible models are not found at all. The following table gives the 
frequency of those models that occur. (See table 2.8) 
The model which occurs most frequently as a style is thus 11000, namely, 
stable, global, external, universal and uncontrollable. This is the modal style out 
of all the attributions considered. Pursuing the train of thought behind the 
reformulated model of learned helplessness this would be a depressive style but 
for the choice of external rather than internal and universal rather than 
personal. The triad of stable, global, internal put forward in the that theory of 
depression does however form a common model (20.5% for all attributions) 
namely: stable, global, internal, personal, controllable. 
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TABLE 2.8 THE FREQUENCY WITH WHICH EACH MODEL OCCURS AS A STYLE 
Attributions considered 
Model All negative speaker negative 
outcome = target outcome 
& speaker 
= target 
00000 20 5 4 1 
00001 3 2 7 2 
00010 1 1 1 - 
00011 - - l - 
00100 - - - - 
00101 1 2 - - 
00110 2 - 1 - 
00111 8 3 2 2 
01001 2 1 2 1 
01001 - - - - 
01010 - - 1 - 
01011 - - - - 
01100 - 
01101 - - - - 
01110 - - - - 
01111 - 2 
10000 4 - - - 
10001 - - 1 - 
10010 - - - - 
10011 - - - - 
10100 - - - - 
10101 - - - - 
10110 - - - - 
10111 10 3 1 1 
11000 22 12 5 2 
11001 - - - 
11010 - - 3 - 
11011 - - - 1 
11100 - - - - 
11101 2 - 1 - 
11110 4 5 .2 2 
11111 25 4 9 1 
104 40 41 13 
3.1.3 Study 3: Are there cross-situational attributional styles? (ii) 
These data can also serve as a pool from which to obtain another empirical 
measure of the probability of the different values of the different attributional 
dimensions. The following tables report a recalculation of the data used in 
study one based on the empirical p values of pooling those data with these. 
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TABLE 2.9a STYLES SHOWN BY EACH PERSON IN THERAPY SESSIONS 4 
(I) AND 5 OR 6 (II) CONSIDERING ALL ATTRIBUTIONS AND 
ATTRIBUTIONS WHERE THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE. 
speaker attributions considered 
all negative outcome 
I II I II 
1 11101 6/50 11000 8/31 11001 4/25 11110 6/24 
11110 6/31 
2 - 11000 7/15 - 11000 5/7 
3 11000 11/38 10101' 4/17 11000 8/5 - 
4 - 10100 6/16 - - 
5 11111 3/9 - - - 
6 11111 2/3 - - - 
7 11000 10/38 - - - 
8 11000 6/12 11000 9/23 - - 
9 - 11000 4/5 - - 
10 01000 8/48 11000 12/34 01101 3/28 - 
11000 16/48 11100 7/34 11000 9/28 
11 11000 16/38 11000 8/22 11000 7/15 - 
11101' 6/38 
12 - - - 
This procedure yields more styles altogether including instances which support 
the cross-situational model. In the case of all attributions five subjects show 
styles in both sessions and two, speakers eight and ten show the same style in 
each, namely 11000, stable, global, external, universal, uncontrollable. No 
speakers show the same style in both sessions when only attributions with 
negative outcomes are considered but under the selection for attributions where 
the speaker is the target, the style 11000 becomes significant for speaker eleven. 
This style remains significant for this speaker when attributions with negative 
outcomes are imposed on this selection. Whilst I would expect there to be 
differences in the proportions of the different dimensions coded in the different 
groups studied here; I cannot eliminate the possibility that the different 
proportions found, and hence the different style found here, are due to 
differences in coding practice. 
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TABLE 2.9b STYLES SHOWN BY EACH PERSON IN THERAPY SESSIONS 4 
(I) AND 5 OR 6 (II) CONSIDERING ATTRIBUTIONS WHERE THE SPEAKER 
IS THE TARGET IN THE ATTRIBUTION AND ATTRIBUTIONS WHERE BOTH 
THE SPEAKER IS THE TARGET AND THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE. 
speaker attibutions considered 
speaker is target speaker is target and 
negative outcome 
I II I II 
1 11101 5/31 11000 5/23 - - 
11100 5/23 
2 - 11000 3/8 - - 
3 - 10101 4/16 - - 
4 - 10100 3/10 - - 
5 11111 3/6 00101 2/5 - - 
6 11111 2/3 - - - 
7 11000 5/24 °'' - - - 
8 - 11000 4/14 - - 
9 - - 
10 01000 5/23 11100 6/17 01000 5/15 - 
01101 4/23 - 01101 3/15 
11 11000 6/23 11000 5/15 11000 5/10 11000 4/8 
11101 6/23 
12 - - 
3 .2 Studies at the 
level of three dimensions 
As mentioned above, Seligman and colleagues have placed a lot of emphasis on 
the idea that there exists a style: stable global internal for the attribution of 
causes with negative uncontrollable outcomes, which they associate with 
depression, or a tendency towards depression. The presence of this style occurs 
as a component of the five dimensional study above, but as I mentioned in the 
case of "factored" scores in study one the occurrence of two styles at the level 
of five dimensions does not enable conclusions to be drawn about any common 
dimensions. This study therefore runs the analysis used above, but for just three 
dimensions. There is, however, an added complication. Stratton et al. ý (1986) 
show that the "internal" dimension employed by Seligman taps information from 
two sources which are separable into an "internal" and a "personal" dimension. 
For this reason my analysis here will cover both possibilities separately, stable 
global internal and stable global personal. In addition cases when the speaker 
is the target will be tested since, in the case of testing a concept relating to 
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depression explanations where things the occur happen to the speaker are 
especially relevant. As in study two the data set consists of seventy seven sets 
of coded attributions. 
3.2.1 Study 4: Are there cross-situation attributional styles? (iii) 
This study re-examines the data used in study one, selecting only negative and 
uncontrollable outcomes. Table 2.10a shows the styles found-for stable, global 
and internal dimensions, table 2.10b corresponding results for stable, global and 
personal dimensions. 
TABLE 2.10a STYLES SHOWN BY EACH PERSON IN THERAPY SESSIONS 4 
(I) AND 5 OR 6 (II) FOR THE DIMENSIONS OF STABLE, GLOBAL AND 
INTERNAL CONSIDERING ATTRIBUTIONS WHERE THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE 
AND WHERE THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE AND THE SPEAKER IS THE 
TARGET. 
speaker SGI 
negative 
outcome 
I II 
negative 
outcome & 
speaker = 
targ 
I II 
1- 111 10/21 -- 
2-- -- 
3-- -- 
4-- -- 
5-- -- 
6-- -- 
7-- -- 
8-- -- 
9-- -- 
10 -- 010 5/9 - 
11 -- -- 
12 
Very few styles are shown at all and no speaker shows a style in . the two 
sessions, let alone the same style. One speaker, speaker 1, shows the "depressive 
attributional style" for stable, global and internal attributions, but not for the 
case where the speaker is the target. 
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TABLE 2.10b STYLES SHOWN BY EACH PERSON IN THERAPY SESSIONS 4 (I) 
AND 5 OR 6 (II) FOR THE DIMENSIONS OF STABLE, GLOBAL AND PERSONAL 
CONSIDERING ATTRIBUTIONS WHERE THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE AND WHERE 
THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE AND THE SPEAKER IS THE TARGET. 
speaker SGP 
negative 
outcome 
I II 
= negative 
outcome & 
speaker 
target 
I II 
1 -- -- 
2 -- -- 
3 -- 110 5/7 - 
4 -- -- 
5 -- -- 
6 -- -- 
7 -- -- 
8 -- -- 
9 -- -- 
10 -- 010 5/9 - 
11 -- 110 5/7 - 
12 -- -- 
3.2.2 Study 5: Are there attributional styles at the level of three dimensions? 
Although fewer speakers appear to hold styles when considering three 
dimensions some do. Table 2.11 shows how many speakers showed styles. Only 
one speaker showed a compound style. 
TABLE 2.11 NUMBER OF PEOPLE SHOWING CERTAIN NUMBERS OF STYLES 
SGI SGP 
Number negative negative negative negative 
of outcome, outcome & outcome outcome & 
styles speaker speaker 
shown = tarnet = target 
0 36 46 50 46 
1 17 6 3 7 
2 - 1 - - 
3 -' - - - 
4 - - - - 
Number of 
people 53 53 53 53 
Number of 
Attributions 1379 649 1379 649 
Table 2.12 shows which styles occurred. The "depressive style" was not common. 
The style of stable, global, personal was the most frequently occurring style for 
negative outcomes, accounting for one quarter of the styles found in that case. 
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When only negative outcomes where the speaker is the target were considered, 
however - the paradigm case presented in the ASQ - this pattern ceased to be 
significant, that is, it disappeared as a style. 
TABLE 2.12 SHOWING THE FREQUENCY WIT] 
AS A STYLE 
SGI 
Model negative negative 
outcome outcome 
& speaker 
= target 
I WHICH EACH MODEL OCCURS 
SGP 
negative negative 
outcome outcome 
& speaker 
= target 
000 4 3 2 4 
001 2 1 3 - 
010 1 - - - 
011 - - - - 
100 - - - 1 
101 - - - - 
110 9 2 3 3 
111 1 2 4 
17 8 12 8 
3.2.3 Study 6: Are there cross-situational attributional styles? (iv) 
Finally I have once again pooled my data with Jo Silvester's in order to obtain 
a broader population of the proportion of the possible codings on the different 
dimensions. Tables 2.13a and 2.13b show styles occurring in the two therapy 
sessions considered earlier. 
Although few styles are shown at all, in one case a speaker did show a style in 
both sessions and it is the same style in each, stable, global, external for 
negative outcomes. Also of interest is that one speaker does show a "depressive 
style", stable, global, personal for negative outcomes and negative outcomes 
where the speaker is the target. 
71 
TABLE 2.13a STYLES SHOWN BY EACH PERSON IN THERAPY SESSIONS 4 
(I) AND 5 OR 6 (II) FOR THE DIMENSIONS OF STABLE, GLOBAL AND 
INTERNAL CONSIDERING ATTRIBUTIONS WHERE THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE 
AND WHERE THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE AND THE SPEAKER IS THE 
TARGET. 
speaker SGI 
negative negative 
outcome outcome & 
speaker = 
targ 
I II I II 
1- 110 10/21 - 111 8/7 
2---- 
3 110 10/14 --- 
4---- 
5---- 
6---- 
7---- 
8---- 
9---- 
10 ---- 
11 ---- 
12 
TABLE 2.13b STYLES SHOWN BY EACH PERSON IN THERAPY SESSIONS 4 
(I) AND 5 OR 6 (II) FOR THE DIMENSIONS OF STABLE, GLOBAL AND 
PERSONAL CONSIDERING ATTRIBUTIONS WHERE THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE 
AND WHERE THE OUTCOME IS NEGATIVE AND THE SPEAKER IS THE 
TARGET. 
speaker SGP 
negative negative 
outcome outcome & 
speaker = 
target 
I II I II 
1 - 110 11/21 -- 
2 - 110 5/6 
3 110 9/14 - -- 
4 -- -- 
5 -- -- 
6 -- -- 
7 -- -- 
8 -- -- 
9 -- -- 
10 --" 010 5/9 - 
11 110 8/12 - -- 
12 -- 
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Finally, I would like to remark that the definition of an attributional style that 
I have used will count patterns which occur significantly few times as a style. 
The final version of the computer program used uses the data itself to generate 
patterns to test, so it will in fact only look at the probabilities of patterns that 
occur somewhere in the data. This is the case with the present data set, but in 
no case did a person show any style in this sense at all, so the possibility of 
holding such a style in both sessions did not arise. Styles in this sense do occur. 
Considering Jo Silvester's subjects, in the case of negative outcomes, nine people 
showed aa pattern with significantly few occurrence six people showing unstable, 
global, external and three stable, specific, external. Considering the dimensions 
stable, global and personal, for negative outcomes, three people showed unstable, 
global, universal, two showed stable, specific, universal and one showed stable, 
global, universal. 
3.3 General discussion 
The six studies only examine a small range of the possible meanings that could 
be attached to the concept of attributional style. In particular I have not 
separately considered cases where the outcome is significant, nor have I looked 
at issues surrounding who the agent in the attribution is. I addressed the idea 
that speakers have a cross-situational attribution style in studies 1,3,4, and 6. 
Considering scores from separate people, that is ignoring the analysis carried out 
on families considered as a group, this provided 168 occasions where the same 
style could be present in both of two therapy sessions. Each study considered 
a dozen speakers and each looked at four different considerations. Studies 1 
and 3 taking all attributions made, ones with negative outcomes, ones where the 
speaker is the target and finally one where both the speaker is the target and 
the outcome is negative. Studies 4 and 6 looked at the triads stable, global, 
internal and stable, global, personal for attributions with negative outcomes and 
ones where the speaker is the target and the outcome is negative. I found only 
five instances where speakers did show the same style in both sessions. Judging 
the implications of these results statistically is tricky, what I think is clear is that 
this test counts as evidence against the claim that people in general hold cross- 
situation attributional styles. 
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Looking at the results another way, speakers show different styles on different 
occasions. 
A basic pair of findings is that 1, there are many attributional styles, not just 
the depressive one and that 2, speakers may hold more that one style. 
3.3.1 Discussion of LACS method 
I think that it is clear that if people's understanding of causes are to be 
conceptualised in terms of the categories provided by attribution theory then 
the LACS is an improvement on the ASQ and on attempts to content analyse 
transcripts. I have, however, reservations about each of the steps involved in 
the application of the LACS. Firstly, the isolation of causal beliefs itself. Even 
if a coder can extract casual statement the problem remains that gauging the 
significance of those beliefs for the person is difficult, in addition there could 
be contextual constraints on the problems that come up for discussion and on 
how these are formulated. Secondly, the task of coding an attributions is not 
easy. In defence of the method the achievement of intersubjectively agreed 
codings distinguishes it from alternative procedures to carry out this kind of 
research. 
4.0 CONCLUSION 
I presented a conceptual analysis of the idea of attributional style, showing that 
many possible versions of it are possible, particularly when the confines of the 
ASQ are broken out of. I then outlined a non-questionnaire based method for 
researching causal beliefs, the LACS. Applying this required the development 
of a statistical approach and a computation procedure to impliment it. 
Within the limitations of the LACS, and I think that the LACS is more valid 
than a questionnaire could ever be, a study of families in therapy failed to show 
impressive evidence for the existence of a cross-situational attributional style. 
I did find that styles, however, do occur, and importantly that there is more than 
one style that does occur and that an individual can show more than one style. 
The styles tested formed only a portion of those possible. A thorough test of 
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the idea that there is a depressive attribution style would of course require a 
group people who have been diagnosed as depressed. These are not directions 
which I will move in here. I want to take up the issue of the expression of 
causal beliefs, leaving aside, attribution and the attempt to describe causes as 
an analytic strategy. 
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CHAPTER 3: IDENTIFYING CAUSAL BELIEFS IN NATURAL DISCOURSE 
The passage from attempts to study causal beliefs through questionnaires to 
looking at the expression of causal beliefs in conversation and writing raises the 
issue of what it is for an utterance or inscription to be an expression of a causal 
belief. Attribution theorists are divided about what kind of expression counts 
as an attribution. An "attribution" here means a causal belief. The disagree- 
ment thrown up most clearly in the literature is whether or not reasons are 
distinct from causes, and if so should be counted as attributions. Davidson 
(1980) argues that reasons are a species of cause. I present his arguments and 
point but that the distinction between reasons and other causes is important in 
looking at what speakers achieve by explaining an event in terms of one rather 
than the other. I conclude that-reason explanations a, can be distinguished from 
non-reason causes and b, should not be excluded from a study of causal beliefs. 
I report a study of the verbal features of those expressions which analysers have 
considered to be "attributions" in transcripts of family therapy sessions and 
interviews. I find that although "because" (or its variant "cos") is the most 
common sentential connective to occur in the expressions identified as 
attributions this accounts for less than half of the expressions selected. The 
remainder are achieved by coordination (juxtaposition of cause and outcome), 
by other connectives or by linking with a verb having a causal semantic 
component. 
1.0 Explanation and the reason - cause distinction 
What is a causal belief? A causal belief is a belief which relates two events, 
a cause and an effect. The occurrence of the cause is offered as an explana- 
tion for why the effect happened. In this chapter I want to look at the variety 
of expressions which analysers of transcripts of stretches of talk have considered 
to be causal beliefs. I hope to clarify our grasp of what a causal belief is and' 
to assess the scope of carrying research on causal expressions. 
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The term "attribution" appears on page 22 of the Leeds Attributional Coding 
System Manual (LACS). The context makes it clear that this term is used as 
a synonym for "causal belief'. The scope of the term "causal belief' is discussed 
here, in particular whether or not explanations involving reasons are to be 
included. I want to look at this in some depth but independently of this issue 
we should note a different distinction which is implicit in the attribution theory 
literature. 
In ordinary language an attribution need not be directly related to explanation 
at all causal or otherwise. A property could be attributed to someone or 
something without a cause in sight. Clare's skill in singing blues could be one 
of her attributes but a speaker could refer to this without expressing any kind 
of cause. "What a good singer Clare is! " So Stratton et al. (1988), along with 
attribution theorists in general, use attribution in a narrow sense. Naturally a 
person's attributes are likely to enter into causal explanations that a speaker 
offers. But simple descriptions, even the ascription of dispositional properties, 
such as impatience or, to give a non-psychological example, fragility, are not 
counted as attributions, unless they occur as part of an explanation. So "the 
vase is fragile" would not be counted as an attribution but "the vase broke 
because it's fragile" would be. We should 'note that this sense of "attribution" 
is wider than one that is used by some authors who restrict the term -to an 
explanation for a significant event, as opposed to any happening. 
Some writers have felt that attribution theorists have concentrated on causal 
beliefs to the exclusion of other explanations, such as reasons. Buss '(1978) 
holds that they are confused about the nature of causes and reasons and that 
this has led to constraints being placed on how attribution theorists have 
interpreted people's explanations. 'I think that the authors of the LACS are 
correct when they say that attribution theory is equally applicable to reasons and 
causes. They adopt an agnostic position following a reference, made by Kidd 
and Amabile (1981) to some remarks which Braithewaite - (1953) makes in 
opening a discussion of the variety of explanations. 
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Any answer to a' "why? " question may be said to be an answer of 
a sort. So the different kinds of explanation can be best 
appreciated by 'considering the different answers that are 
appropriate to the same or different "why? " questions. (p. 319) 
Kidd and Amabile go on to point out that this is not, of course, a sufficient 
definition of an explanation. "How? ", "When? " and "Where? " may also receive 
explanations as answers. 
I shall argue that reasons are a species of cause and so I hold that (if 
attribution theory is applicable to causes then) attribution theory is applicable 
to reasons. It doesn't follow from this reconciliation that attribution theorists 
are not confused as Buss suggests. However I don't agree with Buss's sketch of 
the cause - reason `distinction, nor do I agree with the route taken by the 
authors of the LACS. They write: 
... Whatever the philosophical view, 
'no clear demarcation between" 
teleological explanation and causal explanation that can deal 
successfully with specific examples has yet been established. (p. 23) 
I think that this is wrong because teleological explanation is clearly distinct from 
causal explanation, or to use Aristotle's terms an explanation in terms of final 
causes can clearly be demarcated form one in terms of efficient causes. A 
teleological explanation cites some end point as the cause. An example would 
be "Stones fall when dropped because they tend towards the centre of the earth". 
Introducing gravity switches this to a causal explanation. "Stones fall when 
dropped because gravity, exerts a pull on them". This seems to me to be a clear 
distinction. The authors doubtless mean "reason explanation" not "teleological 
explanation", it is wrong to assume that these are interchangeable. Buss 
consistently identifies reason explanations with teleological explanations. I don't 
think that such an equation is possible. Citing wants, desires, yearnings and 
intentions as explanations yields non-teleological explanations. "Simon went to 
the pub because he wanted a drink". This involves an end point; Simon having 
his pint, which is an end point because it hasn't occurred when Simon did the 
setting off which is up for explanation, but I take it that the explanation is in 
terms of Simon wanting that end-point. That wanting is not an end-point. 
Braithwaite wrote: 
Teleological explanations of intentional goal directed activities are 
always reducible to causal explanations with intentions as causes; 
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To use the Aristotelian terms, the idea of a 'final cause' functions 
as an efficient cause; the goal directed behaviour is explained as 
a goal directed behaviour. 
1.1 Reasons as causes 
In their discussion of causes and reasons neither Buss nor Kruglanski consider 
an ancient, and I think natural, position: reasons are a kind of cause. When we 
cite reasons for someone's action, "Sue went home early because she wanted to 
avoid the rush" it seems to me that we are offering an explanation for Sue's 
action, going home early, in terms of her desire to avoid the rush and that., this 
desire is a cause of the action. Doesn't the explanation work by saying "Sue's 
desire to avoid the rush caused her to go home early"? 
The classical defence of freedom of the will in the face of causal determinism 
hinges on the view that reasons are causes: If all events are caused (causal 
determinism) then how can someone's doing something be something done 
freely? It can be done freely if it is caused by the person's beliefs and desires., 
This view of reasons as causes has been held to be defective by several 
philosophers recently. It's to this work that Buss and Kruglanski refer. 
Following views expressed by Wittgenstein in lectures given the 1930s many 
philosophers of action have held that reasons cannot be causes. 
In The Blue and Brown Books Wittgenstein states that: 
Giving a reason for something one did or said means showing a 
way which leads to the action (p. 14) 
The proposition that your action has such and such a cause, is a 
hypothesis. The hypothesis is a well founded one if one has had 
a number of experiences which roughly speaking, agree in showing 
that your action is the regular sequel of certain conditions which 
we then call the causes of the action. In order to know the 
reason which you had for making a certain statement, for acting 
a particular way, etc., no number of agreeing experiences is 
necessary, and the statement of the reason is not a hypothesis. 
(p. 15) 
In an influential paper the contemporary American philosopher, Donald 
Davidson (1980), has persuasively argued that reasons are a species of cause 
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meeting many of the objections that Wittgenstein and others put forward for the 
distinction. Before representing Davidson's position I want to explain some of 
the terms that crop up here; event, action, agency. An event is simply 
something that happens once, the sinking of the Bismarck, the scoring of the 
winning goal in the 1985 FA cup final, the Wall Street crash, the end of the ice 
age, the depression the formed over the Atlantic last week. Note that all these 
events can, in principle be dated. My paying for the milk each week is not an 
event, but a series of events. Note that events do not have to be, and probably 
are not, instantaneous, the end of the ice age presumably took several decades. 
An event may consist of other events. The hundred years' war was an event, 
and although each of the battles constituting it were events, the battles 
constituting the hundred years' war are not an event. 
Some events are actions. Clearly an event which someone brings about 
intentionally is an action, Bill stamping on Ben's hat for example. But Ben's hat 
getting blown of by the wind is not an action. (Unless we attribute intention- 
ality to the wind). Now if Bill stamped on Ben's hat it follows that Bill stamped 
on a hat. What if Bill stamped on a hat believing it to be Ben's not realising 
it was his own? Now Bill unintentionally stamped on his own hat, but that 
unintentional stamping must be an action of Bill's; since Bill stamped on a hat 
surely is an action. So Davidson concludes that an event is an action where 
intention is relevant. The author of such an event may be called an agent and 
we say that the event shows agency. 
To meet Wittgenstein's argument we have to show that a cause need not be 
a hypothetical statement of the kind that he suggests. But surely (qua scientists) 
we don't want to deny that causal statements relate to laws which are confirmed 
by their instances (disconfirmed by their exceptions) which enable us to make 
predictions. What is the relationship between cause, laws and induction? 
Hume teaches us that "we may define a cause to be an object, followed by 
another, and where all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar 
to the second". This states that every true singular causal statement entails a 
strict law governing events of the kinds to which the events belong. This is a 
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thesis about what we do when we flank "caused" by two events; we propose a 
necessary or logical connection. - If it is true that event f caused event g then 
it is true that any occurrence of event f will cause event g. As Davidson puts 
it any singular causal statement is "backed by" a strict law. The problem is of 
course, that we are (usually) unable to state what that law is. The argument so 
far has been that any singular causal statement means what it does through 
claiming to be an instance of a law. The acknowledgement that we don't know 
what the law enables Davidson to reconciles Hume's view of cause with that of 
Ducasse: 
The reconciliation depends, of course, on the distinction between 
knowing there is a law 'covering' two events and knowing what the 
law is: in my view Ducasse is right that singular statements entail 
no law; Hume is right that they entail that there is a law. (p. 
160) 
If Davidson's analysis is correct then it frees us to talk of singular causal 
statements, such as, "I posted the letter yesterday because I wanted it to reach 
Rosa in time for her 18th birthday", as being causal statements without being 
concerned that they could not be established by induction. Obviously it is 
absurd to talk of a statement such as this as a hypothesis (unless one had 
forgotten the way one had done something and was going through the 
possibilities in order to recall). What we are doing is to deny Wittgenstein's 
view that a causal statement is a hypothesis. We are doing this by separating 
the issue of establishing a causal law from making a causal statement. 
So if a reason is a kind of cause what kind is it and does this have consequen- 
ces for attribution theory? 
A reason is a rational cause. Giving a reason explains an action by rationalizing 
it. As Wittgenstein put it, it shows a way to the action, it leads us to see some 
aspect of the action to be explained as valued by the agent. Davidson coins 
the term "pro-attitude" to cover wants, hopes, desires and so on. These are a 
subset of "propositional attitudes", the philosopher's term for beliefs, doubts as 
well as hopes desires and so on, that is, attitudes "directed to" propositions: 
Ibrahim believes that it will rain tomorrow. He holds that for a rationalization 
to be an explanation it has to invoke more than just the agent's pro-attitude, it 
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has to invoke (or at least presuppose) a means-end belief, a belief about how 
the desire should be satisfied. For Paul wanting to be kinder to the environ- 
ment to be an explanation of why he switched his car to unleaded petrol we 
have to add, or presuppose it is true that, Paul believed that by switching his car 
to unleaded fuel he would be kinder to the environment. Davidson points out 
that it is generally unnecessary to cite both pro-attitude and means-and belief. 
Interestingly, Ellen Skinner, a developmental psychologist, has evolved a similar 
scheme but she has found it 'useful to use a triad adding a control-belief. So 
we also have: and Paul believed that he could switch his car to unleaded petrol. 
To summarise this presentation of Davidson's theory; Actions are a class of 
events, events where intention is relevant. Reasons are a class of causes, they 
are rational causes. Reasons explain or rationalise actions, (mere) causes 
explain (mere) events. 
1.2 Implications for attribution theory 
I want now to apply Davidson's ideas to the ideas put forward by Buss (1978) 
and Kruglanski (1979). Buss opens his discussion with the following outline of 
his position: 
1 Causes and reasons are logically distinct categories for explaining 
different aspects of behaviour. 
2 Causes are that which bring about a change. 
3 Reasons are that for which a change is brought about (eg goals, 
purposes etc. 
4 Behaviour that happens to. a person - that is nonintentional, that 
a person "suffers" - is an occurrence and is explained by both 
actors and observers with causes. 
5 Behaviour that is done by a person - that is intended, that has 
a goal or purpose is an action and is explained by the actor with 
reasons. The observer may use causes and/or reasons in explain- 
ing action. 
6 Thus, the kinds of attributions made depend upon what kind of 
behaviour is to be explained (occurrences or action) and the status 
of the explainer, (observer or actor). 
7 Attribution theorists have tended to project an exclusively causal 
framework onto lay explanation and all behaviour and all explain- 
ers are thus confused and confusing regarding causes and reasons. 
8 Progress in an area is, in part, dependent upon the adequacy of 
that area's key concepts. Attribution theorists need to become 
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more self-conscious about the correct use of the terms cause and 
reason in the explanation of behaviour. 
I think 1 is correct, behaviour seen as a mere event, Sheila sneezing, would be 
explained by a cause, behaviour seen as an action, Sheila fumbling for her 
tissues, would be explained with a reason. 2 is correct, but 3 unsatisfactory. I 
suppose we could say Bill switched his car to unleaded petrol for, for the sake 
of, his desire to be kind to the environment. Accepting Davidson's view that the 
reason includes a means-end belief means that Buss would have to talk of Bill 
switching his car... for what? for his belief that unleaded petrol is kinder to the 
environment? This seems awkward. Hereafter things go haywire. If by "non- 
intentional" Buss means that intention is not relevant then this agrees with our 
thesis. If he means "unintentional" then 4 would hold that Hamlet's stabbing 
Polonius behind the arras is not an action, I do not see how this can be. 
5 Explaining an intentional behaviour with reasons is constitutive of that 
behavioural event being an action. Here we agree. Could an action, an 
intentional behaviour, be explained by causes which are not reasons? "Hamlet 
drank from the poisoned cup because... " can there be a cause which is not a 
reason but which enables us to maintain that Hamlet intentionally drank? I do 
not think so. If an event is explained without intention coming into the picture 
then that event is not seen as an action. Take Hamlet drinking from the 
poisoned cup. If we say Hamlet drank from the cup because he slumped under 
the table and the vile contents trickled into his open mouth then that event is 
not an action. If we say he placed himself in such a position that the vile 
contents... then it is an action. 
An ambiguity that suggests itself earlier comes out: Buss seems to think that 
some behaviour simply is an action, some simply is an occurrence. The whole 
point is that whether it is an action or not depends on how it is viewed in the 
explanation. Some behaviours do seem to fall into the subclass of actions, 
taking a square root, and some do seem to be mere events, reflexes. I would 
say that if an observer (or an actor) explains an event, some behaviour say, 
without invoking intention then that behaviour is not an action, (is not seen as, 
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or represented as, an action). The view which Buss expresses here, that it is a 
conceptual matter that actors and observers must offer different kinds of 
explanation, is the basis for his view that attribution theory needs the distinction 
that he tries to draw. I have argued that whether some behaviour (or any event 
for that matter) is explained using causes or reasons depends on whether it is 
explained as an action or a (mere) event. It seems to me to be seriously 
mistaken to imagine that the logic of our languages forces observers of a 
behaviour to see it one way and the person whose behaviour is up for 
explanation in another. Buss is right when he says that these different kinds of 
explanation are logically distinct. Explain an event with reasons, bring in 
intentions, and the event is an action and the person behaving is an agent. I 
think he is right in an interesting and important way, when he suggests that the 
way in which questions are asked, and the status of explainers, matter. This is 
to do with the implications of being, or not being, an agent. These issues are 
moral, rhetorical, in short loaded ones, and are to do with whether on sees 
oneself, or another, as blameworthy or praiseworthy, or guilty or not guilty. 
Buss can be taken to task for not making it clear that this is a conceptual 
finding, based on the logical properties of the concepts involved. Harvey and 
Tucker (1979) understand Buss to be putting forward a hypothesis. As I hope 
I have shown, his claim that we can conclude what kind of explanation a person 
will draw is a bogus one. 
Kruglanski (following Buss in seeing teleological explanation as identical to 
reason explanation) agrees that since these explanations crop up in lay 
explanation then attribution theory should study them. He says two remarkable 
things. 
1, That reason and causal explanations are part of an indefinitely large class of 
explanation types and that attempting to classify these would be a fruitless task. 
He considers the cause reason distinction to be on all fours with any other 
classifications of explanations that could be proposed for example, mechanical - 
nonmechanical; biological - nonbiological. This is remarkable because 
Kruglanski has not understood the way in which causes and reasons are distinct; 
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I would have thought that the attribution of agency' to another is of key 
importance in our analysis of explanation. 
2, That conceptual analysis of such notions as causes and reasons is tantamount 
to a "preoccupation with lay concepts". Perhaps Kruglanski feels that no events 
can be seen as actions in a science of psychology; a move that B. F. Skinner 
advocated. Isn't the "lay" idea of cause still present? Wasn't it through a 
preoccupation with lay concepts that such a move was made? I agree with 
Stratton et al. (1988) that we have to ask what purpose a conceptual analysis 
will serve. My purpose here has been to decide what expressions should be 
seen as causal ones: For an attempt to select "attributions" from an open field 
it is important to be clear about what we are looking for. In trying to describe 
explaining we should be as clear as we can be about the issues involved. I 
think that grasping the logic of explanation, the notion of agency with its shades 
of culpability and the rest, is important. 
2 .0 Sentential connectives 
in causal expressions 
Given then, that some expressions are not be excluded from the analysis of 
causal beliefs on the grounds that they are reasons, I want to turn to the subject 
of how speakers express causal beliefs. 
Some writers have suggested that a causal statement can be identified by the 
presence of a keyword, for example "because" or "therefore", or a phrase, such - 
as "due to", (Castellon). Others have reported research based on a keyword 
identification (Antaki and Naji, 1987). At first glance this approach seems fine. 
HA7 (01.26) I can't go anyway because it's not fit to live in 
yet. 
HA7 (04.26) 1 hadn't expected it you know so that upset me. 
Clearly, however, some expressions of causal beliefs do not contain a causal 
connective. 
HA7 (04.26) The first week was fine we sort of got on with it. 
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Here it could be suggested that a connective is -elided. "-"The' sense does not 
seem to be changed with the following substitution: 
HA7 (04.26)' The first week was fine because we sort of got on 
with it. 
Are these cases of connective-free causal statements the exception or the rule? 
When connectives are present which ones tend to occur? ' How big a list would 
one need to capture' most causal statements? How many false positives would 
result? Clearly words which can be used as causal connectives are not only used 
in that way, for example: 
TC8 (29.50) 1 don't mean to put it so extravagant as that. 
Answering these questions for a sample of verbatim material is, in principle, 
straightforward. What we require is a sample of expressions which someone 
judges to be causal ones. We could then look at the variety of causal 
connectives in the selected expressions. The answer will of course, be relative 
to that person's judgement, but it seems to me to be a sufficiently interesting 
question to ask what expressions are routinely recognised as causal ones. And 
the answer should enable an assessment to be made of the adequacy of using 
a machine to sample causal expressions in analysing a text. 
The data used in the studies which I reported in chapter, two and the LFTRC 
archives offer data of just this kind. Furthermore, since these are on magnetic 
disk a computer search could be used. A concordance program such as the 
Oxford Concordance Program (OCP) developed for linguistic and stylistic 
analysis is used in this study. ' The program will search through a text and 
report all the occurrences of a specified list of keywords together with a certain 
amount of context. So a comparison can be made between the 
keywords/phrases present in the list of attributions with those present in the 
source text as a whole. This procedure is sketched in figure 3.1: 
1 I'd like to thank Lee Davidson of the department of linguistics and 
phonetics for his help in using OCP. 
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FIGURE 3.1 PROCEDURE FOR COMPARING CAUSAL CONNECTIVES IN THE SOURCE 
TEXT WITH THOSE IN THE ATTRIBUTIONS 
TEXT ATTRIBUTIONS 
OCP OCT 
11 
REPORT REPORT 
L--COMPARE 
This approach differs from the study reported by Altenberg (1984) in that here 
I can look at expressions noted by the coder without them having to contain 
explicit connectives at all. The use of a keyword list here is 1, just one way of 
isolating those sentential connectives which do contain explicit connectives; 2, 
looking at connectives over all noting which connectives were not selected. 
The task of sending the files from disks formatted on a BBC Micro to the 
mainframe computer where a version of OCP is available is fairly straightforward 
using a file transfer protocol such as kermit. In the case of the this material, 
however, certain steps must be taken to prepare the text for analysis by OCP. 
Both the text and the list of attributions need to be formatted in various ways 
and in additional I replaced the participant's names with pseudonyms. 
Unfortunately there are numerous snags with the data available. 
The list of extracted statements made by a coder provides an identification of 
that coder's judgement of what a causal belief is. When a coder makes a list 
of the causal statements they often paraphrase what the speaker says. Para- 
phrasing the connective itself, or the introduction of a connective where there 
was none originally, wrecks the chance of using the list as a sample of naturally 
occurring causal expressions. 
For example the following - attribution is reported 
DS1E (24.58) You like pocket money because of the things you 
can do with it. 
But the text reads: 
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DIGS1 24.58 Yeah. Well, pocket money helps surely. So you 
like the things that you can do with pocket money. Mmm? 
Fortunately the practice followed by most coders involves attaching the time of 
the statement. This helps us to locate the original utterance. 
Method 1: Can the location be done . 
by machine? The time recorded in the 
attribution can serve as a "tag" by which the original statement itself can be 
retrieved. By editing out all the times in the extracted list a file containing 
editing instructions, a macro, can be made which will modify those times in the 
original file. A further, macro can then be run on the tagged file, picking out 
the tagged utterances and a certain amount of context. 
FIGURE 3.2 PROCEDURE FOR COMPARING CAUSAL CONNECTIVES IN THE SOURCE 
TEXT WITH THOSE IN EXTRACTED ßORTIONS CORRESPONDING TO THE 
ATTRIBUTIONS 
?l 
TEXT ATTRIBUTIONS EXTRACTIONS 
II 
OCP OCP 
L1 
REPORT REPORT 
COMPARE 
Unfortunately the time itself is misreported in a small number of cases. In 
these cases, of course, the selection procedure will fail, almost invariably failing 
to find a corresponding time in the original list, a false negative. But these 
failures can be readily detected since the messages returned from the macro will 
indicate "No line(s) changed". I developed a test procedure based on this 
principle. 
There are further problems. Sometimes the tag is inadequate. This is a 
problem in in the case of long uninterrupted stretches of speech. Here a whole 
crop of extracted attributions will share the same tag and only the one near 
enough the start will be extracted. This problem together, with the problem of 
a misreported time which happens to be a time of another statement, can only 
be detected manually. Both these errors will have the effect of producing a 
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false negative: the procedure will fail to find an attribution that was in fact 
detected. 
Wrong speaker identified: The OCP identification of speakers is unreliable due 
to a disparity between the method used to identify speakers in the LFTRC data 
base and the method demanded by OCP. ' 
Compound attributions: There is not always a one-to-one correspondence 
between attribution and utterance; sometimes more than one attribution is 
detected in a single utterance. Such cases affect attempts to find the proportion 
of any particular class of attributions in relation to the total. Here the total 
number of attributions should be adjusted so that each attributional statement 
is only counted once. 
Unfortunately the files yielded by this procedure are simply inadequate. The 
fundamental problem is that the expressions selected often occur a long way 
beneath the time cited. For example, see the three attributions below and the 
corresponding test which the procedure extracted. Here the second utterance 
is retrieved successfully but the first one is not. The third' attribution yields a 
redundant sample of text as well as the one desired. 
<T ARI> 
((02: 08)) <S MUM> They're away , so I'm afraid that was out of 
the question. [coming to Clinic]. 
((03: 47)) <S DAD> (I answered for him because] he probably 
doesn't know. 
((04: 40)) <S DAD> I'm now managing director of the firm in 
Leeds, otherwise I'd up sticks and back to Kent. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Yes 
........ and umm I think we were quite expecting 
that they'd come as well............ 
((102: 05)) <S MUM> + They don't live... umm..... 
((1$02: 08)) <S DAD> ! One's in London...... 
((102: 10)) <S MUM> + One"s in London. 
........ other one ----Polytechnic so... 
..... I see so there away 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Infact we'd better start further than that hadn't we? 
Where, were you born Martin? 
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((103: 45)) <S MUM> + Nottingham. 
((1$03: 47)) <S DAD> I was just going, to ask Martin..... 
((1$03: 47)) <S MUM> + He probably doesn't know. 
........ no a good one. We have one... one 
boy 
born in Colchester, and two born in Nottingham. I've moved 
--------------------------------------------------- -------- 
Where were you born Martin? 
((103: 45)) <S MUM> + Nottingham. 
((1$03: 47)) <S DAD> I was just going to ask Martin..... 
((1$03: 47)) <S MUM> + He probably doesn't know. 
........ no a good one. We 
have one... one boy 
born in Colchester, and two born in Nottingham. I've moved 
round with my job, and we thought we'd got back home when we 
were going back B------- in Kent didn't we? And 
----------------------------------------------------------- + 
Six and a half years ago. 
((104: 38)) <S DAD> Yes. 
((104: 39)) <S MUM> Six years last August. 
((1$04: 40)) <S DAD> I'm now managing director of the firm 
in Leeds, otherwise I'd up sticks and back to Kent. Umm.. 
and I think this has been unsettling don't you? + 
((1$04: 48)) <S MUM> 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
Method 2: An alternative is to compare the OCP report file from the transcript 
with the list of attributions manually, with reference to the transcript for help 
where necessary. This procedure is outlined in figure 3.3. 
FIGURE 3.3 PROCEDURE FOR COMPARING CAUSAL CONNECTIVES IN THE SOURCE 
TEXT WITH ATTRIBUTIONS 
-TEXT ATTRIBUTIONS 
OCP 
1l 
REPORT I 
COMPARE 
2.1.1 Data 
There are four groups of data in the LFTRC archives for which there are 
corresponding analyses of causal expressions as a result of previous work. The 
first group listed below is from my own analyses of the data reported in the first 
study of chapter two. 'The other three groups are from analyses carried out by 
other members of the LFTRC to whom I am very grateful for letting me 
scrutinise their work. Group (2), families carrying out tasks, is drawn from 
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data forming part of a study on the ý relationship between family dynamics and 
obesity in children. The data consist of transcripts from eight families, four with 
obese children and four without, carrying tasks in accordance with tape recorded 
instructions. Group (4) consists of interviews with families in their own homes 
carried out as part of a recent doctoral project at LFTRC. 
TABLE 3.1 PROVENANCE OF DATA 
Provenance Number of 
words 
1 Families in therapy (1). 41 565 
2 Families tackling tasks. 75 804 
3 Families in therapy (2). 65 478 
4 Families not in therapy, 32 445 
(Darlinaton Interview). 
total 215 292 
Chapter two gives more information about the nature of the transcripts. 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below show the amount of time in conversation that they 
constitute and the number of attributions present. 
2.1.2 Analysis 
The method used is to specify a set of keywords/phrases and to see how many 
are represented in the selected attributions. What list should be used? Of 
interest here is the pair "because" and "cos" (Antaki & Naji, 1987) or the 
complete list produced by the linguists Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech and Svartik 
(1985). Appendix 2 contains an OCP command file of the latter list, this was 
used in the present study. The procedure is to compare the ' OCP output of all 
occurrences of because/cos with the list of all attributions and to score a "hit" 
for those occurrences which were selected by the analyser and a "miss" for those 
which were not. 
2.13 Results 
Table 3.1 and 3.2 summarise the data for each group of families. 
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TABLE 3.1 SU14MARY OF RESULTS FOR EACH GROUP OF TRANSCRIPTS AND 
OVERALL SHOWING 
--NUMBER OF WORDS, NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE (RWORDS) 
--NUMBER OF ATTRIBUTIONS, NUMBER PER MINUTE (RATTS), NUMBER PER 
WORD (PATTS). 
T TIME WORDS ATT RWORDS RATTS PATTS 
foer minutel 
1 373.82 41565 461 111.43 1.23 1.109 
2 466.67 75804 894 162.44 1.92 1.179 
3 484.20 65478 766 135.52 1.58 1.170 
4 239.93 32445 151 135.23 0.63 . 465 
1564.62 215292 2272 137.88 1.45 1.060 
TABLE 3.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR EACH GROUP OF TRANSCRIPTS AND 
OVERALL SHOWING: 
--NUMBER OF "BECAUSE" AND "COS" UTTERANCES SELECTED BY ANALYST 
(BCH), IN TOTAL (BCT) AND THE PROPORTION SELECTED 
(PBC=100*BCH/BCT); 
--NUMBER OF ATTRIBUTIONS (ATT) AND THE % CONTRIBUTION OF 
"BECAUSE" AND "COS" EXPRESSIONS'(CBC=100*BCH/ATT); 
--MEAN RATE OF OCCURRENCE OF "BECAUSE" AND "COS" EXPRESSIONS 
(RBC=BCH/TIME) AND 
--NUMBER OF "BECAUSE" AND "COS" UTTERANCES PER MINUTE 
(RBCT=BCT/TIME*1000) 
T TIME BCH BCT ATT PBC CBC RBC RBCT 
fminl 1%1 1%1 fper mint 
1 373.82 137 230 461 59.57 29.72 . 37 5.53 
2 466.67' 257 316 894 81.33 28.74 . 55 4.17 
3 484.20 216 322 766 67.08 28.20 . 45 4.9 
4 239 93 54 85 151 63.53 35.76 . 23 2.6 
1564.62 664 953 2272 69.67 29.23 . 42 4.43 
The overall number of because and cos statements in this data differs from the 
figure reported by Antaki and Naji (1987). For a 200,000 word sample from the 
Lund corpus they reported 666 occurrences of because and cos statement, a 
frequency of 1.06 per thousand words. This is presumably due to different 
choice of words for the speakers in the two samples. Antaki and Naji report 
that the sample that they used consisted of 140 speakers, of whom 67 were 
"academics" "and the rest were in middle class occupations, such as 'banker', 
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'doctor', 'teacher' and 'nurse'for the number of "because"/ "cos". All speakers 
were over 20. My sample included children and people in other kinds of work 
such as a mechanic and a clerical worker as well as some people who were 
unemployed. 
From the point of view of looking at the prevalence of attributions containing 
because or cos column six of table 3.2 is of interest. This shows that 
"because"/"cos" only constitutes 29.23% of the attributions selected. 
Of course not all the occurrences of this connective were picked out by the 
analyst. A worst case would be if we assume that all occurrences of 
"because/cos" are "attributions". This would then make the total number of 
attributions ATT + (BCT-BCH). - In other words, 
(BCT-BCH) were attributions, 
but were missed by the analyst. So then 289 attributions were missed out of 
a total of 2561. In this situation, the proportion of attributions to which 
"because" or "cos" contribute would be 953/2561 = 0.372,37.2% This suggests 
that Antaki and Naji (1987) will have missed a high proportion of attributions 
in their study. If the speakers studied by Antaki and Naji are using a wider 
range of constructions to express causes then this strengthens the case that their 
method of selecting causal expression misses many that are present in the data. 
Of course I cannot say whether or not this would bias the findings which they 
report on the basis of their method of collection. 
Why were some expressions missed and what features are by the rest of the 
expressions selected? Looking at the occurrences of because/cos which were not 
selected we find that many reveal good reasons for being omitted by the 
analyser: 1, They may have been uttered by the therapist or interviewer whose 
speech was not included in the analysis which we are studying. 2, The 
explanation was incomplete, for example the speaker my fail to complete a 
causal expression: 
SR1A 
<A 12: 51> <S DEB> I don't like football either .............. 
<A 12: 55> <S PETER> +I don't like... I don't like ballet 
because it's ........................ don't like school. 
I 
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................. but I like majorettes. 
And I like ballet. That's what I........... 
or there could be a problem with the text: 
PTlA <15: 35> <S ROGER> + Yes. [inaudible] 'Cos he's getting 
married to Sheila. 
A further interesting problem develops. In the case of families solving tasks. 
Here we find causal utterances of relating to the task itself. 
CI1A <29: 36> <S DAD> Yeah, but are these three at the bottom 
there supposed to be yellow because they've got no 
red.... no... no reds. 
These have informally been referred to as "rules". In practice some appear to 
be selected, others not, for example: 
KT1A <29: 05> <S DAD> I 
<A 29: 07> <S MUM> + 
yellow's there. 
2.1.4 Other connectives 
Why not? 
Because the mauve's there and the 
What of the other connectives? "As", "so" and "for" occur in great numbers, 
many of which are clearly not causal. For example: 
ARZT <A 11: 10><S MARTIN> They are so close together and so 
totally different that they don't get on terribly well. But I 
mean that's between the two of them, they get on with that, it 
doesn't usually involve Martin does it? 
AR15 <A 08: 48><S DAD> ... And he says he wants to 
be regarded as a normal eighteen year old but he can't convert 
two and a half yards into feet and inches... 
HAlT <A 30: 32><S MUM> ... I'd get up and get Mary and 
Steven dressed and sorted out and then start on the sweet 
trolley as soon as Mary went to bed for the morning 
nap....... 
Analysing these in the same way as because/cos above is not feasible because 
of the large number involved: there are, as it were, too many false positives. 
This raises the issue, of selecting the verbatim segments of speech used by the 
speaker. As I have shown above there is no economical fast way of achieving 
this. Furthermore it seems that this cannot be done on any simple systematic 
basis as we continually find attributions drawing on large areas of text. 
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For example, in the attributions: 
<06: 12> <DAD> If somebody says do you want to go out for a drink 
tonight with it being tuesday, mid week. Ithink no, I want to do 
something at home. 
<06: 39> <DAD> Unless I was really enthusiastic about it or I'd 
had a bad day and wanted to shut off I'd probably say no, Idon't 
want a drink or go to the pictures. 
Correspond to the following piece of text: 
CL1T <A 06: 08> <S THERP> So would you say that you weren't 
keen or... 
<A 06: 12> <S DAD> Oh no, no, no, it's er.. I think that 
it's er...... a case of... I don't know... how would you 
describe..... it even boils down to if er..... if somebody 
says oh do you want to go out for a drink tonight, with it 
being Tuesday, not that there's 'owt on telly that I want to 
watch but... sort of mid week an I think... na.. I want 
to do something at home... and I'd even put off going out 
for a drink, wouldn't I? truthfully ............. 
<A 06: 39> <S MUM> I Yes 
......... through week you 
know, unless I was really 
enthusiastic about it or I'd had a bad day and I wanted to. 
to totally shut off. Umm..... I'd... I'd probably say na I 
don't want a drink you know.... or go pictures I don't go to 
pictures or 'owt like... 
dy.... umm.... 
It appears that we cannot opt for anything in between the entire text and the 
paraphrased attribution in any other than an arbitrary way. Earlier in the same 
text there is a string of examples showing a range of statements selected as 
attributions, but which lack the causal connectives discussed by Antaki and Naji. 
The attributions recorded follow the piece of text in square brackets 
<T CRL11T> 
<A 03: 40> <S MUM> + I've basically been in clerical but... I've 
done waitressing and all sorts of other jobs.... which I. 
prefer actually. I think this... the job that really gets me 
down just lately...... you know... I think that's what it is, 
definately. 
<A 03: 59> <S DAD> + We're feeling these stress points and.. 
<A 04: 02> <S MUM> Plus working together, you know, living 
together and working together the same office incidentally... 
umm. I don't think... I think where together too much.... 
constantly. It doesn't seem to bother Barry. Well it's not 
apparent with him but.... I crack a bit quicker than you do. 
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[I think it's the job that really gets me down just lately) 
[Plus living and working together in the same office I think 
we're together too much] 
<A 05: 11> <S MUM> Anything that upsets his little daily 
routine bothers him. 
[Anything that upsets his little daily routine bothers him) 
<A 06: 54> <S MUM> No let's face it in town I'll stop 
with any market researcher and umm.. and Susie and I stop 
with them all don't we... testing crisps and everything. I like 
to take part in something if it's helping somebody. 
Ii like to take part in something if-it's helping somebody] 
if he came up.... and said right are ya going out then I'd 
go. 
(If he came up and said right are you going out then I'd go) 
So in addition to constructions involving "if' there is a class of expressions which 
contain verbs with a causal semantic component such as "gets" and "bothers" in 
these contexts. 
Note that "why" can occur as a question or as a causal connection as the "that's 
why" in 
<A 13: 35><S MUM> 
> Like that... Mary no.. [talking to baby] 
........... to the extent 
that's why the pressure is on 
2.2 Attributions and questions 
In providing a rational for their choice of the Lund Corpus Antaki and Naji 
refer to Stratton et al (1986) and remark that in this data causal statements 
were specially sought. This is not in fact true. Perhaps Artaki and Naji 
consider therapy to be fundamentally about therapists searching for causal 
beliefs. The issue of whether or not attributions occur as responses to questions 
from others can be addressed in an approximate way with this data. The 
number of times that "why" occurs, uttered by anyone, let alone the therapist is 
small compared to the number of attributions overall. Looking at other forms 
of interrogatives "what made you... " we again find few of these. Overall "why" 
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occurred, not necessarily as part of a question, 237 times. Since a total of 2272 
attributions were recorded the ratio of "why" to attributions is 0.104. It does not 
appear then that in this data the explanations offered by speakers were 
specifically elicited by the therapist or interviewer. 
23 Discussion of results 
It strikes me as important to make clear three limitations which should be 
bourne in mind when assessing the results of this study. Firstly there are two 
problems with the data itself: there may be, undetected errors' in hearing what 
the speakers said or in its spelling. Such errors won't affect my results 
subtantially however. More importantly, the study looks at just those statements 
which struck a certain group of people as being causal ones. In the absence of 
any alternative I don't see this reliance on the analyst's intuition as a principled 
problem. The problem is that other analysts may have different intuitions. In 
this sense the subjects in my study are the analysts and I am looking at what 
expressions strike them as causal ones, an interesting enough project I think. 
The findings are relevant to attempts to pick out causal statements by machine. 
I have shown, indeed quantified, some of the problems with such an approach. 
3.0 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have tried to address two issues which are important in 
attribution theory and in the study of explanations in general. Conceptually, I 
have tried to show that reasons are a species of cause and to address this to a 
debate on reasons and causes in attribution theory. Empirically I have loöked 
at some of the features of utterances which led to them being 'classified as 
causal ones. 
In that study I have tried to develop and clarify points raised in the LACS 
Manual and in the study of Antaki and Naji (1987). I have shown that a 
machine extraction process would not find many of the "attributions" detected 
by a human analyser, but that it could be of help. The keyword approach used 
by Antaki and Naji would only sample at most half the attributions present. 
Though as they remark there is no theoretical reason, and no evidence here that 
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their finding (that single actions of another person rarely occur as topics of 
explanation) should be different when other, causal connectives are used. This 
is a subject which could be taken up empirically. A topic for further study is 
explored by Altenberg (1984). Altenberg looks to considerations of discourse 
structure to explain the range of expressions which he finds. That is, that 
discourse structure may constrain speakers choice of causal expression. A more 
radical issue is the issue of whether or not causal, beliefs themselves are 
discursively formulated. In the next chapter I want to consider how conversa- 
tional structure has been studied and whether or not such approaches are helpful 
to an understanding the context-specific pressures on a speaker. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS OF ANALYSING SPOKEN DISCOURSE 
In this chapter I pursue the idea that in analysing causal beliefs in naturally 
occurring discourse it is utterances, rather than beliefs that we are studying. 
Now utterances are situated, that is, they occur in specific contexts. By context 
I am specifically concerned with the communicative, rather than, say the physical 
context. In order to examine the sense in which what a speaker says is 
conditioned by the context in which they speak I need to take up a prior 
question: what account can be given of the communicative context? in other 
words, how can utterances, speech, be analysed? I review seven approaches to 
the analysis of conversation which have developed in various disciplines. For 
practical and theoretical reasons I argue that the approach generally called 
"conversation analysis" is the best equipped to guide empirical work in the field, 
at least for my purposes, and I discuss some of the findings and methods which 
have emerged from this subdiscipline. Practically, this approach does not rely 
on the classification of types of utterances as a means of analysis: it tries to use 
material present in detailed transcripts of conversation. Theoretically, it does 
not impose a model of discourse structure nor speaker's methods onto the 
data. This approach stimulates the studies presented below in chapters five and 
six. I discuss it further chapter eight. 
I propose and discuss the term "communicative constraint" as the most general 
term to describe how what a person can say is conditioned by the context or 
situation in which they are. 
1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Utterances as situated events 
In what sense are a speaker's utterances constrained by the situation, or context, 
in which they occur? So far we have looked at causal statements in naturally 
occurring talk and we have considered the impact of this domain for attribution 
theory in particular. In this chapter I want to continue the theme of a transition 
from causal beliefs to causal utterances by examining how the 'fact that 
utterances are situated events can be studied. Utterances are situated in the 
I 
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sense that they occur in specific times and places. This feature is dramatic in 
the case of deixis, or indexical expressions (Bar-Hillel, 1954). An indexical is 
an expression which contains an index or pointing term and which relies on the 
fact that the utterances occurs at a certain time and place for its sense. Stock 
examples of such expression are pronouns and temporal expressions. 
"I am called John" is true when uttered by me, and others with that name. The 
truth value depends on who says. 
"Tomorrow is 12th August 1989" is only true when uttered on a certain day. 
Although we generally analyse such expressions in terms of the situation being 
critical there is a counter part to this in that the speaker has to have an 
understanding of the situation in which they speak. In the case of the 
communicative environment this ability has to be acknowledged as a con- 
siderable accomplishment. A speaker knows how to embed utterances in 
contexts in order to bring about certain things. Habermas (1970a) calls this 
"communicative competence". In so far as speakers are responsive to features 
of the situation we must acknowledge that the situation places constraints on 
what speakers can say. 
I propose to consider pressures which operate in speech situations as "com- 
municative constraints". Perhaps this term sounds unduly pessimistic, but I don't 
intend "constraint" to imply solely coercion, such constraints are also enabling. 
A standard account of the interpretation of a problematic expression is that the 
interpreter has to visualise a context within which the expression makes sense. 
In the case of an ambiguous expression we often say that the context constrains, 
or narrows, the possible meanings that the expression can have, thus Ricoeur 
writes: 
What is important for the present discussion is that the polysemy 
of words calls forth as its counterpart the selective role of contexts 
for determining the current value which words assume in a 
determinate message, addressed by a definite speaker to a hearer 
placed in a particular situation. Sensitivity to context is the 
complement and ineluctable counterpart of polysemy. (1981, p. 44) 
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Furthermore, we also''talk, in at least some cases, of an utterance of one 
speaker constraining the next utterance of another speaker. Indeed I think that 
the concept of a reply involves some notion of a constraint. To be a reply an 
utterance must be interpreted in such a way that it means something with 
respect to a previous utterance. For example if Jones asks Smith when she's 
going to take her holiday, possible replies are under the constraint of containing 
some temporal index or, failing that, a holiday relevant detail, or a reference to 
the situation of the questioning. 
J: When are you going on holiday? 
S: Not until June 15th. 
S: I haven't decided yet. 
S: It's none of your business 
I think that a response such as: 
S: I'm going to the cinema tonight 
Would not usually be recognised as a reply. Of course as I said, it could be 
counted a reply if it could be interpreted in a way that meant something to the 
questioner. I will discuss these issues further when I examine the idea of norms. 
Although I have stressed that I do not want to restrict the sense of constraint 
to situations of dominance and although I shall not study it here, " the coercive 
connotation is important and should not be forgotten. 
In this chapter I propose to ask, 1 what formulations do we have för thinking 
about the relationship of utterances and their contexts and 2, what empirical 
research has been done on this? In chapter one I discussed some of the ways 
in which approaches to the social and human sciences and studies have oriented 
themselves to studying discourse. Some of that discussion will be relevant here, 
for example, ethnomethodological investigations have developed an approach to 
analysing conversational structure. 
In what follows I want to 1, make a brief critical review of some approaches 
to studying spoken discourse which might be expected to be of use in my 
analysis of communicative constraints; 2, draw together some of the ways in 
which the idea of constraints has been used. 
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2.0 Approaches to analysing talk 
In this section I propose to review seven approaches to studying talk. As with 
my review of approaches to the place of language in researching day-to-day 
understanding in chapter one, these approaches are not all on an equal footing, 
differing in their objectives. The first two are approaches that have emerged in 
social psychology; the second is an approach which has arisen in linguistics; the 
third and fourth are philosophical analyses which have stimulated some empirical 
work; the sixth has arisen in anthropology/sociolinguistics and the seventh 
in sociology. 
2.1 Social Psychological Studies: Experimental 
The distinctive feature of a study which proceeds by an experimental method is 
that conditions are manipulated so that the effect of different conditions (the 
independent variable) on something else can be observed. Many researchers 
have felt that the experimental method is the hallmark of science. Two things, 
however, -bear on an experiment. The state of knowledge about the phenomena 
observed needs to be quite advanced so that a manipulation can occur at all. 
Secondly we need to be in a position to say what variable we want to test. 
Several researchers in the field of conversation have argued that naturally 
occurring data are important, I agree with them. On this issue Goodwin (1981) 
cites Condon and Ogston (1967, p. 221) 
the need to control the variables in experimental method tends to 
modify the process under investigation. In human behaviour, it is 
quite often not even clear what the variables are, such that they 
could be controlled. What is required to some extent is a method 
which could investigate and make relatively rigorous, predictable 
statements about a process without disrupting the process too 
severely. 
Goodwin also cites Kendon (1974, p. 150) 
In all these cases, however, the investigator has studied only those 
features of the listener's behaviour he has determined in advance. 
The listener is always giving a controlled performance, where what 
he does and when he does it has been decided upon beforehand 
as part of the experimental design. We know remarkably little in 
1 TI 
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a systematic way, about what it is that speakers ordinarily do, and 
how what they do is related to what speakers do. 
2.2 Social Psychological Studies: Observational 
In non-experimental studies social psychologists have tended to follow a 
procedure capable of yielding quantitative data. The method widely adopted is 
to choose a set of categories and to then note how often they occur in a scene. 
This approach is the basis of content analysis and of the procedure adopted by 
Bales (1950). There are two limitations of such a procedure: firstly, with 
respect to categorization, what categories are to be used? Secondly a simple 
frequency count of these categories fails to grasp the structure of the interaction 
or conversation. 
Observational studies of conversation in social psychology have tended 
overwhelmingly to be carried out along the lines of content analysis. This 
proceeds by scoring the occurrence of selected phenomena in a stretch of data. 
The results are frequency counts. In a sense the studies reported in chapter 
three are content-analytic in so far as I am interested in the occurrence of 
certain categories, namely different causal connectives in transcripts and in 
analyst's selections of causal attributions. There are two limitations of this 
approach, which I shall argue, render it unsuitable for my purposes. Firstly 
there is the problem of the categories themselves. In my study of causal 
connectives the point of the analysis was explicitly to look at the occurrence of 
these terms. It is typically the case in a using content analysis that the 
researcher needs to choose phenomena as an index of something else. In a 
study which I will report below (Duncan and Fiske, 1977), the investigators 
didn't even know what phenomena would be of interest to them. Furthermore, 
in my study the categories can be defined precisely and distinguished mechanic- 
ally. Firstly, there is no doubt about whether or not a "because" or an "in order 
to,, is occurring. Secondly, there is no problem about distinguishing these from 
each other. The second major limitation is that in compiling a frequency count 
the structure of the data is unanalysed. 
ehr 
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Duncan and Fiske (1977) report what they call an "external variable" study. This 
name seems to have been chosen for two reasons. Firstly the variables studied 
are defined etically, that is they are objectivistic. Secondly the variables are to 
be related to identify relationships between them and other measures, such as 
length of turn and speakers' judgements of whether or not the conversation was 
sociable. They hypothesised that personality would relate to behaviour in 
conversation. They find however, (p. 123): 
Our substantive findings from our studies of correlates of acts in 
interaction do not impress us. While the number of observed 
relationships was large, it formed a small proportion of the total 
number of correlations computed. In other words, the proportion 
of large correlations was not greatly above the proportion which 
would be expected by chance. 
I have trouble understanding the point of this kind of analysis. It, seems to be 
the case that research is motivated by finding data on which to exercise 
methodological ideas rather than to explore interaction. 
2.3 Exchange Structure 
The approach to the analysis of talk which is most closely rooted in linguistic 
theory amongst the analyses which I will consider in this brief review originated 
in the English Language Research Group at Birmingham University (U. K. ). 
Important presentations of this groups work are Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) 
and Coulthard and Montgomery (1981). The intellectual orientation of the 
group can be summarized as follows: spoken discourse consists of a number of 
units which are hierarchically organised, units can only fit together in certain 
ways. Taylor and Cameron label this a "slot and filler" approach and emphasise 
its similarity to Pike's theory. 
I have already indicated why I think that the isolation of units is problematic. 
There is nothing in this approach to justify how the stream of speech can be 
segmented into conversational units. The motivation behind the organization 
account sought by workers in this tradition is that there are quasi-grammatical 
rules which will generate stretches of well-formed discourse. 
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Writing on the "motivating analysis of exchange structure" Stubbs (1981, p. 107) 
remarks that . 
Linguistics has traditionally been concerned with characterising 
well-formed versus deviant strings, that is with stating the con- 
straints on the distribution of units such as phonemes and 
morphemes. The basic aim is to predict the correct surface 
distribution of forms, and the basic assumption is that any given 
string is recognisably well- or ill- formed, with only a few doubtful 
cases if any. 
He continues, saying that grammaticality too, fading hopes of transformational 
grammar notwithstanding, is a meaningful concept. What of discourse? 
On the face of it, the concept of well-formedness also applies to 
discourse. (p. 108). 
Taylor and Cameron (p. 74) point out that the proposed rules, for example, 
that an "Exchange" is made up of a sequence of "Initiation" + "Response" + 
"Feedback" are just descriptions of -the patterning of discourse, not rules. 
Furthermore, Stubbs needs to invoke a competence-performance distinction in 
order to explain departures from the norm. This is problematic since it leaves 
unexplored the data that we actually find. Taylor and Cameron go on to point 
out that it is not clear whether or not these principles are rules in the 
grammatical sense, or whether they are followable prescriptions which speakers 
choose to follow rationally. 
This approach may offer interesting descriptions of speech phenomena at a fairly 
coarse level, descriptions which could be of value for specific ends in many 
teaching environments. It may be useful for people learning English as a 
foreign language to know that typical service encounters in the U. K. the person 
behind the counter may open with a question like "who's next" followed by a 
request to know what the customer requires. 
Of course the reason why this knowledge would be useful is so that the language 
learner has the social know-how to get along smoothly. What an account of 
regularities falls short of offering is a grasp of what these regularities consist in: 
I don't detect either an analysis of how contexts may constrain speakers. This 
reason, along with my doubts about how move tokens are to be identified, 
renders this approach unsuitable for my purposes. 
I 
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2.4 Speech Act Theory 
Speech act theory originates in a series of lectures, the William James Lectures, 
given by the Oxford professor J. L Austin at Harvard University in 1955. As it 
happens the next of the philosophical approaches which I want to consider, H. P. 
Grice's analysis of conversational implicature, also originates in a series of 
William James Lectures. The lectures were published after Austin's death in 
1962 as a short book entitled How to do things with words. Although another 
philosopher, John Searle has amplified and systematized Austin's work. I want 
to start with a consideration of Austin's book. 
The title is apt for Austin's objective is to show the sense in which utterances 
are used to do things, to bring things about, rather that to describe how things 
are. He starts his discussion with "a consideration of utterances which would be 
classified as statements on grammatical grounds but which, unlike usual 
statements 1, do not report or describe anything and, are not true or false; 2, 
when utterred are part of doing something, which would not normally be 
considered to be reporting or describing. 
Examples are: 
'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth' uttered in the course of 
naming a ship, or 
'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow' (p. 5). 
Austin proposed to call such utterances "performative utterances", or just 
"performatives". These are contrasted with "constatives", his name for statements 
which report or describe and which are true or false. If such utterances are not 
true or false are there any constraints on them at all? For a naming of a ship 
to be a naming of a ship certain things need to be the case, certain conditions 
need to hold. Austin call such conditions "felicity conditions". After analysing 
these he goes on to show that his isolation of performatives was really a didactic 
step and he proceeds to argue against the distinction between constatives and 
performatives showing that in speaking three acts take place. 
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The theory that emerges proposes that there are three kinds of acts performed 
when an utterance is made, locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. 
The locutionary act is the act of saying whatever one does, the illocutionary act 
is performed in saying something, for example ordering something and the 
perlocutionary act is brought about by speaking, for example offending someone. 
Attention then focuses on illocutionary acts and it is these that get referred to 
as "speech acts" in post Austin work. 
Searle's contribution is to systematize Austin's in three ways, 1, suggesting a 
typology of speech acts, 2, offering a conceptual analysis of what such acts 
presuppose 3, exploring, formally, the logic of speech acts. It is primarily the 
first contribution that empirical researchers have drawn on. Let us assume for 
a moment that we have a well defined set of speech act types and that we can 
isolate, from transcript what speech act is occurring. We could then apply this 
to an analysis of causal explanations, for example, distinguishing causal 
utterances occurring as question, commands etc. Such a project might yield 
interesting results, but I don't think that it is a project which we could ever 
carry out because we are not in a position to make the categorizing step. 
There are two reasons for my pessimism about this. Firstly, the reason that 
emerges when Austin and Searle raise the issue of a typology. Austin remarks 
that a standard dictionary of English will contain between one thousand and ten 
thousand speech act verbs (p. 149). He proposes a set of families instead, an 
approach echoed by Searle (1976) although Searle distinguishes illocutionary 
acts from illocutionary verbs. Whereas he holds that illocutionary acts of 
differents kinds, or speech acts of different force, are distiguished on 
fundamental conceptual grounds and are part of all languages, illocutionary verbs 
are contingently part of a language. So Searle's approach to classification is to 
consider the conditions constitutive of speech acts. In this way he reaches a set 
of five speech act types. These are assertives, directives, commissives, expressives 
and declarations. 
Assertives: commits speaker to the truth of the proposition, examples are 
statements; 
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directives: speaker intends that the hearer do something; examples are 
instructions, commands; 
commissives: commits the speaker to some future act, 
examples are promises; 
expressives: speaker makes attitude knownfor example thanking or deploring; 
declarations: bring about a congruence between the proposition content of the 
speech act and some state of affairs, examples are the words utterred in 
marriage ceremonies or in granting a pardon. 
My second reservation is one that is emphasised by Taylor and Cameron namely 
that this account is etic, do speakers understand utterances in this way? Is it 
fundamental to conversation that they do? Although Searle's conceptual analysis 
is appealing I don't think it helps us interpret what speakers mean. Taylor and 
Cameron produce a clear illustration of some problems in an attempting to base 
an analysis of discourse on a taxonomy based on speech acts. This is a 
simplified extract from Edmondson (1981, p. 176) 
1 X: well er I'm terribly sorry but er [apologise] 
2 I'm afraid you're in my seat [complain] 
3 you've moved my books [complain] 
4 Y: oh dear [exclaim] 
5 X: and papers 
you must have realized that somebody was here [complain] 
Taylor and Cameron reproduce a somewhat longer stretch of the discourse that 
this is taken from and query Edmondson's application of his own criteria. The 
definition for "complain" starts: 
S wishes H to believe that S is not in favour of H's having 
performed an act A, as being against the interests of S. (p. 143) 
They query the appropriateness of categorising utterance 5 in this class and 
suggest that another category "opine" might be more appropriate. The definition 
for "opine" starts: 
As with the Claim [another category] above, S wished that H 
believes that the information contained in the locution by means 
of which the Opine is made is true. An Opine differs from a 
Claim concerning the nature of the information transmitted. (p. 
145) 
(Edmondson has a problematic fact/opinion distinction in mind). 
This account however is only based on speech act theory in so far as it assumes 
that there are discrete speech acts. The fundamental notion of there being 
constitutive rules for speech acts to be what they are. If the possibility of 
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classification is not helpful to us in our attempt to analyse stretches of talk does 
this idea of there being constitutive rules help us to analyse conversations? 
Some users of ideas inspired by speech act theory have believed that it can: 
Edmondson (1981, p. 190) in Taylor and Cameron (p. 59) 
It should be possible to formulate a set of discourse formulation 
rules which would recursively enumerate an unbounded number of 
interactional structures. 
Clarke (1983, p. 106) op cit, 
The rules which generate all and only the speech act sequences 
which are sensible conversations are ... like the rules which 
generate all and only the morpheme strings which are well-formed 
sentences. 
I think that it is merely incidental that these writers have claimed a basis in 
speech act theory for their work. There is nothing iutspeech act theory to 
support such claims. In this sense it is a little disingenuous of Taylor and 
Cameron to include these views in their chapter on speech act theory. Recently 
Searle (forthcoming) has actually based an argument against the possibility of 
giving an account of conversation structure by arguing that no rules analogous 
to the constitutive rules of speech acts could be applied at the level of 
conversations. I shall include some of his discussion of Grice's maxims and of 
Ethnomethodological work in my outline of these areas below, see section 4.0, 
Communicative Constraints. I think we have to draw a distinction between 
putting forward a taxonomy of speech acts and suggesting definitions or 
categories aimed at selecting speech act types from open discourse. 
A classificatory account would only be possible as part of a theory of conversa- 
tional structure for identification of speech act type would need to draw on 
features outside the utterance to be identified. Since Searle resists the 
possibility of an account of conversational structure it follows, if I am correct, 
that he cannot be concerned with the very point that people seeking to apply 
speech act theory to naturally occurring conversation have had, namely 
identifying speech act types. 
In summary then, despite its merits in clarifying the nature of certain paradigm 
utterances, in emphasising that in speaking things are done and in drawing some 
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useful distinctions, speech act theory is not helpful in the investigation of the 
context-specific pressures on a speaker. Firstly, there are principled and 
practical objections to attempts to categorise naturally occurring utterances into 
speech act types. Secondly, understanding conversation structure in terms of 
speech acts is forlorn because speech act theory does not have the conceptual 
resources to carry out this task. I think that it is clear that neither of these are 
goals of the project to which Austin and Searle contributed. 
2.5 Conversational Implicature 
Grice holds that speakers follow a set of principles or maxims when they speak, 
and that it is this which gives conversation its regularity. These maxims differ 
slightly from rules, I shall have more to say on this point. 
The argument of Grice's William James lectures is available in two papers, 
"Logic and conversation" (1975) and a follow up to it (1978). Grice wants to 
show, against the apparent contrast between the formality of an argument laid 
bare in formal logic and the casual looseness Of everyday talk, that there is a 
logic to conversation. He invents the following exchange: 
Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who 
is now working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his 
job, and B replies, Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, 
and he hasn't been to prison yet. At this point, A might well 
inquire what B was implying, what he was suggesting, or even what 
he meant by saying that C had not yet been to prison. The 
answer might be any one of such things as that C is the sort of 
person likely to yield to the temptation provided by his occupation, 
that C's colleagues are really very unpleasant and treacherous 
people, and so forth. It might be quite unnecessary for A to make 
such an inquiry of B, the answer to it being, in the context, clear 
in advance. I think it is clear that whatever B implied, suggested 
or meant, etc., in this example, is distinct from what B said, which 
was simply that C had not been to prison yet. I wish to introduce, 
as terms of art, the verb implicate. (1975, p. 45). 
So implication is insinuation. Certainly Grice has identified a feature of 
conversation inference which is clearly very important: participants in conversa- 
tion have a "know-how" which enables them to reason about what is going on. 
To give an account of this phenomenon would be to describe an important 
t 
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human capacity. Grice focuses on what the speaker does, rather than the 
hearer's capacity. He holds that implicature is related to general features of 
discourse. It is in the process of trying to say what those features might be that 
he proposed the well-known maxims. He puts forward what he calls the 
cooperative principle (CP) 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the 
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purposes or direction of 
the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (1975, p. 45) 
Allowing such a principle, he goes on to list four categories which contain more 
specific maxims. Following Kant he labels these categories quantity, quality, 
manner and relations. 
Category of quantity 
Maxims: 1, "Make your contribution as informative as is required 
(for the current purposes of the talk exchange). " 
2, "Do not make your contribution more informative than 
is required. " 
Category of quality 
Supermaxim: "Try to make your contribution one that is true" 
Maxims: 1, "Do not say what you believe to be false. " 
2, "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. " 
Category of relation 
Maxims: 1, "Be relevant" 
Category of manner 
Supermaxim: "Be perspicuous" 
Maxims: 1, "Avoid obscurity of expression" 
2, "Avoid ambiguity" 
3, "Be orderly" 
Speaking in terms of conversational goals seems a plausible way of understand- 
ing the structure of conversation. Unlike Clarke and Edmondson who favour 
a rule based model here we acknowledge that participants in conversation have 
choices and that constraints in what they say relate to having an interactionally 
successful conversation. Of course Grice's principles, though they identify 
something important, are demonstrably not always followed. Indeed Grice 
himself has an interest in how they can be flouted. What motivates speakers 
when they do go along in a way that these maxims describe? The method 
projects a rationality onto the conversation. To be sure I think that there is 
rationality in conversation, but the level at which Grice's maxims operate tells 
I 
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us little about member's methods - why not use conversations' as a source of 
conversational inference? This is one way of interpreting the ethnomethodologi- 
cal approach to analysing talk: conversation analysis. Before considering this I 
want to return to another approach which I reviewed in chapter one. 
2.6 The ethnography of speaking 
Research projects carried out under this title have used a variety of methods 
to collect and analyse data. What is, I think, valuable and distinctive about this 
approach is its orientation, namely seeing communication as an aspect of the 
cultural knowledge that members of a community have. In chapter one I 
presented two pieces of work which have been carried out in this tradition. In 
Frake's study of Subanun drinking ceremonies I tried to indicate how Frake 
attempted to exhibit the cultural know-how that a participant needs in order to 
take part in such an event. Frake says that " the cultural pattern of drinking 
talk lays out an ordered scheme of role play through display of verbal art 
"(1964, p. 131) In the study of code switching in Norway carried out by Blom 
and Gumperz we saw how a phonologically detailed analysis of conversation 
showed how situational factors appeared to influence the speech code that a 
speaker adopted. This provides a vivid example of what might be called a 
communicative constraint. Gumperz does in fact use the term "constraint" here 
and in other cases. I discuss the uses to which this term has been put section 
4.0 below. 
2.7 Ethnomethodological Conversation Analysis (CA) 
In chapter one I outlined the role of language in the approach to sociology 
started and named by Harold Garfinkel. A detailed concern with conversation 
as place where member's methods can be studied is essentially due to Harvey 
Sacks and his pupils, although Goffman is often also evident as an influence. 
Having already sketched the back-drop to this approach I would like then to 
indicate the style of analysis followed by this group. There are now several 
edited collections of papers on CA, Sudnow (1972), Schenkein (1978), Psathas 
(1979), Atkinson and Heritage (1984), Button, Drew and Heritage (1986) Button 
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and Lee (1987) and several book-length studies such as Atkinson and Drew 
(1979) on language in law courts, also Goodwin (1981) and Heath (1986) which 
extend analysis to body movement. In addition some useful expositions on CA 
have appeared recently. Notably Heritage (1984,233-292) for a detailed 
discussion and (1988) for a succinct account. Heritage has also reviewed the CA 
literature, Heritage (1985,1989). Levinson (1983,284-370) includes an account 
of CA. Inevitably Taylor and Cameron offer a critical discussion (99-124). 
Hopper (1989) provides a straightforward account of the differences between CA 
and social psychological approaches to conversation and warns against the 
possibility of a simple synthesis of these two disciplines. Sharrock and Anderson 
(in Button and Lee) reach a similar conclusion in their more theoretical 
discussion. 
Because of its concern with repeated readings of transcripts of naturally 
occurring conversation and for its disdain of theory construction CA is often 
perceived to be atheoretical. Whilst the reading of transcripts is atheoretical in 
an important sense the project overall: the choice of conversation as data, the 
conception of the participants in conversation, the role of the analyst, the 
avoidance of premature theorizing itself are all supported by a coherently 
followed, though not fully articulated theory, namely Garfinkel's ethnomethodo- 
logy. 
I want to try to pick up my discussion of ethnomethodology by looking at Sack's 
use of conversation as data for studying social organisation. Often Sacks 
adopted an approach somewhat close to what I outlined above as the ethno- 
graphy of speaking. For example in "Hotrodder: a revolutionary category" 
(Sacks, 1979) he discusses member's knowledge of how a hotrodder differs from 
other car owners and how distinctions are articulated. We come closer to the 
style of work so distinctive of conversation analysis in his paper "On the 
analysability of children's stories" where the ordering of the two sentences of 
"The baby cried. The mommy picked it. up. " 
is part of Sack's analysis. Sacks is concerned with how this pair of sentences is 
heard as a little narrative in which the "it" refers to the "baby" and the "mommy" 
is taken to be the mother of he child. 
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Attention to the sequencing of utterances, or "turns" as they are called in this 
literature, has been called the "analytic dynamo" of CA (Button and Lee). 
Consider the analysis of a turn in a conversation. The orientation of workers 
in the field of CA is to point out that the next turn is an analysis of that turn 
by an in situ ethnomethodologist. Thus Heritage (1984, p. 256) 
The important thing is that, once again, the interpretations 
embedded in these treatments of the prior turn are publicly 
available as the means by which previous speakers can determine 
how they were understood. Thus the sequential 'next positioned' 
linkage between any two actions can be a critical resource by 
which the first speaker (and, of course, 'overhearing' social 
scientists) can determine the sense which a second made of his or 
her utterance. 
Reflecting on this idea we can of course note that whilst the next turn is, - in a 
very important sense, an analysis of the previous turn does it show an analysis 
of that turn? Taylor and Cameron treat the next turn analysis idea as the only 
analytic resource that a student of CA has and point out, correctly, given their 
premises, that an observer would perpetually be postponing analysis one turn 
by shifting to the next one, and so on. The damage of this criticism for CA is, 
I think exaggerated, and in practice things may be less controversial. In his 
discussion of how the next turn displays an understanding Heritage (1984,255) 
gives the following example: 
#1 
B: Why don't you come-and see me some times 
A: 
EI 
would like to 
(see appendix 3 for an explanation of the transcription conventions) 
We can imagine A's response being: 
#2 
A: I'm sorry. I've been terribly tied up lately 
I don't think that it is controversial to say in #1 A interpret's B's turn as an 
invitation whilst in #2 it is a complaint. Interestingly, Heritage has recently 
related this issue to Grice's work on conversational implicature (1989, p. 25), 
and in fact lists Grice, along with Garfinkel and Goffman, as an example of a 
source of theoretical insight (p. 37). In fact the term "sequential implication" 
crops up in the CA literature. In a footnote Sacks and Schegloff (1974) say: 
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By 'sequential implicativeness' is meant that an utterance projects 
for the sequentially following turn(s) the relevance of a deter- 
minate range of occurrences (be they utterance types, activities, 
speaker selections, etc. ). It thus has sequentially organized 
implications. (239) 
2.7.1 Some principle findings 
How does this principle guide analysis? What findings have come out of its 
application? I propose to answer this by summarising some of the main findings 
of CA, presenting some findings under four headings, turn taking, preference 
organisation, topic organisation and the integration of vocal and nonvocal 
behaviour. Of course what follows is not a summary of the whole field, but 
rather some illustrative examples which I think bring out different and important 
points. 
turn taking 
It is evident from the most casual observation, in western society at least, that 
conversation is made up of turns at talk being taken by different parties. In 
their classic paper, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) list fourteen "grossly 
apparent facts" about turn taking which a model will need to cope with. I've 
reproduced the list here (omitting the references at the end of each line in the 
original) since it conveniently sets out the nature of the problem: 
(1) Speaker-change recurs, or at least occurs. 
(2) Overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time. 
(3) Occurrences of more than one speaker at a time are 
common, but brief. 
(4) Transitions (from one turn to the next) with no gap and no 
overlap are common. Together wiith transitions characterized 
by slight gap or slight overlap, they make up the vast 
majority of transitions. 
(5) Turn order is not fixed, but varies. 
(6) Turn size is not fixed, but varies. 
(7) Length of conversation is not specified in advance. 
(8) What parties say is not specified in advance. 
(9) Relative distribution of turns is not specified in advance. 
(10) Number of parties can vary. 
(11) Talk can be continuous of discontinuous. 
(12) Turn-allocation techniques are obviously used. A current 
speaker may select a next speaker (as when he addresses a 
question to another party) or parties may self-select in 
starting to talk. 
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(13) Various 'turn construction units' are employed; e. g., turns 
can be projectedly 'one word long', or they can be sentential 
in length. 
(14) Repair mechanisms exist for dealing with turn-taking errors 
and violations; e. g., if two parties find themselves talking at 
the same time, one of them will stop prematurely, thus 
repairing the trouble. 
(p. 700-701) 
It is important to bear in mind that this list is intended to give constraints that 
will apply to models of turn taking. That some of the points clearly sometimes 
do not hold (for example parties may be told by an operator at the start of 
certain calls that the telephone conversation will be limited to three minutes) 
does not remove them from the list of things that a model will need to 
accommodate. 
Sacks et al. go on to propose the "simplest systematics" for the organisation of 
turn taking consisting of two components and a set of rules. The two 
components which they have in mind are 1, the "turn-constructional component" 
which refers to the bits of talk that a speaker uses to make a turn and 2, the 
"turn-allocational component" which refers to the techniques used to allocate 
who is to speak next. The latter component is subdivided into two groups, 
namely where the current speaker selects another or where the current speakers 
select themselves to speak next. The rules are as follows (p. 704): 
The following seems to be a basic set of rules governing turn 
construction, providing for the allocation of a next turn to one 
party, and coordinating transfer so as to minimize gap and overlap. 
(1) For any turn, at the initial transition-relevance place of an 
initial turn-constructional unit: 
(a) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as to involve the use of a 
'current speaker selects next' technique, then the party so selected 
has the right and is obliged to take next turn to speak; no others 
have such rights, or obligations, and transfer occurs at that place. 
(b) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use 
of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, then self-selection for 
next speakership may, but need not be instituted; first starter 
acquires rights to a turn, and transfer occurs at that place. 
(c) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the use 
of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, then current speaker 
may, but need not continue, unless another self-selects. 
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(2) If, at the initial transition-relevance place of an intitial turn- 
constructional unit, neither la nor lb has operated, and, following 
the provision of ic, current speaker has continued, then the rule- 
seet a-c reapplies at the next transition-relevance place, until 
transfer is effected. 
This may seem like little more than a rather tedious spelling out, spiced or 
soured with jargon, depending on your taste, of a rather unremarkable observa- 
tion. Namely that in a conversation there are points when the person speaking 
continues or hands over to somebody and that at such points they nominate 
someone else to speak, pick themselves to carry on speaking or do neither of 
these in which case, if they don't just carry on speaking themselves, then 
whoever starts first wins the floor. Of course there's nothing wrong with stating 
the minimum that needs to be said but I do not think that such a summary does 
justice to the formulation. Because, though capable of fitting with intuitions, the 
proposed mechanism is non-trivial in that it is not obvious. Levinson illustrates 
this by contrasting it with what else but other models of turn-taking namely 
"signalling" models, which propose a signal analogous to the use of "over" in two- 
way radio communication, and with models which presuppose units beneath the 
surface on the conversation (p. 302-303). Against the former model Levinson 
remarks that visual cues can't be fundamental since telephone calls apparently 
take place in the absence of special intonational patterning and that anyway such 
signals cannot account for overlap. This point is also Levinson's argument 
against the ideational model. On this account recipients retrieve the type of 
move being performed by speakers' surface utterances and then make their own 
move. Levinson claims that such an account cannot be correct because 
predictable expressions such as stereotypical greetings, would be subject to 
more overlap than they apparently are. Although I don't want to get into a 
discussion of these points it seems to me that what these models would require 
to improve them would involve attention to turn taking as a locally managed 
phenomenon which is precisely the point of the approach of Sack's et al.. 
I want to make some remarks on what they refer to as the "context-free" and 
"context-sensitive" nature of the organisation of turn-taking. Clearly whatever 
mechanism there is to turn taking is extraordinarily context sensitive since 
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speakers need to respond to highly local details moment by moment in different 
conversations in different times and places. That the putative mechanism holds 
in such diverse situations is its context-free character. 
adjacency pairs 
An adjacency pair is, roughly speaking, a member of a class of pairs of turns 
such as question/answer, greeting/greeting. A feature of the turn-taking model 
is that it bridges two different turns, which may be made by different speakers. 
The sense, in which it does this is geared to who speaks, rather than to what 
they speak about. - 
An adjacency pair is the application of the idea that an 
utterance sets up constraints on what can happen next, or on what some 
utterance implies, not only to who is to speak next, but to what they are to say. 
Sacks and Schegloff (1974) talk of the first pair part of an adjacency pair 
providing a speaker specifically concerned with the "close order sequential 
implicativeness of an utterance" the chance to achieve it. 
topic organisation 
Topic organisation attempts to study details of how participants establish certain 
topics or how they move on to others. Atkinson and Heritage (1984, p. 165- 
166) remark that though this might appear to be a natural area for CA to study 
progress has been slow and cautious. I presume that whilst the establishment 
of a topic is achieved on a turn by turn basis, even if in a step-wise way, a topic 
is not a conversational object in the sense that a turn or even an adjacency pair 
is. 
Extension of methods to non-vocal behaviour 
Conversation analytic techniques have been applied to non-vocal behaviour in 
communication in a way that contrasts markedly with the approach which 
enjoyed vogue in psychology during the 1970s. The expression "non-vocal" is, I 
think, preferable to "non-verbal" when it comes to studying phenomena such as 
body movement and gaze, since the distinction between vocal and non-vocal 
phenomena is parallel to that which can and can't be captured on an audiotape. 
A verbal/non-verbal distinction suggests a subdivision of the vocal into separate 
phenomena implying a distinction between words and in-breaths, laughter and 
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many familiar back-channel responses (mmhmm's and so on). Apart from the 
fact that such a distinction becomes a difficult one to draw, the development of 
CA happens to have integrated verbal and non-verbal vocal phenomena prior to 
attention to body movement and gaze. 
The strategy of CA treatment of videotape data differs from other approaches 
in a number of respects. In particular, the structure of the interaction is the 
focus of interest, rather than frequency analysis of isolated behaviours. And the 
integration of speech and nonverbal behaviour has been emphasised. Goodwin, 
for example, in a paper which I discuss in more detail chapter seven (Goodwin, 
1987, p. 117), invokes nonverbal behaviour to clarify what a speaker is doing at 
a point in speech. 
G. 86: 490 
Mike: I was watching Johnny. Carson one night 
en there was a guy 
by the na- What was that guy's name. 
t 
Mike Shifts Gaze To Phyllis 
Goodwin, whose attention is on the impact of Mike's forgetting on the 
interaction is able to draw on other analyses of gaze and word-searches to show 
that Mike is addressing the question to Phyllis. An* important theme of 
Goodwin's work which is presumably made possible by attention to non-vocal 
features of interactions is attention to social organisation not at the level ` of 
turns - the hallmark of CA - but within turns too. Goodwin (1979,1981) shows 
evidence that restarts and hesitations may be understood as devices for securing 
the gaze of a recepient. In other words the production of a turn may take 
account of not merely the sequential environment in which it is placed but also 
concurrent details of the situation. 
0 Critical remarks on the role of convention in communication 
Before moving on to consider how to conceptualize constraints in communication 
I want to consider a point of tension which emerged in the discussion of 
different approaches to analysing talk. 
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Davidson (1984a, 1984b) questions the appeal often made in accounts of com- 
munication to the place of convention. For example, is it by virtue of 
convention that a speech act has the force that it has? When commenting on 
Austin I remarked that his starting point was with sentences which grammatically 
are indicative expressions but which do not constate anything. This distinction 
between the grammatical form of a sentence and the use of to which -an 
utterance is put is the distinction, in philosophical tools of trade, between mood 
and force. The moods, imperatives, interrogatives, optatives are grammatical 
classifications of sentences. "There goes Charlie. ", "When is dinner? " and "I wish 
I was in Vienna. ", like those unskilled in diplomacy, show their moods. The 
force of a proposition, at first sight, might be thought to be related to mood. 
For example assertions seems to be close cousins of indicatives, "There goes 
Charlie. " looks like as good an example of an assertion, an utterance with 
assertoric force, as one could hope for. But the use to which an utterance is 
put depends on things beyond the expression used to make it. This is not 
restricted to Austin's examples such as "I bet you sixpence. " but is something 
more general. On certain occasions an indicative sentence can be used to issue 
a command "In this house we remove our shoes", or a sentence in the 
imperative mood can be used to ask a question 'Tell me who won the third 
race" . 
Davidson points out that it cannot be by convention that an utterance has the 
force that it has. He points out, for example, that an assertion cannot label 
itself an assertion. If there was an assertion sign in language it would of course 
be used by every trickster. Davidson considers the example of a play during 
which a house catches fire and an actor has the job of trying to peruade other 
peole to the best of his abilty of the danger. What if a real fire broke out in 
the theatre at just that time? What extra resources could the actor have? 
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4.0 Communicative constraints 
. ý, 
The idea that use of the term "constraint" to express pressure that somehow 
operates in communication is a widely drawn on, but seldom indexed. Perhaps 
it is felt to be too general aý term to fashion into a technical one. I mentioned 
above that the phenomenon of code switching gives a clear example of an aspect 
of someone's communicative conduct being influenced by the speech-situation. 
Gumperz talks of constraints at various points. In the case of code switching 
we have the flavour of something normative, to do with culturally acceptable 
conduct taken into the sphere of communication. Introducing the Norwegian 
study in editorial capacity Gumperz and Hymes (1972, p. 407) say: "... the 
outcome is an understanding of social constraints and linguistic rules as parts of 
a communicative system. " Gumperz and Blom (1972, p. 416) talk of "selection 
constraints" giving the Ranamal-BokmAl switch a distinctive character, differing 
from the situation in New York, which, apparently, is similar phonologically. In 
the conclusion they write: 
Our analysis in this chapter is based on the assumption that 
regularities in behavior can be analyzed as generated from a series 
of individual choices made under specifiable constraints and 
incentives (Barth 1966). This position implies an important break, 
with previous approaches to social structure and to language and 
society. Behavioral regularities are no longer regarded as 
reflections of independently measurable social norms; on the 
contrary,, these norms are themselves seen as communicative 
behavior. They are what Goffman (1959) calls the rules of 
impression management or, in our terms, in the social meanings 
which constrain the actor's adoption of behavioral strategies in 
particular situations. (p. 432) 
Elsewhere, however, Gumperz draws on the idea of constraints within code 
switching itself (1982, p. 86,89). The point is that switches in code do not 
occur randomly. He reports some data drawing chiefly on members' intuitions 
of what would sound acceptable. This phenomenon, though undoubtedly 
interesting, is separate from my concerns. 
In my introduction to this chapter I presented the idea that it is meaningful to 
talk of constraints in the context of a question-answer sequence. In a paper 
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entitled "Conversation" Searle mounts an attack on the possibility of giving an 
account of conversational structure. His starting point is to remark that speech 
act theory takes single utterances as its subject matter. As I discussed in 
chapter one, he proposed conditions, in the form of 'constitutive rules' for 
speech acts to come off successfully. 'Searle asks if we could get an account of 
conversation in terms of constitutive rules. His answer is that we can't. To 
reach this answer he sets off by remarking that some speech acts do have 
appropriate responses to them, so we have the germ of a sequential analysis. 
He used the term "constraint" to express this, pointing out, as I did ' earlier, that 
for an response to be an answer to a question it is constrained. 
If we consider question and answer sequences, we find that there 
are very tight sets of constraints on what constitutes an ideally 
appropriate answer, given a particular question. Indeed the 
constraints are so tight that the semantic structure of the question 
determines and matches the semantic structure of an ideally 
appropriate answer. If, for example, I ask you a yes/no question, 
then your answer, if it's an answer to the question, has to count 
either as an affirmation or a denial of the propositional content 
presented in the original question. 
Searlesays that in addition to questions requests to perform speech acts also 
"constrain the form of a possible reply". A third case of constraint establishing 
speech acts appear to be bets, or offers. Concluding that speech act theory does 
not get far in producing sequencing rules, he canvasses Gricean pragmatics. He 
wants to talk of the maxims of quantity and relevance as "external constraints" 
on speech acts relating to cooperation and relevance. He points out that it is 
not a constitutive rule of making a statement that it should be relevant. This 
is true, and it should be remembered that it is a feature of speech act theory 
that it wants to hunt down constitutive rules. 
Workers in the field of conversation analysis have often drawn on the idea of 
constraints. Examples of this can be found with respect to work on 1, turn- 
taking, 2, adjacency pairs, 3, preference organisation and 4, topic organisation. 
Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) (p. 696) say that "... an investigator 
interested in some sort of activity that is organized by a turn-taking system will 
want to determine how the sort of activity investigated or is adapted to, or 
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constrained by, the particular form of the turn-taking system which operates on 
it. " 
In his exposition of CA Heritage (1984, p. 260) states: 
We started by describing very tightly organized sequences - 
adjacency pairs - in which the options available to second speakers 
were relatively constrained. By contrast, we have now lapsed into 
a looser mode of exposition in which the local positioning of 
utterances 'next' to one another is crucial. 
We need to work in this way because, as was previously stressed, 
conversation is not an endless series on interlocking adjacency 
pairs in which sharply constrained options confront the speaker. 
Rather conversation is informed by the general assumption - 
common to both speakers and 'hearers that utterances which are 
placed immediately next to some prior are to be understood as 
produced in response to or, more loosely in relation to the prior. 
In her analysis of responses to compliments Pomerantz identifies competing 
pressures on the recipient. Put crudely the dilemma is to accept the compliment 
but thereby engage in self praise or to deny the praise but thereby disagree with 
the speaker's assessment. Pomerantz formulates this in terms of "constraint 
systems" (p. 106): 
The productions of compliment responses are sensitive to the co- 
operation of multiple constraint systems. One preference system 
is that of supportive Actions, that is responses which legitimize, 
ratify, affirm, and so on, prior compliments. A second constraint 
system is that of the self-praise avoidance. 
In their discussion of "topic intial elicitors" Button and Casey (1984) draw on 
the idea of a constraint to formulate their operation (p. 169): 
Topic initial elicitors then, produce a constraint system, with two 
options, for the next turn, and within which the production of one 
option over which the other is preferred. Further the production 
of either of the options can itself have related sequential con- 
sequences for the shape of the following turn. 
I use the term "communicative constraints" since I take it that such constraints 
are intimately part of communication. "Constraints on communication" would 
not really capture this but would mean obstacles to communication exclusively. 
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4.0 Conclusion 
There are fundamental differences between the methods which I examined. The 
approaches stemming from social psychology are oriented to establishing 
statistical relations between events. This approach is not suitable for my 
purposes because it does not enable conversation structure to come into view. 
In addition it is open to methodological objections concerning the validity of the 
use of categorial methods. This is a general problem affecting approaches which 
rely on the isolation of conversation units of any kind. Are the units to be 
identified etically or emically? Does conversation require that participants 
recognise units? This is therefore a criticism to which the Birmingham exchange 
structure is vulnerable. The ethnography of speaking demonstrates some 
interesting and clear ways in which aspects of speech, in particular choice of 
code by bilingual speakers relates to conversational context. The two philosoph- 
ical theories considered are concerned with a conceptual analysis of certain 
features of talk. Speech act theory, concerned with establishing rules which 
determine the successful performance of a speech act does not concern itself 
with speech phenomena beyond single utterances. Grice's interest moves close 
to my own in his attempt to describe general features of talk which constrain 
what people can say. Nevertheless, this analysis of the logic of conversation is 
pitched at the wrong level when it comes to dealing with empirical data for it 
does not show how to reveal the conversational logic to be found there. I have 
suggested that conversation analysis can be seen in this light: an attempt to 
establish the methods used in structuring conversation. 
For practical and conceptual reasons I have chosen to proceed in the manner 
of conversation analysis. This approach is oriented to revealing the communica- 
tive practices of participants in conversation, rather than projecting a model onto 
their behaviour. This situation is a counterpart of the conclusion that I came 
to in connection with the parent discipline of ethnomethodology. Although 
notions of rule following are appealing the truth is that we have no mandate to 
assume that conversational activity is rule governed. Certainly the hegemony of 
one application of an appeal to rules in connection with one area of language, 
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transformational grammar, should in no way imply that this model should be 
applied to conversation. 
Furthermore, CA has proceeded using just the material that participants have 
available to each other which means that it does not assume that participants 
need to identify an utterance as belonging to a certain class in order to deal 
with it, and therefore does not engage in speculation about a taxonomy of 
utterances. Rather features of the data itself are appealed to. 
There are however, limitations to the approach. Clearly native communicative 
skills are required on behalf of the analyst. I don't see how this could be 
otherwise but it should not be claimed that research of this kind is entirely free 
from unarticulated everyday understandings on the part of the analyst. 
In a way the imperative of CA is an aspect of a directive which I argued for in 
chapter two: if you want to study personality terms then look at them in their 
natural habitat, so too, if you want to study the logic of conversations, look at 
the practical reasoning constitutive of talking to each other. 
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CHAPTER 5: EXPLORATION OF COMMUNICATIVE CONSTRAINTS IN 
ADVISORY EXCHANGES 
In this chapter I carry out an analysis of interactions in a computer advisory 
centre. The analysis is based on the approach of conversation analysis, 
described in the last chapter, but is limited to those methods which are ' required 
to further my claim that talk occurs under communicative constraints. The 
analysis bears on the topic of explanation in so far as user and advisor are 
required to explain problem and solution respectively. The situation is however, 
more interesting and more complex than this. I show that such explanation 
stages are not discrete episodes at all but are interactively attained through 
conversation. Furthermore, I show that the appearance of accounts, against the 
conclusions of some students of explanation, occur as a routine part of the 
business-at-hand, unconnected with accounting for untoward goings on. ' In 
addition to addressing explanation giving itself I also find examples of how a 
speaker's formulation of some business changes in the course of the interaction. 
I offer this as evidence of communicative constraints on a speaker's formulation. 
1.0 Introduction 
Having argued in favour of conversation analysis with respect to both its 
conceptualisation of conversation and its research methods a natural step would 
be to return to the data discussed in chapters two and three in an attempt to 
elucidate how the formulations which speakers produce are a product of the 
situation in which they occur. This is not the strategy which I will adopt here, 
not least because it is beyond the scope of my ability and of this phase of my 
research to apply conversation analysis in such a focussed way. Therefore I have 
chosen to take a context in which explanations, in the form of episodes rather 
than utterances, take place to try to clarify some of the ways in which speakers' 
contributions are constrained by the situation. In this way I hope to offer 
concrete examples of what has so far here been an abstract claim. My method 
is based on conversation analysis in so far as 1, I shall avoid a theory based 
classification of speakers' contributions; 2, analysis will centre on repeated 
readings of detailed transcripts and 3,1 will be interested in inductively 
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recurrent" patterns in` the data. " 'Although based on CA the studies presented 
below should not be understood as demonstrations of this approach, but rather 
as an exploration of certain details through an attempt to apply some of the 
points which conversation analysts have emphasised. 
The data come from the programming advisory service at the 'University ` of 
Leeds which is a help facility provided by staff of the University's Computing 
Services Department. Computer users, Usually members of the university's 
academic staff or research students, can 'consult the 'advisory, as it is usually 
called, for help with their computing requirements which vary from `detailed 
problems with writing programs to registering for a computing course + or 
consulting a manual. The advisory is staffed during office hours by one of the 
members of staff of the computing service on a rota basis. I have followed the 
indigenous practice of calling someone consulting the service a "user" (from 
computer user) and I have called the person on duty the "adviser". 
The advisory is an attractive place to collect data on interaction because 1, the 
interactions are short so several examples of sessions being opened and closed 
can be collected in a given time; 2, the interactions are usually between just two 
people (which simplifies transcription and further analysis) and 3, the pariicipants 
are engaged in a non-sensitive task in' a location which is convenient to record 
in. I suspected that these" interactions would be particularly interesting in that 
the participants have to negotiate different knowledge in the situation. Although 
I do' have some examples of this happening the most exciting findings lie 
elsewhere. My findings fall into two areas. Firstly, issues relating to explana- 
tion, namely how problems are formulated and how speakers tend to account for 
claims that they make. Secondly, body posture during telephone calls. This was 
an unplanned area of study which I report on briefly in chapter six. 
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1.1 Relationship of the study to earlier chapters 
I have argued above that everyday psychological concepts and causal explana- 
tions surface not in a vacuum but in the course of talk where such expressions 
do something. The method of. analysis has followed two suggestions from 
ethnomethodological conversation analysis. Firstly, the creation of transcripts 
designed to show the structure of the interaction by, paying attention to timings 
and overlap. Secondly the idea that a hearer's response is an in situ analysis 
of the speaker's last utterance. As I mentioned in chapter four it seems to me 
that the claim that the next position in a sequence "shows an analysis" which can 
be read off by an observer has been over stated and is susceptible to the 
criticisms made by Taylor and Cameron. Nevertheless I think that attention to 
what strikes the analyst as important for the hearer is an important resource that 
a nonparticipant should attend to. ., 
1.2 Earlier work on computer advisory sessions 
Once my data collection was underway my attention was drawn to earlier work 
on computer advisory sessions carried out by computing personnel and published 
in the human computer interaction literature. I am grateful to Dr Jon Duke for 
making me aware of this work. The work in question was carried out by J. L. 
Alty and M. J. Coombs (Alty and Coombs, 1980; Coombs and Alty 1980,1984). 
Although the aims of my research are almost diametrically opposed to theirs I 
feel that it is important to acknowledge it. 
Whereas their perspective is one of monitoring and improving the service for me 
it is an example of a naturally occuring interaction with its own integrity. 
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In representing my interests to the advisors and users that I studied I distanced 
myself from having any concern with making judgements of their abilility. 
Coombs and Alty (1985), on the other hand discuss "potential and actual 
communication difficulties" and present "long rhetorical sequences during which 
the advisor externalised his thoughts" as an example. Their point is that such 
episodes are problem solving rather than educational and were often not 
understood. We are not told how it is known that these episodes were not 
understood. I would not feel inclined to analyse multiple - turn episodes in this 
way. 
An additional difference is that Alty and Coombs (1980) are concerned with 
establishing findings about the usage of university computer advisories and -also 
with such things as user's satisfaction with the service and other characterisations 
such as differences between experienced and inexperienced users. 
Coombs and Alty (1985) report an analysis of advisory sessions using the 
Birmingham exchange model. They found that they could apply the model to 
tape recordings of advisory sessions with only a little modification to the original 
definitions. They present the " hierarchical model that they arrived at and include 
three examples of analysed transcripts. They conclude claiming that the analysis 
has had important applications in identifying communication failure, development 
of better advisory and teaching strategies. They do not describe how these 
applications are achieved and it is not clear to me how the descriptive analysis 
leads to such applications. It seems to me that the conclusions reached could 
have been obtained by simply reading and reflecting on the transcripts.. But if 
the coding procedure helped the analyst to get to grips with the the data in a 
practical way then it clearly has some value. 
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1.3 Practical details 
I wrote to the head of computing services explaining my plans. My request to 
make video recordings in their advisory was discussed at one of their depart- 
mental meetings and was accepted, upon the condition of consent from user and 
advisor. The departmental assistant circulated a memo round the staff and 
provided me with a rota showing the advisors who were prepared to be, video 
recorded. This enabled me to turn up for the duration of their advisory 
session, set-up my equipment and ask users as they turned up whether or not 
they would let me record. Only two users declined out of twenty nine 
approached. - The correspondence with the computing department, and the note 
which I handed to the users are included in appendices 4 and 5. This should 
indicate the way I presented my interests to the participants. Whether or not 
people's behaviour is changed through being video recorded has been much 
discussed. It has been argued that people still have to communicate and 
presumably certain formal features of interaction will occur regardless of the 
participants being self conscious. I do not feel inclined to adopt this approach 
because I am not sure that formal processes can be separated out from the 
stream of behaviour. I would argue that the task that the people perform under 
video conditions is itself interesting enough. Surreptitious recording would not 
have been practical. I consider this an unecessary and unethical option. Several 
references do occur to the process of recording in the interactions. At several 
points my talk with users as they arrive is audible. 
The usage of the advisory varies greatly; both in terms of the contents of the 
consultation and their length, but also in frequency. Although I attended on 
more occasions I only came away with recordings on eight. I decided to allow 
the advisor, one consultation before recording on each occasion. In total I 
collected three hours eleven minutes of video tape. Plus an additional 20 
minutes on an audio backup tape. Considering just the video tape data, this was 
from twenty five advisory sessions. Three of these were nested within longer 
sessions. The quality of the recording varied a lot. It's difficult to talk in terms 
of an "acceptable quality" since much depends on the hearer's determination! 
However in some sessions the users spoke too softly to be audible. One 
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disadvantage of recording in the advisory is that the user access area to which 
it is connected is quite noisy, including two line printers just outside the door 
of the advisory. In addition, the advisor's desk has a window behind it, so I was 
shooting into the light. 
I viewed the data several times noting gross features of the interactions. An 
analysis of body movement during telephone calls, which I report in chapter six, 
comes out of this process. I made audio copies of the video soundtrack and 
made transcriptions from selected sessions. I feel that a transcript of the speech 
is the most useful way to structure the data. Even where my interest was on 
movement and posture I found the most practical way of proceeding was to 
mark movement ona transcript of speech. An audio tape recorder is easier to 
get access to, enables you to concentrate on the sound alone, and is easier to 
use. Some stretches of talk require several hear ngs before the meaning can be 
made out. This is an interesting phenomenon in its own right. 
The method of transcription was devised by Jefferson. I'm indebted to Dr Paul 
Drew of the University of York for giving me practical help in using this 
method. I've followed and developed Goodwin's modifications to the system and 
extending it to non vocal phenomena such as gaze and body movement. Potter 
and Wetherell (1987) estimate that the Jefferson system requires twenty units of 
time for transcribing one unit of tape. The method of transcription is radically 
different to the method used in the earlier studies. Appendix 3 describes the 
conventions. I began work on the clearest recordings first: the analysis reported 
below is based on transcriptions of twenty sessions, about 50,000 words. Some 
summary details of these sessions make up appendix 5. 
All the video taping was done with a tripod mounted Sony HVC 3000P video 
camera feeding a Canon VR 10 video recorder. A Sony Professional cassette 
recorder was introduced towards the end of the study. Recording spanned five 
weeks, being interrupted by the University Easter vacation. 
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2.0 Analysis 
Talk in the advisory may be expected to be a distinctive kind of conversation, 
different from say, casual conversation, in the following way: The advisory 
exists, as its name implies and instructs people going there, to enable people to 
get help with computer-relevant activities. Explanations should thus be a focus 
of the interactions since if they are to receive advice relevant to their concerns 
users have to explain what those concerns are and the advisory has to explain 
some course of action or offer some information which counts as an explana- 
tion of the user's concerns. If the business of the advisory sessions is explana- 
tion then this should provide opportunity to study those conversational activities 
which are constitutive of, and carried out in connection with, explanation. In 
short, how explanations (perhaps of a certain kind) are achieved. 
In what follows I want to present several issues which recur in the data. This 
can hardly be an exhaustive account of all that a conversation analytic 
perspective can say about this situation. Indeed I do not attempt to give an 
account of these advice sessions as distinctive, integral species of interaction. 
Furthermore although I suspect that there is hardly an utterance in my data for 
which a previous CA finding was irrelevant, I shall not attempt to tell a story 
simply by applying such finding to the data 'step by step. The familiar way of 
proceeding in CA has been the search for phenomena which happen repeatedly 
in a corpus of data, that is by induction. Schegloff (1987), nevertheless, offers 
an example of an analysis of a single episode which proceeds by bringing CA 
findings to bear on it. As even my modest data set will show, a given stretch 
of talk can reoccur under different analytical considerations. I am sceptical, 
therefore, that there could be such a thing (at least at present) as a definitive 
analysis of a situation by the application of CA findings. But as I also hope to 
show, the findings reported in the CA literature can be applied to specific cases 
and certainly can direct and illuminate a reading of the data. 
Although an A priori model of what is to be expected in these advisory sessions 
could be constructed, for example by extending my remarks above on the user's 
requirements to what has to happen for an explanation to come off, I will avoid 
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doing this. Although I could have a go at producing an account by drawing on 
my own' use of the advisory, my own understanding of the kind of requirements 
met by computer users at Leeds, on conversations with the computing staff and 
on impressions made through viewing my recordings and reading the transcripts 
of them, ' I shall not do that here. Such an ethnographic approach certainly has 
value, but my focus is simply on the conversational detail of explanation, details 
which I have demonstrated to myself can only very exceptionally be noted and 
recalled without the aid of transcripts. So I have tried to remain close to the 
transcripts. Though an ethnographic method would not capture 'member's 
methods at the level of conversational detail and would therefore not explicate 
members' practices in putting explanations together I have inevitably drawn on 
an understanding of the running of universities, the management of computing 
resourse and a limitless list of other details to make sense of what's going on. 
Indeed in presenting fragments of transcripts I have to ask myself whether or 
not there are features that require a gloss to enable readers to get my 
understanding of the fragment. Of course my own understanding of these 
features is limited. In one of the sessions which I report where I was making 
an enquiry the advisor addressed my understanding of computer resources: 
[ UAA. 2] 
U: well I mean can I set up my own permanent disks. 
(0.6) . 
A: No you ca- well (. ) not permanent no. 
U: [[(Uh: -) 
A: LLThe whole reason why we have the filestore. (0.6) is (. ) 
>that when you set up a permanent disk you're allocate 
piece- er-< area of disk 
(") U: y: eh. 
A: which only yeu can use 
U: ye: s 
A: 'f y'don't have any files on it. 
(") 
U: yes= 
'A: =it is still in use. - 
U: =right yeh (. ) this is- 
A: and therefore (1.0) uh (1.0) (y'know) it'can be wasted so 
the whole idea of >the whole idea of the filestore< was 
th'you GeT at the disk space when you need it 
U: yeah 
" 
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In order to offer a context for the fragments which I'll report and to make some 
comments on the limitations of the data I want to start with some remarks on 
the recognition of the situation as an advisory session. 
2.0.1 Remarks on being-in-an-advisory situation 
I don't think a general account of how a cuboid a few metres above the earth's 
surface in a west European conurbation gets recognised as a place where advice 
on computing matters can be given here. The data however do show some 
things about this issue which it is easy to let slip as unremarkable. Firstly the 
advisor routinely treats the presence of a person in the room as the presence 
of a user of the advisory and orients to the institutional arrangements 
constitutive of the advisory. Consider the following exchange: 
(UAA21i) 
((a session is in progress when the door opens and closes, timed 
from loudest sound, (presumably the door closing) and a woman 
comes in)) 
(4.7) 
A: We are actually shut now 
(0.5) 
U: Oh I'm so: rry: = 
A: =it's okay >are you j- is it to borr-< borrow a book or 
sj°meth ing 
U: LOhh 
LI 
j-Just wanted to have a [look in a manual isý 
A: L yeh go ahead 
U: that alright 
A: ye [h okay 
U: 
LthankyouJ 
ghuh ghum ((clears throat)) 
This fragment, the shortest one that I recorded, reveals a considerable 
("awesome" as Garfinkel might say) competence on behalf of the participants. 
Here I just want to note that entering the room is oriented to as. the entry of 
a user, a user who has come at a time when normal user activities are somehow 
problematic. In addition the advisor treats the user's response as the response 
of someone who has been rebuked (He says that "It's okay" "n he finds a user 
relevant activity which would make the user's presence unproblematic). Indeed 
he gives the go ahead for the user to fulfil her requirements before she has 
finished her request, a request which he nevertheless acknowledges. 
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Reciprocally the advisor needs to be recognised as a source of help for a session 
to happen. Here a session is in progess when (U) comes in and rests a manual 
on the advisor's desk to consult something. (U) has been there a while at the 
point where the following fragment starts. 
(UAA. 9) 
A: well while that's doing, I- I'll see (who's) waiting 
(0.8) what you you've got a a- you think you've got a 
problem with er-= 
U: =yes tha:: 
A: 
1ghost3 
have you 
U: m- (. ) this w- trivial one and then I wan' to ask 
something about using some the (. ) nag routines wither::: 
intregral °analysis ° 
(A) lifts the manual up to look at it, and is hence able to guess the user's 
problem. This is a thorough identification of the man leaning on the desk as 
a user, someone to whom help can be offered and who's activities are 
interruptable to this end. (The "Ghost" is a graphics printer, a "nag routine" is 
a ready made computer program which can be called from a library of such 
programs, "integral analysis" refers to "numerical integration", a computational 
procedure for carrying out a certain mathematical operation. ) In his reply it is 
imaginable that the user might say "hand's off what's it got to do with you" but 
the user knows that this man is an advisor, to whom not only an affirmative 
response is given but to whom another requirement should be lodged. 
Identifying the advisor is not automatically unproblematic. On two occasions 
that I recall I was asked for help by users. On one occasion I can be heard off- 
camera talking to a user who, following my request that I video record his 
consultation, proceeds to address his problem to me. Interestingly users 
sometimes down-graded the interest that their session might have for me. For 
example (off-camera talk): 
[UAA. 18J 
U1: s"only going to be a brjf one 
In the following four sections I will explore four different things that strike me 
as interesting about the data. Firstly, how speakers may complete an expression 
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started by the other person; secondly, that speakers change the way that an 
object or activity gets formulated during the interaction; thirdly the giving of 
accounts. Finally I will make some remarks on four, the user's initial expession 
of their requirements and the advisor's initial formulation of a response. 
2.1 Collaborative completion 
Paul Drew has pointed out to me that in the following section there are cases 
where a recipient completes a turn which is somehow problematic. The arrows 
point to such completions. In these cases the speaker. whose turn gets 
completed continues in a way which accepts the completion. 
[UAA. 20) 11.1 
U: all I want to (do: ) is h: ow I can: (1.5) use 
(know) 
kermit on the (1.3) pee see five dw'I need any 
additional: chips or:: anything or r(0.7) will[ the 
Lno L no 
U: software just= 
A: a- =It'd just be the software: 
(0.8) 
U: (Th') kermit softwa: re (0.6) will do it. 
A: Tha's right yeh I mean y- y- you've got to have th the 
pee see: z: got to be plugged Into a um= 
U: b-+ =a ser- aa line- 
aa line 
A: =obviously a line yeh um 
U: 
[ 
so w io will tell me what 
configuration for the (0.5) er:: - 
A: c-+ =f'th'kermit side of it 
U: 
I 
yeh= 
A: -oh (0.5) em (0.3) wrell 
U: LI just wan' y'know obviously I'm 
close to aa em nest of terminals with tack'lines 
Drew has suggested the name "collaborative completion" for such phenomena 
and has isolated cases of which the following are examples (Drew, 1979): 
(I) [Sch: I: 14: 15] 
Jill: I- was thinking of trying to make one. °hh 
Just getting a- a:::, (1.0) uh, a tubing of 
some sort and pu- a:: nd°hh 
Ellen: -º Wi: ring it, 
Jill: And wiring it, and painting it brow: n or 
black. Can't you just get a piece of pipe? 
and paint it? 
Ellen: 1-Certainly. 
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Ben: Yea: h, you, uh, you ordinarily use thin pipe, 
Jill: Yeah that's what I would want ve: ry thin. 
Like uh:: 
Ben: -. Quarter inch. 
Jill: Quarter inch, or ha- or half in ch. 
Ben: 
1No 
half is 
too big. Well it'd be alright, 
Jill: It'd be about this big around, 
(II) [NB: IV: 2: R) 
Gladys: ... tacos fer the children w'n they come down 
dimo: rrow? °hhhhh a: nd uh, h (. ) sh- an' I, m 
gontuh phone the orduh tuh the gro: cuh this 
morning cz I ha we won(. )'t get 
up th°e-: r e 
Emma: 
[ON 
o 
Gladys: °hhhhh So e-d'you need uh hhamburger don't lchu. 
Emma: °hh Ye: u: ss? en y1uh needrsome: ulh I 
Gladys: -4 
[E 
nj Ls- °hh J sh: rJ edded 
lettuce? 
Emma: shredded lettuce en CHEE: tSE? 
(0.4) 
Gladys: Oh:, any (. ) s- puhticuluh khha: nd? 
(III) 
Caller: Who am I talking with. = 
Wendi: =°hhhh This is Wendi the receptionist? 
Caller: Linda the receptionist. Linda? hh this is= 
=((click click)) 
Wendi: Hello? 
---- tape cuts ---- 
Wendi: Good mo(h)rni(h)ng Brestts? 
Caller: Linda the rece2tionist just goofed. 
Wendi: Uh no: I didn't. I was sitting here ans a: ll 
of a sudden it jus:: t 
(") 
Caller: -º went to a dial to: ne. 
Wendi: 'e: ah hu rhh 
Caller: LYe: h that's what it did here too 
Each of these sequences appears to have the following three turn structure: a 
first part which I'll call a "completable" which show some disruption, the 
recipient provides a "completion" and the original speaker then continues with 
a "ratification", echoing the completion (wiring it/And wiring it), (Quarter 
inch/Quarter inch), (shredded lettuce/Shredded lettuce) or acknowledging it 
(went to a dial tone/yeah huhh). Only (c-+) above has precisely this form. I 
will return to (a-') and (b-. ) later. 
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[UAA. 20] 11.2 
A: =obviously a line yeh um 
U: 
I 
so who will tell me what 
1-. configuration for the (0.5) er:: = 
A: 2-+ =f'th'kermit side of it 
U: 3-. 
1 
yeh= 
This structure, [completable] [completion] [ratification] occurs several times in the 
data in just this form: 
[UAA. 9] #1.3 
U: this one is er: which is er trivial is. (. ) I want to 
plot some bi: g picture on the calcom plot or 
°aychpeeplot°= 
A: °(big) picture°= 
U: =mm but is thuh (. ) the mapping (. ) which is er zero to 
1-' one zero to one you've gotta define a (. ) sch::: 
A: 2-º spa rce first 
U: 3-' knm Wright] 
(") 
U: it's zero to one and zero to one which gives you (. ) the 
square page. 
(UAA. 9) #1.4 
A: =well you can do a call pee space (0.8) er= 
U: =z: ero to one. zero to one is the maximum (0.7) for the 
system:? = 
A: yeh (. ) well (. ) that's right so you can do thee ex (. ) 
1-4 you can do zero to: 
U: 2-' whadever you wannoo= 
A: 3-º I believe er- whatever you want s'you can do zero to five 
or something zero to one (1.4)'the wy you can't- in- the 
wy can't be any greater than one b'cos that's the width 
of the pa per butt the- the x is the length of the paper 
U: 4 paper 
A: so that can be (. ) 
U: okay 
[UAA. 9] 01.5 
U: do can it- can it do: one thing (0.4) can it do this bit 
first. phi: (1.3) one at a ti:: me (. ) so will do this 
bit first (. ) and then go for thee second one 
() 
?: °maybe° 
(2.8) 
U: can it can it do this integration part first 
(. ) 
A: what with respect to er beta 
(. ) 
U: yeha 
A: °well yeh of course. that's the way you do an 
integration isn't it° 
U: "; " and then () 
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A: well yeh I mean that's the way you do it I mean I wanted 
1-' to see whether there was a (. ) 
U: 2-' >ready made one< 
A: 3-' whether there was a (. ) ready ma: de routine you see (0.9) 
is funct- function form of integrand known the answer is 
n: o: 
U: mm hm 
[UAA. 9] #1.6 
A: How many v'these data points have you got. 
(. 4) 
U: ah:: m:: (0.8) about twenty hwords in every:: 
(0.9) 
A: °'bout what? ° 
U: twe: nty= 
A: =in er (. ) and is there um aen1erated a griD. 
U: L() 
(0.9) 
U: they:: (. ) are:: (. ) not perhaps 
A: 1-+ not) ° they're randomly s- 
(0.9) 
U: 2- °spa: ced° 
A: 3-' randomly spaced even phi beta=even=l'm talking about in 
phi beta space= 
U: =yeh= 
A: =so [y1 have] 
U: lno no i- in- in in when it- we've got a phi: is 
changing phi: 
(0.7) 
Before asking what the implications of the occurrence of such objects might be 
I want to focus on some borderline cases to see what they might reveal. 
Sometimes cases are encountered which have the air of collaborative completions 
but which, on close inspection lack one of the two flanking components which 
I presented above. That is, we find [completable] [completion] and 
[completion] [ratification] 
2.1.1 completion without clear ratification 
(IV) (DA) 
Betty: Look Is spent- I didn'even go tuh see huh 
that often becawss uh:: °hhhh uh:: even 
though uh:: we smoke to one another on the 
phone or ruh things like that-°hh I, I-I jis 
couldn'take thee constant repetition 
1-4' of ruh::: r::: 
Fanny: 2-. bf- bf the same story. Oh don' I kno: w- 
Betty: 
Lu- 
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Fanny: =or how enla: rge'it was or why huhr artery wz: 
five times 
[UAA. 11) 11.7 
U: erh we're second year, 
(0.4) 
A: yeh, 
U: undergraduate students (0.6) and we >an I've< been 
advised by (. ) Mr Roberts of the French department (. ) em 
to do a (. ) one day. course er two day cour: se 
A: y Zeh 1 
U: Lt hat's an introduction to the amdahl 
(0.4)_, 
A: y: es 
(0.6) 
U: an: we were told to come and see you 
1-' to (. ) find ou t when 
A: 2- book u 
(. ) 
A: yes well the courrses are 1 (0.7) there aren't very many 
U: 
[times 
*av ailable 
courses this year, (2.0) am: (10.6) there are no (. ) 
completely basic courses. (1.0) for beginners left this 
year 
(0.4) 
#13 Can be analysed as a collaborative completion. The timing of the advisor's 
"book up" does imply that the pause in "to (. ) find out", although only a subtle 
perturbation, is heard by him as a completable. Tentatively, I want to suggest 
that the fact that the speaker has continued beyond what I am taking to be an 
offered completion does whatever interactional work a ratification would do in 
this context or (which comes to the same thing from her standpoint) that the 
speaker is not hearing the advisor's intervening talk as a completion which would 
probably also entail that she does not acknowledge her pause as a completable. 
The fact that the speaker continues with ' the apparently oddly placed "times 
available" could be evidence for this. 
2.1.2 completion without clear completable 
[UAA. 20] #1.8 
U: you can use t'kermit as a terminal terminal emulator? 
A: yes that't right yes I mean indeed you have to. use its 
(styulised) facilit Lies 
U: 2- to be able to do it 
A: 3- to be able to. use it as a -file transfer yeh (0.6) and er (0.7) you know its its as well to know, about the um (0.7) 
things to avoid doing () when 
w when you're using the pee see five (0.9) er: (. ) in 
order to keep the session going. (. 7) but if you like 
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I'll give I'll give Agnes a buzz and er= 
(UAA. 201 11.9 
A: what (. ) what we have got that you just reminded me of 
is that (. ) we have the bit of paper somewhere over 
there= 
U: =I- I've got the piece of paper 
A: 2-' 
[ou 
(. ) y'have explaining about 
kermit 
U: 3-º yeh 
A: yeh okay 
U: but it's more that (. ) more like (0.4) if I need anything 
extra on this opus (. ) er and and [Obviously I'll need a 
A: L yeh 
U: (0.7) piece of wyer fuh- 
These deserve to be called collaborative completions since, although there 
appears nothing to me as an analyst that could be counted as a completable, the 
recipient treats the speakers turn as a completable or at any rate an interupt- 
able: the warrant for calling it a completable is that the speaker 1, gracefully 
leaves the floor and 2, produces some sort of ratification that is, acknowledges 
what was said by recipient to be what they were going to say. 
An additional feature of #1.8 is the actual form of the ratification. It consists 
of an elaboration of the completion, filling out "do it" with "use it as a file 
transfer". This is nevertheless packaged to close with an affirmative "yeh". 
Applying such considerations to #1.9 suggests that (A)'s completion could itself 
be a ratification of an earlier completion by (U). There is some circumstantial 
evidence. for this interpretation: Looking back we find 1, a formulation by (A) 
which (A) could hardly have intended to stand as an adequate designator of the 
object referred to (the piece of paper explaining about kermit) and 2, a restart 
by (U) at the start of turn which is often associated with a floor-winning device. 
This could lead to the following tentative formulation: 
(UAA. 20] 11.10 
A: what (. ) what we have got that you just reminded me of 
*1-. is that (. ) we have the bit of Paper somewhere over 
there= 
U: *2-s =I- I've got the piece orf paper 
A: *3-+ Lvou (. ) y'have explaining about 
kermit 
U: yeh 
A: 
Llyeh 
okay 
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U: but it's more that (. ) more like (0.4) if I need anything 
extra on this opus (. ) er and and viously I'll need a 
A: 
1-0!, 
eh 
U: (0.7) piece of wyer fuh- 
Despite the uncertainty of the possibility of construing * 1-', *2- *3--> as a full- 
blown collaborative completions, these considerations explain why "I've got the 
piece of' should be heard by (A) as a completable: (U)'s emerging affirmation 
cannot be relied on as an affirmation of what (A) was setting out to ask. 
2.1.3 application of the analysis 
This fragment looks like a paradigm collaborative completion with all three parts 
present. 
[UAA. 19) #1.11 
A: 1- I- I can (. )I ca [n 
U: 2-' Lpass it on= 
A: 3- =I can pass it on to him y: e: ah. (. ) c- can I keep this 
bit of print? out. =- 
U: =>y: es< 
Looking at the preceeding turn (see #1.12), however, shows that the dysfluency 
in1-º is interactional: both parties speak simultaneously and compete for the 
floor. At least this is one analysis. I would prefer, to maintain that this ja 
collaborative completion, even though it may appear more competitive than 
collaborative because primarily, whatever the antecedent of (A)'s dysfluency, (U) 
does treat 1--º as a completable. A secondary consideration is that (A) responds 
to (U)'s turn, whatever it is, as a completion, filling it out and adding an 
affirmative as I noted earlier. 
[UAA. 19] #1.12 
((replaces phone)) 
(0.6) 
A: No:. He's not there either, (0.6) er: m (1.7) we: ll. 
(0.6) 
U: 11You cou-1 
A: L 1I- I can-J (. ) I ca [n 
U: Lpass it on= 
A: =I can pass it on to him y: e: ah. (. ) c- can I keep this 
bit of print? out. = 
U: =>y: es< 
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The cooperative appearance may be reinforced in contrast to the following 
fragment where the advisor takes over the user's attempt to recap the procedure 
which they have worked out. Note that the arrowed turn contrasts with the 
completions presented above 1, it reformulates (U)'s agenda 2, it does not lead 
to a prompt return of the floor to (U). 
[UAA. 9] 11.13 
U: I think I got the feeling 
A: you you understand what 
U: yes 
(exactly soon) this is the first ste p 
A: -4 it's two steps 
that's the first'step that's the integration with respect 
to beta 
U: and () the second step 
A: and they both- you'll both use- write down the name of 
this routine. dee oh one jee ay eff you'll both 
U: dee (. ) oh (. ) one 
A: jee ay eff 
Earlier in that session there are cases where (U) chimes in during fluent talk 
from (A) echoing what (A) has said, 1-* 2--' and 6--' in #1.14. This seems, to 
be built to show that (U) is literally following (A)'s advice. 2-'. is incidentally 
I suspect a true collaborative completion. The lengthening of the n of next is 
an appreciable pause in (A)'s speech. Interestingly (U) shadows and projects 
what (A) is saying. Presumably having said exactly what (U) projected, no 
interactional work is necessary, on (A)'s behalf to further mark ratification. of 
(U)'s completion. 
(UAA. 9] #1.14 
A: I believe er- whatever you want s'you can do zero to five 
or something zero to one (1.4) the wwy you can't- in- the 
y can't be any greater than one b'cos that's the width of 
the pa (per but] the- the x is the length of the paper so 
U: 1-º Lm paper 
that can be (. ) 
U: okay 
(") 
A: any (. ) the only problem is you'll the- the the plot will 
go over the onto the n:: r ext piece of 
U: 2-' 
Uto 
the next piece of paperl 
A: piper so there'll be wh perforations across the middle of 
the plot so it won't look very nice (0.6) but- 
U: 3-' but for my design it's alright 
A: 4-' 
Lyou 
can do it] yeh you have pee space 
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greater than rer (greater than)1 
U: 5-+ Lnow second thing which I have in 
mind is I have, some double integration (. ) on (1.8) I've 
got a function (. ) er: which is (1.2) er (. ) phi (. ) beta 
(. ) nine. nine so (. ) I've g- I've got this I is 
dependent on (1.2) ph: i: (. ) is dependent on (. ) phi: and 
beat (. ) phi 
(1.6) 
A: I is a function of phi and beta phi= 
U: =phi and be rto 
A: okay= 
U: now I don't kno: w (. ) e- exact (. ) relationship between 
(. ) I (. ) phi and °beta° (0.4) 
U: but I got the value of phi: with different values 
A: «( )J U:, of [so 
A: Lso you've got- (0.7) you've got in tabular form in 
other words y'v got a table of functional value s 
U: 
Lyes3= 
A: =but you haven't got the functional rru: le 
U: 6-º Lfunction 
U: r ight 
A: 
L 
ok 
J 
ay= 
U: =what I wanted to integrate is (. ) from (1.2) mm: (. ) 
phi? is equal to zero to pi by two:, 
I want to apply some considerations which have developed in looking at 
collaborative completions to 5-º . This a redirection, as in the example above. 
I was puzzled by the aggressiveness with which (U) proceeds to the new topic, 
although the graphics problem was marked as trivial (see #1.3). The answer 
lies partly in the fact that (U) is not so much competing with the advisor for 
floor space, but with another user for the advisor's time. This point, the 
resolution of the first and trivial problem, is likely to be vulnerable as a place 
where (U) may be displaced. But I think that this is only part of the picture. 
Take 3-, this looks like a collaborative completion and certainly occupies a slot 
where one would be appropriate. (Incidentally, "slot" is a term which I am 
imposing on the data, only in reporting could it be called a "slot", for the 
participants it is simply the latest thing to be happening). But I doubt that (A) 
would have said "it won't look very nice but for your design it's alright". On 
this analysis the next slot after (U), the place which a ratification could occupy, 
is a place where I would expect (A) to formulate a version of his projected 
speech, and this is I think what we have. The net result is that (A) rehashes 
the solution which (U) has already got. (I think that 3--' is a closing down 
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move which in a sense fails because of its sequential position. ) Hence the 
legitimacy of (U)'s brisk change of topic. 
2.1.4 A hypothesis about the completion slot 
After many, many listenings to cases such as the following, in order to be able 
to remove the doubt-parenthesis around "automatically", and thereby enlarge my 
data set of collaborative completions I had to admit defeat. 
[UAA. 5] #1.15 
A: yes (0.7) you have: er::: m six hundred (0.6) minutes 
(0.6) per week (1.5) so (. ) you're allowed to ask for: 
twice that. so you'can ask for another six hundred 
(0.7) 
U: yes 
(") 
A: and that will be (. ) granted (. ) 
U: -º °(aut omatically)° 
A: 
[automatically] 
(0.6) 
A: but if you ask for more than tha- (0.9) then there will 
be a long delay: 
There are, however, reasons to suspect that there are constraints on the 
completion slot. If the user is to show understanding before the advisor 
formulates the expression themselves then. they have to do it fast. 
[UAA. 9) #1.16 
A: any (. ) the only problem is you'll the- the the plot will 
go over the onto the n:: 1 ext piece of 
U: 2-' 
[onto 
the next piece of paper 
A: paler so there'll be wh perforations across the middle of 
the plot so it won't look very nice (0.6) but- 
(UAA. 9] #1.17 
A: well yeh I mean that's the way you do it I mean I wanted 
to see whether there was a (. ) 
U: -. >ready made one< 
A: whether there was a (. ) ready ma: de routine you see (0.9) 
is funct- function form of integrand known the answer is 
n: o: 
This means that use of delay, which is often associated with dispreferred 
activities is ruled out, speaking softly is an alternative. 
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(UAA. 9) #1.18 
A: How many v"these data points have you got. 
(A) 
U: ah:: m:: (0.8) ab out twenty hwords in every:: 
(0.9) 
A: °'bout what? ° 
U: twe: nty= 
A: -in er (. ) and i s the re um gen. erated a griD. 
U: L () 
(0.9) 
U: they:: (. ) are:: (. ) not perhaps 
A: CO( not) ° they're randomly s- 
(0.9) 
U: -+ °spa: ced° 
A: randomly spaced even phi beta=even=I'm talking about in 
phi beta space= 
U: =yeh= 
A: =so y1 have 
U: 
] [ 
Lno no i- in- in in when it- we've got a phi: is 
changing phi: 
(0.7) 
2.1.5 Further complex cases 
Earlier I reported a case which I suggested, tentatively could support two 
readings as follows: 
[UAA. 20] 11.19 
A: what . (. ) what we 
have got that you just reminded me of 
is that (. ) we have the bit of Paper somewhere over 
there= 
U: 1- =I- I've got the piece o rf paper 
A: 2- Lvou (. ) y'have explaining about 
kermit 
U: 3- yeh 
[[ 
A: yeh okay 
Here (A) collaboratively completes (U) 
(UAA. 20] 11.20 
A: what (. ) what we have got that you just reminded me of. ý 
1- is that (. ) we have the bit of Paper somewhere over 
there= 
U: 2-' =I- I've got the piece orf paper 
A: 3-' Lyou (. ) y'have explaining about 
kermit 
U: yeh 
[t 
A: yeh okay 
Here it is (U) that completes (A), in other words, to use the jargon advanced 
earlier, the completable in #1.9 is a completion in #1.20, or to put it another 
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way round, if both these readings are correct, a completion is itself vulnerable 
to completion. This is tantamount to saying that the completion offered is not 
acknowledged as such and that therefore the ratification slot is occupied by an 
interuption or, if you like, a second order completion. In the following fragment 
(U)'s "yeh" suggests that (A)'s prior turn is heard as a completion: 
[UAA. 5] #1.21 
U: () after er five it's free:: 
(1.1) 
A: after six= 
U: =(after six)= 
A: well now it's (. ) its not w-uh huh ((laugh)) if can't log 
on (. ) during (0.5) nine to five. (. ) >nine to< six (. ) 
you will be allowed to log on after six 
U: yeh 
A: but if if you us: e 
(0.7) 
U: -4 all the ( 
A: 
La 
lot more aglain. 
U: - yeh 
A: then (. ) it will not let you log on after sjjx (. ) but it 
will let you log on after ten 
If we have a case of a completed completion where could all the parts lie? We 
could have: 
A: [completable] 
B: [completable] [completion] 
A: [ratification] = [completion] 
B: [ratification] 
[UAA. 20] #1.21 
A: what (. ) what we have got that you just reminded 
me of 
l-# is that (. ) we have the bit of a er somewhere over 
there= 
U: 2-' *1.4 =I- I've got the piece orf paper 
A: 3.4 *2. Lyou (. ) y'have explaining 
about kermit 
U: *3.4 yeh 
t[ 
A: yeh okay 
This however, is not the only structure that can be found in connection with 
complex collaborative completions. In #1.23 the user offers a completion which, 
the advisor chimes in with. The completion offered by the advisor however is 
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different to the one that the user offers, but both parties in turn ratify what the. 
other said. 
(UAA. 9) 11.23 
A: come along on monday and I. ll have a look at it then= 
U0: ='kay thankyou very much indeed= 
A: o rkay - (0.4) I'll log you out 
U: okay 
A: 1-º now (1.0) I know that there's a (0.6) a- er routi: ne 
for: 
(1.0) 
U: 2-4 *1-4 this sort of thing 
A: *2-º 
Lintegrr 
al= 
U: -3- =Yeh= 
A: 3-+ =>that sort of thing< in: (. ) one dimension 
(integrarls) I'm] ý not sure whether there is for two 
U: l mm 
dimensional integrals 
(UAA. 201 #1.24 
U: all I want to (do: ) is Wow I can: (1.5) use 
(know) 
kermit on the (1.3) pee see five dw'I need any 
additional: chips or:: anything or 1(0.7) will[ the 
Lno L no 
U: software just= 
A: -4 =It'd just be the software: 
(0.8) 
U: (Th') kermit softwa: re (0.6) will do it. 
A: Tha's right yeh I mean y- y- you've got to have th the 
pee see: z: got to be plugged into a um= 
U: -º =a ser- aa line= 
-+a line 
A: =obviously a line yeh r um 
U: l so who will tell me what 
configuration for the (0.5) er:: = 
A: -+ =f'th'kermit side of in 
U: l yeh= 
A: =oh (0.5) em (0.3) wrell 
U: LI just wan' y'know obviously I'm 
close to aa em nest of terminals with tack lines 
2.1.6 Conclusion 
The phenomenon of collaborative completion is a specific case where the sense 
in which the advisory sessions are cooperative, jointly constructed, endeavours 
comes out. The phenomenon makes visible some of the ways in which people 
understand and orient to what is going on in an interaction in which they are 
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participating. The next two phenomena which I want to discuss are somewhat 
less formal. 
2.2 Reformulation 
In chapter two when discussing the idea of attribution style I suggest that the 
causal expression that a person comes out with is possibly discursively produced, 
in a sense the product of that speech situation. This is also a view implicit in 
Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) idea of repertoires, an idea that Potter and Wetherell 
(1987) adopt. A primary case of a capacity to manage and produce different 
explanations, tell different stories about some matter or have different 
understandings of what's going on in some situation or generally have different 
formulations of some issue would be the, conversational management of different 
formulations. The achievement of a different formulation of some matter as the 
result of an argumentative process would be a strong and explicit case of this. 
In the section that follows I want to pull out different cases of changes in 
formulations in the advisory session. This has a certain relationship to 
Garfinkel's study of the documentary method, of "fact production" in flight, 
seeing how people update their understanding of what is going on. Here I have 
a naturally occuring situation and I don't have protocols to get at the subject's 
understanding of what the other party says. 
2.2.1 Analytic outline 
I want to discuss reformulations under, three headings, corresponding to a gross 
distinction between different changes in the way that something was expressed 
in my data in terms of who is speaking. 
(1) Self reformulation: where a speaker uses an expression at some 
point and then later adopts a different expression. 
(2) Other reformulation: where a speaker uses an expression, but 
the other speaker uses a different' formulation. 
(3) Adoption of other reformulation: following (2) first speaker 
subsequently adopts second speaker's expression. This is a special 
case of (1). 
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Diagrammatically: 
(1) (2) (3) 
A: --º[f] A: -ý [fI A: -' [f] 
A: . [f*] B: -º [f*] B: --ý [f*] 
A: --> [f*] 
Now a number of conversation analytic findings are relevant to here. 
2.2.2.1 repair 
Repair, as it is formulated in the classic paper "The preference for self- 
correction in the organization of repair in conversation. " (Schegloff, Jefferson and 
Sacks, 1977), is distinguished from correction in that correction is taken to be 
a species of repair. Correction is generally taken to be the replacement of 
something faulty with something else. This is too narrow to capture cases which 
Schegloff et al. want to study. For example in a word search the retrieved name 
does not replace anything faulty. 
Clacia: B't a-another one theh wentuh school with me 
-. was a girl na: med uh, (0.7) °W't th' hell wz 
-º er name. ° Karen. Right Caren. 
At this stage I intend to use the term "reformulation" in a weaker sense still, for 
the sake of safety. I would not want to defend the occurrence of a synonym, 
or a more precise expression as a repair, but I would not want to deny that it 
is a repair. So corrections are a subset of repairs which are a subset of 
reformulations. 
2.2.2.2 formulating place 
Schegoff (1972) addresses the issue of how an object, in particular a location can 
be referred to, in different ways (p. 81). 
For any location to which a reference is made, there is a set of 
terms each of which, by a correspondence test, is a correct way to 
refer to it. On any actual occasion of use, however, not any 
member of the set is "right". How is it that on particular 
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occasions of use some " term from the set is selected and other 
terms rejected. 
Pomerantz and Atkinson (1984) focus on the way in which the damage to a 
garment is formulated by the plaintiff in a small claims court. In my data it is 
clear that speakers can, as a matter of course, draw on a range of coreferring 
expressions. The following example is made up of fragment of all the different 
way in which the personal computer, an Opus PC 5, gets referred to: 
[UAA. 20] #2.1 
OPUS PC5 
1 
A: Yreh 
U: L RIGHT(. ) what do you know about cermit(h) (. ) and 
-º opu s (pee see) (. ) pee see fives: 
A: 
Lum 
uh": m 
A: Well I er I kn-(. ) what I (. ) do know I copyright (. ) er 
2 
U: (Th') kermit softwa: re (0.6) will do it. 
A: Tha's right yeh I mean y- y- you've got to have th the 
-º pee see: z: got to be plugged into a um= 
U: =a ser- a ra line= 
La line 
3 
U: all I want to (do: ) is h: ow I can: (1.5) use 
(know) 
kermit on the (1.3) pee see five dw'I need any 
additional: chips or:: anything or 1(0.7) willrthe 
Lno Lno 
U: software just= 
4 
A: for the (0.5) e:: r its RS two three two isn't it 
A: -4 yeh. r (0.4) I mean we we've actually cot a (. ) an opus, 
U: Lyeh 
A: -º five (0.7) with ay kermit (0.4) er (. ) on it 
r(0.6) erm 
U: land it's had no modifications (to speak of) 
51 
A: things to avoid doing () when. 
-º w when you're using the pee see five (0.9) er: (. ) in 
order to keep the session going. (. 7) but if you like 
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6 
U: I had a word with her last week: yrou know but then I 
A: L yes 
hadn't got me opus= 
A: =yes okay 
U: so I was sort of using (0.5) this (. ) huh (. ) system up 
here which is u: seless 
7 
U: =I- I've got the piece of paper 
A: 
[ou 
(. ) y'have explaining about 
kermit 
U: ý yeh 
A: yeh okay 
U: but it's more that (. ) more like (0.4) if I need anything 
-º extra on this opus (. ) er and and -obviously I'll need a 
A: 
n obviously 
U: (0.7) piece of wyer fuh- 
8 
A: (0.5) em (. ) I've got a somebody here (. ) who (0.8) erm 
would like a few words about (0.5) running kermit on a 
-º pee see five. (0.8) on an opus 
(2.9) 
9 
U: -º I've got me opus pee cee five now. (0.6) and what I 
A: 
Lyeh 
want to know is (. ) um (. ) }}: ow to configure thee (. ) 
interface (. ) I'm I'm close to aa room full of tack 
lines (. ) 
10 ((second advisor has entered)) 
U: I'm-(. ) mainly it's just going to be for transferring 
files I mean in in the future I might use it (. ) for 
editing with since I've got tack lines there and proper 
terminals (. ) makes sense to use um (. ) in the 
environment I'm used to (. ) rather than fiddling about 
with keys (. ) er er 
Al: yes that's the yeh then in that case there's absolutely 
-º no problem r for you with the pee see five (. ) transfer 
U: L no 
Al: - files in the usual way (. ) you know (. ) setting 
I 
It is difficult to see a pattern in the way that these different terms are used, but 
I would like to note that 1, the full name of the machine is used when a new 
recipient is addressed ((U) in 1 and 9, and is constructed by (A) in 8) 2, in 
possession "opus" is always used (4,6,9, but see 7); whereas 3, usage or running 
of the machine is formulated by "the PC 5" (5,10). The "PC" in (2) refers to 
personal. computers in general. The point that I want to stress here, however, 
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is that in'the course of talking speakers have the competence to manage a range 
of formulations of some object. I want to take the analysis further by 
considering the three different possibilities which I identified earlier; self- 
reformulation, reformulation by another person - in particular the advisor's 
reformulation of the something the user says and change within a speaker's 
formulation following a reformulation by another speaker. 
2.2.3 Self reformulations 
[UAA. 20] 12.2 
1 
A: yes okay well I don't think we'll have any problems (0.4) 
when you're using it as. a terminal emulator there a: re 
-º one or two little snaggles that r we know about (0.6) 
U: 
Ihn; 
which kermit (. ) which Agnes will t1ell you about 
Lhmm 
2 
advice is that you you ought to see Agnes A: yes sell IT 
U: L(mm) 
A: -º before you start anywhere on this because of, this slight 
-º keyboard problem that we know about r with the Chm 
A: terminal emulator rbut I'll give Agnes a ring because i- 
U: Lright 
A: if she's she won't want to be interupted but em 
3 
A: Basically I think he's g- he's go: t it (0.6) er and he 
just wants to know is there anything special he should know 
and I said well (0.6) we (. ) we we do know that the 
-º terminal emulator is less than perfect and I thought you 
might be able to (0.1) give him a few tips on how on how 
how to- he wants to use it for file transfer you see 
U: -(mm) 
A: -º before you start anywhere on this because of, this slight 
-º keyboard problem that we know about r with the Chm 
A: terminal emulator rbut I' ll give Agnes a ring because i- 
U: Lright 
A: if she's she won' t want to be interupted but em 
Nowhere in the intervening talk did the user make any reference to this issue. 
Such changes in formulation are to be distinguished from cases where a speaker 
simply changes their mind about what they are doing, rather than changes the 
way that they formulate it: 
(UAA. 8i) #2.3 
A: right (. ) I'll do it in a second we'll just em (2.0) I'll 
just we'll do it now: (. ) we'll log in one r- one of these 
terminals over here and do it while this chaps putting in 
the data. 
Some reformulations make reference more specific: 
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(UAA. 10) #2.4 
A: =I mean there are various (different venues) around the 
university? 
(0.8) 
U: c'z I found'the Bayne's wing (0.5) um (0.9) which have got 
-º a few word processors in them= 
A: =yeh= 
U: - =bee bee see °micros° 
(0.7) 
In the following cases reformulations have an explanatory function: 
[UAA. 9] #2.5 
U: now second thing which I have in mind is I 
have some double integration (. ) on (1.8) I've got a 
function (. ) er: which is (1.2) er (. ) phi (. ) beta (. ) 
nine. nine so (. ) I've g- I've got this I is dependent on 
(1.2) ph: i: (. ) is dependent on (. ) phi: and beat (. ) phi 
(1.6) 
A:, I is a function of phi and beta phi- 
U: =phi and be rto 
A: okay= 
U: now I don't kno: w (. ) e- exact (. ) relationship between 
(. ) I (. ) phi and °beta° (0.4) 
U: but I got the value of phi: with different values 
A: «( )J U: of I: 
A: -º 
[so 
you've got- (0.7) you've got in tabular form in 
-º other words y'v got a table of functional value s= 
U: 
[yea] 
A: =but you haven't got the functional ru: le 
U: 
[function] 
[UAA. 5] #2.6 
A: -' this is how much (. ) this is additional 
(3.4) 
U: additional 
A: -. 
Lnot 
total (. ) so its six hundred 
(5.4) 
U: previous value that's six hundrred 
A: Lye: s. 
(4.0) 
U: temporary:? 
(1.9) 
A: It has to be temporary: if you ask it (0.6) again if you 
ask for a permanent increase (0.7) it will (. ) take much 
lo: nger (would have to authorised by a committee) 
Such reformulations may involve a change in a unit of talk larger than one 
word, for example in #2.7. 
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[ UAA .7] 12.7 
A: -º erm from a uniform distribution between nought and 
ninety per cent in other wore (. ) it's an equal 
probability. ( )-er for getting the number at any 
particular value in that range. 
(") 
A: e 
U: 
ýýgen-erated 
a 'numbers and forgetting it. is that? °(well 
see)° 
A: well. (. ) each time you call it in glenerates 
U: Lyeh: J 
a different random number= 
U: =ye: ah:? 
A: and if you call it many ti: mes, 
U: yeh. 
A: -º thee (. ) numbers will be distributed with equal 
probability in this ra: nge 
U: Y: eh? 
In #2.6 the advisor's change, from "additional" to "not total" follows a silence 
and a minimal response from the recipient. In the case which follow there 
reformulation appears to occur in the light of intervening talk from the recipient, 
in other words, the speaker shows sensitivity to the "sequential environment". 
[UAA. 203 #2.8, 
A: erm well Helen Brown is our resident (. ) 
-º kermitologist (1.0) 
U: yes 
A: -º f frog tamer (0.5) em (0.5) and (. ) Iý, will refer people 
with kermit (0. x)r requirements (to her) 
U: L um that will she'll know the interface 
Here the advisor reruns a joke (kermit, the software being discussed has the 
same name as a frog puppet in a television programme). 
[UAA. 9] #2.9 
A: do do can it- can it do: one thing (0.4) can it do -' 
this bit first. phi: (1.3) one at a ti:: me (. ) so will do 
this bit first (. ) and then go for thee second one 
?: °maybe° 
(2.8) 
U: -º can it can it do this integration part first 
A: what with respect-to er beta 
Here user upgrades his formulation in two ways, substituting a less formal noun: 
"part" for "bit" and adding an adjective "integration". The following fragments 
involve reformulations following longer stretches of talk. Incidentally, both 
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involve the same advisor and the same requirement: that the user join a 
computer course. In both, cases some kind of restatement of earlier material 
occurs after it appears that getting on a course will be difficult. 
(UAA. 1) #2.10 
A: Ye:: s'se there are very few courses left now= 
U: 
- =(hm) A: but obv'ously there's only (1.5) I don't know whether 
there's any acshally any courses (. ) if you (. ) your 
you're a beginner are you= you haven't used (th) computer 
before, 
U: -+ no well er a little biT 
A: yeh 
U: *in my own country* 
A: ah ye: s 
() 
A: well ah'l explain tuh you this 
U: 
Llhis 
is only one we:: ( ) 
A: you see tha' that's wor: d processing on the BBC which is= 
U: yes 
A: nyeh (be a good one) (0.4) and that one is (. ) how to use 
the'amda: l computer. 
U: yes=_ 
A: =but it's for people (0.3) who 'ave used other computers 
beforehand (. ) so (0.3) 
rit might bei a bit-= 
U: Lyes um 
U: -º =I have used= 
(ý l 
A: 
= 
bh well then it- well that's the twenty sev enth of April 
(UAA. 11] #2.11 
U: erh we're second year, 
(0.4) 
A: yeh, = 
U: undergraduate students (0.6) and we >an I've< been advised 
by (. ) Mr Roberts of the French department (. ) em to do a 
-+ (. ) one day. course er two day cour: se 
A: yreh 
U: Lthat's an introduction to the amdahl 
(0.4) 
A: s:: - the only one (1.0) this course here, 
U: yeh, = 
A: =people who have eased other machines already 
U: oh- (1.5) °um: ° 
(3.0) 
A: most of the rcourses 
U: 4e were] under we were under'the impression 
that there there was some sort of three day course that 
was just before the beginning of term 
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Reformulation in cases such as #2.5 and #2.10 bring about dramatic changes 
in the recipient. Such cases are doubly interesting since they show the sensitivity 
to the immediate sequential 'environment of both parties. There are additional 
places in my corpus where reformulations bring about changes in the advisor's 
line. 
[UAA. 15]"#2.12 
U: and I've typed in all my text 
A: in script 
U: -+ yeh in script 
A: -º have you used script before 
U: no 
A: okay 
U: -+ no it's in wor: d 
A: in word 
U: yeh 
A: -+ okay so if it's in word its on a pee see somewhere isn't 
it 
2.2.4 Advisor's reformulations of user's expressions 
A speaker may reformulate what another speaker said in a remedial way. #2.13 
is an example of such repair. 
[UAA. 9] #2.13 
A: I I- don't think you should have too much difficulty? 
U: hheh huh huh huh honestly I think so 
A: well 
U: -º I hope so 
A: -+ you hope not. 
In the sessions I find cases of reformulations by the advisor of what the user 
says which are related to technical matters up for explanation. These may 
clarify what is going on, or simply perhaps show an understanding of the user's 
account of their concerns. 
(UAA. 10) #2.14 
U: >the other thing I was going to ask you< is um (0.5) if 
um (. ) I'm (at a computer) printing off a particular 
software program (0.7) does it (. ) um: disk have to be 
(. ) reprinted on a machine using (0.5) exactly the same 
(. ) software °program° 
(3.9) 
A: you mean if your using one (. ) w ford pr1 oce rssor a1 nd 
U: Lyes Lum: 
then you move t'a diff'rent machine 
(0.4) 
U: yah- 
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[UAA. 9] #2.15 
U: mm: (. ) this w- trivial one and 
something about using some the 
-ý intregral °analysis ° 
A: rr numelrical integra? tion. 
(U: )-' LL(yah)J 
ý4 
then I wan' to ask 
(. ) nag routines wither::: 
(UAA. 9] 12.16 
U: now second thing which I have in mind is I have some 
double integration (. ) on (1.8) I've got a function (. ) 
er: which is (1.2) er (. ) phi (. ) beta (. ) nine. nine so 
(. ) I've g- I've got this I is dependent on (1.2) ph: i: 
(. ) is dependent on (. ) phi: and beat (. ) phi 
(1.6) 
A: I is a function of phi and beta phi= 
U: =phi and be rto 
A: okay= 
U: now I don't kno: w (. ) e- exs: ct (. ) relationship between 
(. ) I (. ) phi and °beta° (0.4) 
U: but I got the value of phi: with different values 
A: «( )J U: of II: 
A: Lso you've got- (0.7) you've got in tabular form in 
other words y'v got a table of functional value s= 
U: 
[yes] 
A: =but you haven't got the functional [function] 
U: `function 
[UAA. 20] #2.17 
U: So I'm just going to string 
U: [(you know to) 
A: 
L 
yes 
U: -º temporary 'r' probably want 
A: L Yes 
U: sessioins hat's a: ll 
A: -º LYes just now and 
kermit type of thing (isn't 
U: yeh 
a piece of (. ) wire 
it for y'know half hour 
again (. ) it's a typical 
it) 
[UAA. 8ii] #2.18 
A: =well it won't take second (0.4) em- which routine was 
it you °wanted°? = 
U: -. =em: it's: (. ) dee oh two (. ) bee ay eff 
A: -. bee (. ) ay (. ) eff (. 0.7) 1.11 do it for you now (1.8) 
save you hanging round any °longer° (2.3) rung- runga 
kutta 
U: that's right 
[UAA. 9) #2.19 
A: well yeh I mean that's the way you do it I mean I wanted 
to see whether there was a (. ) 
U: -º >ready made one< 
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A: -' whether there was a (. ) ready ma: de routine you see (0.9) 
is funct- function form of integrand known the answer is 
n: o: 
U: mm hm 
Sometimes, to have the right formulation is to have an answer to some question: 
[UAA. 7] #2.20 
U: trying (. ) to know (. )'I've (. ) u: ed? this er. (. ) 
function 
(1.1) 
A: yeh (poh) 
U: and [that's] (1.1) (the whisk there and I got this 
A: L yeh 
brief er signal) er description of er= 
A: =ye: uh: = 
U: =zero point poi: nt I don't really understand don't 
completely understand what is the (. ) purpose of this 
(values) 
(") 
A: ye: uh:. (. y we; ll, (. ) er: m: (. ) eesh- (. ) it's a random 
number generator 
() 
U: -º random generated number in duh- between two lines. - 
A: -º =tha's right it- th- y- y- you've got- uh- a 
lower a1 ower lower bound an' an upper and 
U: 
Ltha's 
right 
and it generates random numbers (. ) in that ra; nge (. ) 
er but- (. ) they're always referred to as pseudo random 
numbers (. ) okay 
U: y: eh? 
A: th- the- the difference is qu- was just a matter of 
precise terminology °(how) really°= 
U: =yeh 
A: erm from a uniform distribution between nought and ninety 
per cent in other wors (. ) it's an equal probability. 
() er for getting the number at any particular value 
in that range. 
(") 
A: r rge- 
U: -º Llgenerated a numbers and forgetting it. is , that? *(well 
see)" 
A: -º well. (. ) each time you call it 'i n glenerates 
U: Lyeh: J 
a different random number= 
U: =ye: ah:? 
A: and if you call it many ti: mes, 
U: yeh. 
A: thee (. ) numbers will be distributed with equal. 
probability in this ra: nge 
[UAA. 5] #2.21 
U: T if I am: °a° I have a password in er: m prime 
(") 
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A: mhm, 
U: -9 can 1: (. ) go through prime to the amdal 
(1.3) 
A: no 
A: -' ryou c- you c-'Y Iou can connect from the prime to the 
U: L( ) 
A: amdal 
U: yes 
A: that doesn't give you any additional recources just the 
same that logging in on an amdal terminal 
[UAA. 5) $2.22 
U: why not make a -calculation as example. (. ) er some times 
six hundred per week is ten hours 
A: yeh 
U: I': m not work anything this week why you are not () ]Et 
week 
A: -+ well it's a moving average: (. ) it's not strictly six 
hundred per week 
U: yeh 
A: er: if you over run slightly 
U: ye [h 
A: 
Lif 
you'don't use enough as much th'following week it 
will average itself out- it's averaged over ten days 
U: ah um 
A: ((clears throat)) (. ) so you're you're running average is 
still obviously larger than this 
U: , aha 
2.2.4 User adopts advisor's reformulation 
There are cases where following reformulation by the advisor a user will adopt 
that expression. 
(UAA. 5) #2.24 
U: 1- () after er five it's free:: 
(1.1) 
A: 2- after six= 
U: 3- =(after six)= 
In the following extended example, which includes the whole of a session where 
I made an enquiry, I adopt the advisor's formulation of the disk that I want. 
Note that he emphases what this disk is known as, but doesn't say that I was 
in error. The transcript overs an example of a change in. formulation not of a 
word, but of a whole way of describing the requirements where I switch from 
talking about my needs to talking in terms of a group (4-' and 7-'). I didn't, 
however, grasp the idea that there is just one filestore which is shared 5-' and 
6--'). 
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(UAA. 2] #2.25 
U: er:: (0.8) person I know (. ) in linguistics was able to 
1-º send me er, (0.9) sort of-dee disk (0.7) um which I'm 
able to: (0.7) well which is attached t'when I log 
o: n, which contains a load of files that he's prepared 
(0.4) 
A: Yeh er:, 
U: um (0.4) can (0.5) I set up a whole multitude of disks 
like that. 
(1.2) 
A: 2-+ w(h)ell: (0.7) that (. ) disk (. ) there is a permanent 
disk that er (2.3) as which belongs to- (. ) you you've 
got there cos you've got a, link into (. ) a permanent 
disk. 
U: Yeh= 
A: =belonging to somebody else 
U: Yes 
A: Um (1.8) you can't (. ) well you can s- have as many disks 
as you like, 
U: Yeh. 
A: but um if you want to have them automatically. (0.7) then 
the owner, (0.6) then the (0.9) owner has (0.9) 
>°(we: ll I can't- I don't want to say any more than I've 
got to)<° but- (. ) you've got to your directory= you've 
got to have to get th' directory entry of the machine 
updated. 
(0.5) 
U: 3-º well I mean can I set up my own permanent disks. 
(0.6) 
A: No you ca- well (. ) not permanent no. 
U: rr(Uh: -) 
A: The whole, reason why we have the filestore. (0.6) is 
(. ) >that when you set up a permanent disk you're 
allocate piece- er-< area of disk 
(") 
U: y: eh. 
A: which only you can use 
U: ye: s 
A: If y'don't have any files on it. 
(") 
U: yes= 
A: =it is still in use. - 
U: =right yeh (. ) this is- 
A: and therefore (1.0) uh (1.0) (y'know) it can be wasted so 
the whole idea of >the whole idea of the filestore< was 
th'you Get at the disk space when you need it 
U: yeah 
A: and then files not (in use) are kept in the (. ) (format) 
where they're compressed down and then can be (withdrawn) 
of f line, 
U: yeah 
A: now (. ) if you have a particular need (1.2) for (. ) 
permanent disk space (1.0) you can get some-. 
U: ye rs 
A: [you can apply for it (0.5) and get it 
(0.3) 
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U: yes 
A: and then- that will be (0.7) er put in your direct'ry 
entry so every time you log on (0.6) you can get it 
U: yeah 
A: er 
U: 4- well m- maybe my sRpervisor could ask thee 
A: Leh 
U: =th'reason is that he's he's obtained a load of um (1.1) 
transcripts of >conversations with< young children= 
A: =oh I see (ye: ah, ) 
U: um (. ) it's a (. ) research group in America and th'-and 
er >I mean obviously (1.1) i- it'd be useful to er to er 
kee: A them (. ) the (best) but yeh obviously (they wont be 
all the time) (. ) 
r(available)= 
A: kaell you c- 
A: =I mean you can copy them across (one at a time) and put 
5-+ them in the filestore. 
U: yeh 
A: and then just get the one's you want (and then sort it 
out? ) (. ) just get the ones you require at any particular 
time 
(1.9) 
U: 6-+ wuh you mean have them in your own filestore 
A: yeh 
U: (half an hour)= 
A: =yeh you (only 
you know when you- (8.8) e: m: (1.0) when you go into 
files- (1.2) to the filestore. ( 
where I say (. ) you can put files into the pool there. 
U: yeh 
A: and then wh'never you need one do a get on it 
U: yes= 
A: =n'then when you finished with it erase it (. ) and then 
it's used so that you can use use ordinary 
work disk in that way 
U: 
Lyes 
(0.7) 
U: yeh well >that's how I mean< o- obviously that's how I 
usually work but I was just= 
A: =yeh but if you wahnt to have a permanent (0.9) I mean 
y'super- yes. supervisor or you can put in (. ) for a 
permanent d isk. (. ). and then it will be 
U: 
Lyeh 
set up (0.9) and= 
U: =yes 
A: it it will then appear in your (. ) in your machine as 
some 
U: yerh 
A: Laddress say one nine (. ) three or something= 
U: =yeh 
A: um (. ) now if its one nine two: (. ) it automatically gets 
linked as disk dee when you log on= 
U: =yeh 
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U: 7- yeh (. ) well I'. ll. check and see how many people wou- 
people would be-(into the information) >it's just that<= 
A: =yeh 
U: (the ones) 
A: 
LLI 
think that's that's the critical thing. 
U: y reh 
A: Lif a whole grow: of people yes are going to 
share 1the same information then it makes sense 
U: 
Iyeh 
U: yerh 
A: Lto have it on a permanent disk 
A: but important you can always any time (. ) link into any 
disk you like, 
U: yeh. 
A: any permanent disk (1.4) em by using a t'link command 
U: y: es 
A: you spcify: the user'name (1: 0) er- (0.6) what number 
that disk is known to 'em 
U: LLyeh 
A: that user () 
then you can access it afterwards 
U: does that mean that you can't sort of er: m: (0.8) 
-º protect, (1.2) permanent disks. 
A: -º well (. ) permanent disks. have got passwords on them. = 
U: the- they have that's fine= 
A: yes so you have so you have to specify a pa- (0.9) if 
it's going to be a public one, 
U: ye rh 
A: Lyou can omit the password. 
U: yeah. = 
A: see normally. (0.9) er when you er when you do a li: nk, 
(0.7) it will specify: (0,8) y'know ask (it as) a 
pa: ssword (. ) and there are two passwords. >one for 
reading one for writing< there are problems with see em 
ess allowing the people to write to the disk so we that 
normally give out that one but but the reasd one. (. ) you 
know it will be (. ) will come up 
U: but yeh 
A: () 
2.3 Accounts 
Students of accounts have generally seen them as explanation for unusual goings 
on, especially untoward behaviour. For example, Cody and McLaughlin (1985) 
state that: 
Accounting sequences '... are manifestations of a systematic provision 
in the organization of social interaction for the management of failure 
events. Such sequences revolve around the proposition that one of the 
parties to a relationship has committed an offence ... or has neglected 
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some obligation, and that a remedy should be proposed by the offending 
party for evaluation by him/her who has offended 
An example of this in my data is where a user agrees that he has a file that 
calls a routine, but then it turns out that he hasn't. 
[UAA. 221 #3.1 
A: do you have an exec to run the program 
(0.6) 
U: -" °yeh° 
(8.4) 
A: can't find it (0.9) is it not on the disk 
(20.1) 
A: that's the only (. ) exec file you've go: t, (0.4) so you 
don't run it with an exec 
(. ) 
U:, no 
(1.2) 
A: I thought you said you did 
(") 
U: oh yeh er s- sorry V 
(0.4) 
A: okay (. ) so you you, run it by doing (0.6) a (. ) fort set 
up (. ) a fort vee ess essetra 
(0.3) 
U: yeh 
(") 
A: okay (0.3) would you like to go through that sequence (. ) 
and I'll I'll watch 
(2.4) 
U: -º I'm er (. ) I'm not very (. ) familiar with execs 
(0.8) 
A: with 
(") 
U: execs 
(0.8) 
A: okay well it doesn't matter (. ) um (0.6) you know y you 
run through the the can we read the whole of the program 
and em then you load it and try to run it with some data 
I'd like to watch () what happens 
I want to make a very basic point. Note that at the end of this fragment the 
advisor provides an account for getting the user to run the program "I'd like to 
watch () what happens". Such accounts, though hardly for untoward things 
pervade the talk in the advisory sessions. The following fragments are an 
assortment of different cases where some kind of account is offered for 
something. 
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Inevitably accounts are produced for technical reasons such as the operation 
of the computer services: 
(UAA. 51 13.3 
A: and that will be (. ) granted (. ) 
U: °(autr-omatically)0 
A: `automatically 
(0.6) 
A: -º but if you ask for more than tha- (0.9) then there will 
be a long delay: (0.8) cos I it'll have to go through 
U: 
LO(hm)J° 
A: a committee 
The following cases show how speakers draw on accounts in the course of the 
exchange. The third one arrowed is interesting since it is offered to explain 1, 
conduct within the interaction itself and 2, action which has not yet occurred. 
[UAA. 11 #3.2 
U: yeh 
A: -º uh 'ts a bit late in the year now 
U: (MM) 
A: most uv th' courses av: f: inished bu we've still got a f: ew 
A: ... your you're a beginner are you= you haven't used (th) 
computer before, 
U: no well er a little biT 
A: yeh 
U: -. Oin my own country* 
A: ah ye-. Ls 
A: -4 well ah'l explain tuh you this 
U: LThis is only one we:: ( ) 
A: you see tha' that's wor: d processing on the BBC which is= 
1 
[UAA. 8ij #3.4 
A: - right (. ) I'll do it in a second we'll just em (2.0) I'll 
just we'll do it now: (. ) we'll, log in one r- one of these 
terminals over here and do it while this chaps 
putting in the data. 
(UAA. Bii) #3.5 
A: y::: eh (. ) um well got a de- copy (0.4) copy i'your 
department. 
U: -º no. are (. ) been up to: thee: um (0.7) one in th' 
(0.4) mechanical engineering and it's missing out off 
((chair creeks)) 
A: it's what 
U: -º missing out of that er set of rdata files 
A: Lruhah 
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[UAA. 8] #3.6 
A: what- (0.7) there's something f: unny going on 'ere III 
I don't know whad id is so (. ) em- 
(2.1) 
A: -º do you want to I think I we'll have to look at this some 
other ti: CM e I- I thi1nk it's to li- i- it'll take a 
U: okay 
A: time to look art here] (0.7) you- (2.0) what you could 
U: L yeh 
[UAA. 11] #3.7 
A: -º by this time most people have decided whether they want 
to use it or they dont't so 
(") 
U: y ren 
A: Lso] lot'sof courses in october november (. ) right 
through to february but- 
usually there isn't much demand now 
U: -º 
I 
that's no good to us cos 
- 
we'll be over in 
France next year: 
[UAA. 18] #3.8 
A: -º =okay well (0.4) you log on an we'll (then) see what the 
problem is 
(UAA. 18) #3.9 
U: I need to- I've just been getting a message on the 
computer screen (0.6) that (0.4) the disk is full. (1.0) 
-ý erm: (. ) an'I don't really know what to do about it so 
(0.4) 
2.4 Some considerations on getting the session going 
I want to close with a brief presentation of two phenomena which may be 
distinctive of the kind of conversations that take place in the advisory. 
2.4.1 Users' presentation of the problem as their problem 
Overwhelmingly users formulate their problem astheir own problem or their 
situation. 
(UAA. 1j #4.1 
U: as'd my'er: (. ) asked by my er (. ) supervisor to: take 
some computer course. 
A: ah yes s'you le, 
U: Le given me some information. 
A: yes well these are the courses we've go: (t), 
(UAA. 2] #4.2 
U: As it happens I've got a (0.3) problem myself tha' I 
could ask you about it, 
165 
(0.9) 
U: e Lr 
A: right 
(0.1) 
U: er:: (0.8) person I know (. ) in linguistics was able to 
send me er, (0.9) sort of dee disk (0.7) um which I'm 
able to: (0.7) well which is attached t'when I log o: n, 
which contains a load of files that he's prepared 
(0.4) 
A: Yeh er:, 
[UAAX. Bi] #4.3 
U: Excuse me (. ) em:: 
>introductory< (. ) 
rtwenty seventy of 
A: Ly: ::::::: 
register you. 
U: please (. ) I 've gi 
A: 
L 
okay 
(1.0) I'm (. ) interested in thee; 
course (. ) on the amdahl on the (. 
ap-ý ril and rI ] 
bh . do you want me to 
Dt a user name 
[UAAB. ii] #4.4 ` 
U: 'scuse me (0.40 is there any chance I can have a 
? photocopy of one of these er (1.2) 1(graph) can I do it 
A: 
A: y::: eh (. ) um well got a de- copy (0.4) copy i'your 
department. 
U: no. are (. ) been up to: thee: um (0.7) one in th' (0.4) 
mechanical engineering and it's missing out off 
r( )ý ((chair creeks)) 
A: it's what 
U: missing out of that er set of i-data f1iles 
A: Lruhah 
Some users even classify themselves as a preliminary to explaining their business. 
This could be because they know, as I mentioned above, that the user access 
area in which the advisory is places is not intended for use by undergraduates. 
This is relevant in the next example: 
(UAA. 10) #4.5 
U: right hello? (. ) um:? 
(3.4) 
A: do you want it ((the chair)) 
(1.3) 
U: () s'long as it's no hassle 
U: -4 um I'm an undergraduate= 
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A: =yeah= 
U: um (. ) at the university an I've got a dissertation (0.5) 
um which I (0.6) like to:: °um° print up ona word 
processor 
A: y: eah 
(UAA. 111 #4.6 
U: -º erh we're second year, 
(0.4) 
A: yeh, = 
U: -+ undergraduate students (0.6) and we >an I've< been 
advised by (. ) Mr Roberts of the French department (. ) em 
to do a (. ) one day. course er two day cour: se 
A: y reh 1 
U: that's] an introduction to the amdahl 
Such formulations are not inevitable, however, the following two fragments are 
exceptions. Interestingly, the user's opening question, which is not couched in 
first person terms, is not given a serious reply. Incidentally, the user has already 
shared a joke as the previous session came to an end. The user soon produces 
a first person story as he narrows down what the problem is. 
[UAA. 20] #4.7 
A: "Y reh 
U: -º 
L RIGHT(. ) what do you know about kermit(h) (. ) and 
opu s (pee see)_(. ) pee see fives: 
A: 
L 
um uh:: m 
A: Well I er I kn-(. ) what I (. ) do know I copyright (. ) er 
U: ((lau rgh) ) 
A: L ((laugh)) ( (1.2) copyright (1.2) what) 
(2.5) 
A: rr er 
U: LL all I want to (do: ) is h: ow I can: (1.5) use 
(know) 
kermit on the (1.3) pee see five dw'I need any 
additional: chips or:: anything or (0.7) will1 the [no 
no 
U: software just= 
A: =It'd just be the software: 
In the next fragment the speaker adopts, and sticks to, a non-first person 
account. 
[UAA. 21] #4.8 
U: -º it suddenly decided not to work anymore. 
(0.9) 
A: it suddenly decided not to work anymore. - 
U: =yes 
A: [oh 
U: L`it was working fine (an em) 
A: yeh okay (0.7) you you've obviously made some changes to 
it 
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(0.6) 
U: er no: (0.6) just suddenly decided not to work anymore 
(") 
A: oh kay, when did you last use the program -- 
(0.6) 
U: er:: (1.7) yesterday 
(0.2) 
A: yesterday and it's stopped working since then 
(0.5) ' 
U: yep 
2.4.2 Aspects of the advisors' response 
Often the turn during which the advisor responds to the users formulation of the 
problem contains hesitations and restarts, which for convenience I will gloss as 
"dysfluencies". 
[UAA. 7J #4.9 
A: 
(5.4) 
A: Is your's a very quick question, 
(0.5) 
U: Y: es. 
(") 
A: Yes. go on. then, 
(2.4) 
U: trying (. ) to know (. ) 
, 
Lve (. ) u : _ed? 
this er. (. ) 
function 
(1.1) 
A: yeh (poh) 
U: and [that's] (1.1) (the whisk there and I got this 
A: L yeh 
brief er signal) er description of er= 
A: =ye: uh: = 
U: =zero point poi: nt I don't really understand don't 
completely understand what is the (. ) purpose of this 
(values) 
(") 
A: -+ ye: uh:. (. ) well, (. ) gr: m: (. ) eesh- (. ) it's a random 
number generator 
() 
U: random generated number in duh- between two lines. - 
Yet at other times the advisor comes straight out with a fluent response. 
[UAA. 1] #4.10 
U: as'd my'er: (. ) asked 12y my er (. ) supervisor to: teke 
some computer course. 
A: ah yes s'you rr 
U: Le given me some information. 
A: -4 yes well these are the courses we've go: (t), 
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U: yeh 
A: uh 'ts a bit late in the mar now 
U: (mm) 
A: most uv th' courses av: f: inished bu we've still got a 
f: ew 
What could be going on here? A number of different things might be possible. 
Certainly the advisor's task in each of these two examples is very different. In 
the first one the formulation of the user's requirement is harder to grasp than 
in the second one and a response harder to formulate since there is uncertainty 
about what kind of knowledge the user will have. But though this might 
account for why giving a response is difficult here it does not explain why the 
advisor is not fluent. I want to examine some other cases to try and get at why 
this might be. Firstly this dysfluency is not idiosyncratic, for the same advisor 
as in #4.10 is speaking here: 
[ UAA. 2] #4.11 
U: As it happens I've got a (0.3) problem myself tha' I 
could ask you about it, 
(0.9) 
U: err 
A: Lright 
'(0.1) 
U: er:: (0.8) person I know (. ) in linguistics was able to 
send me er, (0.9) sort of dee disk (0.7) um which I'm , 
able to: (0.7) well which is attached t'when I log o: n, 
which contains a load of files that he's prepared 
(0.4) 
A: Yeh er:, 
U: um (0.4) can (0.5) I set up a whole multitude of disks 
like that. 
(1.2) 
A: -+ w(h)ell: (0.7) that (. ) disk (. ) there is a permanent 
disk that er (2.3) as which belongs to- (. ) you you've 
got there cos you've got a link into (. ) a permanent 
disk. 
How tightly specified the question is seems to be relevant: 
[UAA. 20] #4.12 
U: See how trusting you a: re with a piece of stri: ng? 
(0.8) 
A: well. 
(0.6) 
U: ((laughs)) 
A: I(. )it(s) it is not the value of it (. ) it's the 
availabilty of it that's important 
U:. Caught me 
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(1.4) 
A: Yeh okay thanks u: m (0.9) le let me just put a ring round 
it (0.5) er 
(11.5) 
A: thanks okay (0.4) y'n(. ) somebody will send you a mail 
note about it 'ts the best way(h) 
U0: yeh thanks very mr uch? 
A: I okay bye 
(1.4) 
A: Y1eh 
U: L RIGHT(. ) what do you know about kermiT(h) (. ) and 
opu s (pee see) ( L .) pee see fives: 
A: um uh:: m 
A: -º Well I er I kn-(. ) what I (. ) do know I'copyright (. ) er 
U: ( (lau rgh) ) 
A: L ((laugh)) ( (1.2) copyright (1.2) what) 
(2.5) 
A: rrer 
U: LLall I want to (d o: ) is h: ow I can: (1.5) use 
(know) 
kermit on the (1.3 ) pee. see five dw'I need any 
additional: chips or:: anything or r(0.7) will1 the 
Lno no 
U: software just= 
A: -º =It'd just be the software: 
Whilst other enquiries about courses get prompt responses 
[UAAX. 81) 14.13 
U: Excuse me (. ) em:: (1.0) I'm (. ) interested in thee; 
>introductory< (. ) course (. ) on the Amdahl on the (. ) 
rtwenty seventy ofap-1ril and rI 
A: -º Ly: :::::::: bh . do you want me to 
register you. 
U: please (. ) I 've got a user name 
A: 
I 
okay 
I 
[UAA. 11] #4.14 
U: erh we're second year, 
(0.4) 
A: yeh, = 
U: undergraduate students (0.6) and we >an I've< been 
advised by (. ) Mr Roberts of the French department (. ) em 
to do a (. ) one day. course er two day course 
A: yreh 1 
U: Lthat's an introduction to the amdahl 
(0.4) 
A: y: es 
(0.6) 
U: an: we were told to come and see you 
to (. ) rfind ou t when 
A: lbook upý 
(") 
A: - yes well the courses are 1 (0.7) there aren't very many 
170 
U: Ltimes °avJ ailable 
courses this year, (2.0) am: (10.6) there are no (. ) 
completely basic courses. (1.0) for beginners left this 
year 
The following fragments suggest that there are constraints on how long a silence 
can be left before a response of some kind has to be provided or on how much 
explaining can be expected form the user: 
[UAA. 18] 04.15 
U: I need to- I've just been getting a message on the 
computer screen (0.6) that (0.4) the disk is full. 
-r (1.0) 
erm: (. ) an'I don't really know what to'do about it so 
(0.4) 
A: ri' [ ght j or kay 
U: LI think that you have to save it or something 
like that 
(UAA. 4) #4.16 
U: No I wouldn't waste er (. ) either of our time with 
>a contrived< one. (0.4) em (1.2) and a- (0.4) well 
Ithink I know the answer. (0.5) and that's that 
(0.3) I think the answers negative. (0.8)-em I'm trying 
to (1.3) send er: m (0.8) BBC files in view, 
(0.3) >well in fact you only had a phone call about this 
a moment ago<= 
A: =°mm hm°= 
U: =em (0.8) view (0.5) output files. (. ) to thee 
(0.8) Amdahl (0.2) em (1.1) now (. ) >as far as I know 
there 
are two ways of doing this< one is using a kermit (0.8) 
where you have to em (0.5) spool them into (0.7) file 
stripper (1.0) control 
characters (an then sernd it through) kermit 
(A: Lright) 
(0.6) 
U: and then the alternative is to use thee (0.7) em 
(0.6) the host (. ) facility using the write 
on that (0.6) 
A: 
Lyeh 
U: now (0.7) the the problem is that the files I've got are 
very big (0.4) they're too big to (0.2) all be read into 
(0.4) the memory of a BBC micro. (0.5) which means that 
neither of those methods wo: rks (. ) >the kermit thing 
doesn't work straight off because< (0.5) to: spool it (. ) 
with (. ) the pee (. ) spool (. ) are (. ) that removes 
the (. ) >control characters< you need to have it 
all all in memory °I think* 
A: °mm hm°= 
U: and then also to use the host thing you have to 
(0.8) have the file (. ) in the memory. 
(0.5) 
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A: -. no the well. (1.4) there is- (0.7) there is a 
mechanism whereby you can (2.1) you can stage it 
off a disk (0.6) with (. ) vie: w (. ) o: n >host< 
(1.3) 
(UAA. 10] #4.17 
U: right hello? (. ) um:? 
(3.4) 
A: do you want it ((the chair)) 
(1.3) 
U: () s'long as it's no hassle 
U: 
(") 
um I'm an undergraduate= 
A: =yeah= 
U: um (. ) at the university an I've got a dissertation (0.5) 
um which I (0.6) like to:: °um° print up ona word 
processor 
A: y: eah 
U: (in advance of) handing it in= 
A: =yeh= 
U: -' I was (. ) wondering if thee (. ) university has facilities 
to do things- to do tha' 
A: -' well. (1.6) there are, (1.0) >see the've go'-< (0.7) 
these (0.6) micros up here are (restricted use) (0.8) 
particularly for research purposes (0.6) theory j' 
- (0.6) is that only research [ 
h 
the problem (0.5) er: m 
U: ( ) yea 
some uv thuh departments have goT (0.8) er which 
department are you from 
U: I'm from law: akshually (. ) and they don't have (them) 
(UAA. 2] #4.18 
U: er:: (0.8) person I know (. ) in linguistics was able to 
send me er, (0.9) sort of dee disk (0.7) um which I'm 
able to: (0.7) well which is attached t'when I log o: n, 
which contains a load of files that he's prepared 
(0.4) 
A: Yeh er:, 
U: 1 um (0.4) can (0.5) I set up a whole multitude of disks 
like that. 
(1.2) 
A: w(h)ell: (0.7) that (. ) disk (. ) there is a permanent 
disk that er (2.3) as which belongs to- (. ) you you've 
got there cos you've. got a link into (. ) a permanent 
disk. 
(UAA. 71 #4.19 
U: =zero point poi: nt I don't really understand don't 
completely understand what is the (. ) purpose of this 
(values) 
(") 
A: -º ye: uh:. (. ) well, (. ) er: m: (. ) eesh- (. ) it's a random 
number generator 
172 a 
U: random generated number in duh- between two lines. - 
These examples suggest a relationship between offering a personal account and' 
the advisor's dysfluency. In these examples although the users have sketched 
quite detailed concerns they feel it necessary to offer autobiographical 
supplementaries "I don't really now what to do about it", "I was wondering if the 
university had facilities to do that", "can I set up a whole multitude of disks like 
that", "I don't really understand the purpose of these values". Such devices 
appear to be effective in placing the responsibility for further talk with the 
advisor. 
3.0 Conclusion 
Drawing on detailed transcripts and on some findings in conversation analysis 
I have 1, tried to understand a cooperative conversational phenomenon and to 
apply an analysis of it to some features found in the advisory sessions. 2, shown 
that at the level of lexical selection speakers manage reformulations on a routine 
basis and appear to orient to the sequential environment where they speak. In 
this sense the choice of term can be understood as being under a constraint 
which is communicative in nature. A separate point is that 3, within the 
explanatory business of advice talk explanations routinely occur in the form of 
accounts. A whole range of things become the business of accounting. Finally 
4, I gave examples of two things which in general appear to characterise some 
of the constraints operating at the start of the sessions: the advisor's dysfluency 
in the initial response to the user's problem and the user's adoption of a 
personal style of narrative. 
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Although I drew attention to the role of accounts in the advisory sessions my 
analysis has departed from the path marked' out by the studies' in chapters two 
and three in two ways. ý Firstly, in those chapters the focus of analysis was on 
discrete explanatory utterances, whereas here, although I have taken data from 
episodes where explaining is going on, I have not tried to identify and analyse 
isolated expressions which encapsulated an explanation. Secondly; in connection 
with the style of work, those earlier studies involved pushing certain conceptual 
claims by appealing to data derived from conversation. In this chapter the force 
, of inquiry has been more tentative and exploratory. I want to emphasise that 
my analyses here are not representative of the detail and subtlety which an 
experienced conversation analyst cbuld bring to bear. As I pointed out at the 
start of this, chapter, I have been concerned with illustrating some of the ways 
in which the conversational environment appears to constrain what participants 
in conversation do. 
A topic for further exploration would be the analysis of explanatory utterances 
themselves, elucidating the role that they have in explanation giving and how the 
speech situation ° constrains their function and formulation. In the remaining 
chapters, however, I want to examine, - in different ways, the sense in which 
communication and what I have called communicative constraints are social 
phenomena. In the next chapter I want to pursue the idea that the participants 
have -knowledge of a way, of 
behaving which is normative in nature and is 
sensitive to the concurrent details of the interaction by taking up, very briefly, 
a feature the nonvocal activities in these advice sessions. 
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CHAPTER 6: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE ORGANISATION OF BODY 
MOVEMENT IN COMMUNICATION 
I want, briefly, to comment on the appropriatenesss of the idea that participants' 
behaviour is normative (rather than rule governed in a quasi-grammatical sense). 
I discuss this in relation to a set of findings on change in body-posture during 
telephone interuptions to the advisory. During such calls the advisor and user 
typically move apart, and then move together again once the call is over. 
1.0 Introduction 
It is obvious, reflecting on our ability to walk along a busy street without 
bumping into people, that we are sensitive -to other people's spatial positioning. 
It would be surprising if such a capacity did not have a role in the conduct of 
communication. In addition to taking enquiries from users coming to it, the 
advisory also receives telephone enquiries. When a phone call first occurred 
during a session that I was recording I initially viewed this as a problem for my 
data collection. But of course it is also a problem for the participants which 
requires management. Although the phone call enquiries themselves are not 
researchable (only one party can be heard of course) the impact of the call on 
the session in which it occurs turns out to be highly interesting. Watching the 
video tapes shows that the phone call is a site of bodily repositioning of the 
advisor and user. Acknowledging the complexity of face to face communication 
much of the early work in conversation analysis was carried out on telephone 
call conversations because in an audiotape of a phone call the analyst has all 
the material that was available to each participant. (See for example Schegloffs 
work on "Sequencing in conversational openings" (Schegloff, 1968)). My situation 
ironically complements such data. Again in acknowledgement of its complexity 
I will only attempt a very coarse analysis of a gross phenomenom. On some 
occasions the advisor phones out for information. The data showed nine cases 
of telephone calls altogether, seven involving calls out, two calls into the 
advisory. 
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1.1 Relationship to previous work on body movement in communicative 
situations 
I have already mentioned work on body movement in earlier chapters. For 
example, Marsh et al (1982), used video recordings to establish patterns in the 
distribution of football fans in the stands. Duncan and Fiske (1977) included 
body movement categories in their "external variable study". Birdwhistell 
established a field called "kinesics", the study of body movement in 
communication. This approach involved attempting a comprehensive description 
of body movement in interactions (Birdwhistell, 1970). 
Conversation analytic work on nonvocal phenomena (Heath, 1984,1986; 
Goodwin, 1981,1984; Schegloff, 1984) differs from most social psychological 
work in that quantitative observation is avoided in favour of trying to examine 
the structure of body movement which is construed as interactively organised. 
Here too the idea that phenomena of interest are produced and attended to by 
the participants is used as a guiding principle. 
Heath (1986) presents an analysis of medical interactions. In his chapter on 
"Display of recipiency and beginnings of consultation" he includes the following 
fragment (p. 38): 
(1) 
Dr: and they help (. ) at the time 
(0.5) 
P: yeh (o. kay) 
(1.5) 
P: -+ but I haven: 't (1.2) he gave me seven to take it 
dow: (n) 
Dr: Lmm huh 
P: taking them like that:: t 
Heath's analysis focuses on the pause in the patient's talk (in the arrowed 
section). Paying attention to the non-vocal environment in which this utterance 
occurs shows that it has an interactive dimension to it. At the start of this turn 
the doctor is reading the medical records, but after one second starts to move 
his gaze to the patient. When his gaze reached her face she continues speaking. 
The patient is withholding talk until the doctor's gaze returns. 
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(2) 
P: but I haven: 't ---------+--he gave me seven to take 
------------... 
t 
reads records 
Here I shall not attempt an interaction analysis of the non-vocal behaviour. I 
will only describe the phenomenon that I want to at a very coarse level, using 
a few illustrations. 
2.0 Analysis 1 
2.1 Basic finding 
The basic finding appeared to be that during any phone call the advisor and 
user would separate for the duration of the call and then move back together 
when it was over. The movements are highly complex. Repeated viewing 
reveals that each movement has a number of components, suggesting the 
possibility of an analysis in terms of how the movements of each participants 
relate to each other. I will not attempt such an analysis here. Figures 6.2,6.3, 
and 6.4 illustrate the basic finding. (These drawings are produced by tracing 
onto an acetate sheet placed over a television screen. This method is fast, and 
is far cheaper than photographing the screen or use of an image analyser. 
Furthermore the drawing can be readily photocopied. Of course the drawings 
are very simple and are simply intended to sketch the behaviour in question. ) 
The figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the positions taken up before, during and after the 
phone call. The user in figure 6.3 carried out an extended movement stretched 
over a few seconds. This figure show the positions of user and advisor before 
the call, the final position adopted by the user (lowermost) and an intermediate 
position. Appendix 7 gives brief details of the users in the sessions studied 
lI am grateful to Colin Clark, Dept of Psychology, University of York, for 
discussing these data with me. 
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FIGURE 6.1 SKETCHES OF BODY POSITIONS BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER 
A TELEPHONE CALL INTO THE ADVISORY [UAA. 3] 
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FIGURE 6.2 SKETCHES OF BODY POSITIONS BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER 
A TELEPHONE CALL OUT OF THE ADVISORY [UAA. 6) 
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FIGURE 6.3 SKETCHES OF BODY POSITIONS BEFORE, AND DURING 
TELEPHONE CALL INTO THE ADVISORY [UAA. 9] 
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2.2 Development of the analysis 
I want to supplement this basic finding by adding brief verbal descriptions 
of the other cases and then by considering some cases which show variations on 
the pattern that I reported. 
2.2.1 Verbal description of movement 
Since the movements concerned are complex and difficult to transcribe all I have 
attempted to do here is list what I would point out to someone watching the 
video data itself. I offer these as a brief record of how many calls occurred and 
whether the call was made out of or into the advisory. 
1, UAA. 3 in 
Illustrated in figure 6.1. The user is invited to carry on trying something on the 
terminal which he initially does, until he adopts the middle of the illustrated 
positions. After the call the user and advisory move back to look at the 
terminal together. 
2, UAA. 6 out 
Illustrated in figure 6.2. The advisor moves considerably, leaning right back in 
his chair with his legs outstretched. The user adopts the position illustrated and 
holds it throughout the call. 
3, UAA. 8 in 
Illustrated in figure 6.3. The user makes a dramatic movement made up of a 
number of stages. 
4, UAA. 14 out 
Here the user remains standing during the start of the session. He is standing 
when the advisor phones out and remains in that position during the call until 
the advisor discovers that he has misidentified the person at the other end of 
the line. At that point the user walks off and returns with some documents 
which he looks at standing in his initial position. 
5, UAA. 15 out 
In this instance the user is seated opposite the advisor. When the advisor 
phones out she takes off her coat. 
6, UAA. 17 out 
See discussion of the session below. 
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7, UAA. 19 ,ý out 
During the call the user sits back in his chair and grooms his beard. 
8, UAA. 20 out 
At the start of the call the advisor and user look at each other. Once the call 
is underway the user grooms his beard and joggles a box of disks which he has 
in his right hand. 
9, UAA. 21 out 
User grooms hair as call starts, then shifts in his chair once the call is underway. 
10, UAA. 24 out 
As in UAA. 14 the user is standing on the advisor's right, leaning on the desk. 
At the start of the call the user stands more erect and then walks off. He 
returns and adopts his original position when the call finished. 
2.2.2 Additional movements 
The findings reported above require elaboration. Some of the interactions 
mentioned above involved other movements which are possibly related to the 
ones that typically occur during phone calls. 
1, The position taken up in figure 2, UAA. 6 occurs elsewhere independently of 
phone call. Figure 6.4 shows the positions before and just after the advisor 
invites another user if his problem is a short one. Again, as the session nears 
its end the user once again takes up his position, lowermost of figure 6.4. The 
user also adopts this position when another person is attended to by the advisor. 
The sketches show that despite the similarity in the posture the users body is 
oriented differently in these cases. 
2, The result of the phone call made by the advisor in UAA. 15 is that a 
document that the user wants to have printed can be done straight away. The 
advisor explains this and requests that he drinks his coffee before he shows her 
where she has to go. At this point the user looks away from him and as he 
drinks she busies herself with some papers. 
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3, UAA. 17 is an exceptional case in so far as the advisor speaks to the user at 
two points whilst on the phone. At these points the user nods stiffly and leans 
forward slightly, keeping his back straight. This contrasts with the movement 
that he makes towards the advisor after the call is over. 
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FIGURE 6.4 SKETCHES OF BODY POSITIONS BEFORE, AND WHILST THE 
ADVISOR ADDRESSES ANOTHER USER, PLUS POSITION ADOPTED NEAR THE 
END OF THE SESSION [UAA. 6) 
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3.0 Interpretation of findings 
I think that it is clear that the behaviour observed is interactively organised and 
locally managed. The fact that such organisation occurs and in such situations 
is interesting in its own right but I want to consider the implication of such 
behaviour for rule-governed models of human behaviour. When attempting to 
explain the structure of conversation some students have been tempted to draw 
on quasi-grammatical accounts, for example Clarke and Stubbs. I hold that such 
accounts can't be correct because the kind of grammar that can be said to apply 
in the case of an utterance is pitched at the wrong level to describe an 
interaction or string of utterances. It is pitched at the wrong level because in 
the case of a single utterance the grammar describes an aspect of how elements 
of that utterance go together to give it its distinctive structure. Now, irrespective 
of the impact of concurrent speaker - recipient interaction, an utterance is 
fundamentally something which one party puts together to display to another, 
even if those parties are the same person. Since a different arrangements of 
elements could constitute a different utterance:, just how the elements are put 
together is crucial to the speaker's intention, goals, or whatever. Such structure, 
though it may perhaps relate to the structure of a story, has no counterpart in 
the structure of an interaction. In an interaction the emergent structure is the 
collective result of two, or more, parties. Whilst each utterance constitutes an 
ordered display for another party the interaction as a whole does no such thing. 
In certain cases people might "look back" on an exchange and analyse it too see 
just where it went wrong, but speakers are not generally in the business of 
putting together a show which is surveyed at the end to see what the result of 
it is. What then motivates or organises each element of the interaction, each 
turn, move or utterance? The truth is that we really don't know in any detail. 
Besides what would an account of it involve? 
Whatever the answer is, it must start from a practical knowledge of what is 
going on in the situation in which interactants find themselves and in a 
knowledge of what is appropriate conduct to some end, be it to comply or resist. 
That people in interaction have such a commonplace yet sophisticated capacity 
is something which I think the brute data of the body movement which I have 
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discussed leads us to. For such data, not being a propositionally differentiated 
sign or any such, thing, Is simply people co-interacting in orientation to some 
practical understanding of what fits in that situation. Such conduct may be 
described in terms of acting by orientation to a norm.. 
4.0 Conclusion 
The method of analysis that I have applied is of course very simple. The 
structure of such behaviour could be further described by a transcription method 
such as the, one used in the fragment quoted from, Heath above. I have 
experimented with transcribing some of these episodes in such a way and 
certainly the detail which emerges when repeated viewing is coupled with some 
means of representation is astonishing and I have resisted the temptation to take 
up the challenge of pursuing these themes. The analysis is, I think, sufficient 
to illustrate a practical capacity which is unsuitable for having a quasi- 
grammatical account grafted onto it. I think that such behaviour points to a 
basic interactive capacity which lies prior to and underlies behaviour that a 
rule-governed account might wish to describe. 
I 
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CHAPTER 7: COGNITIVE AND INTERACTIVE PERSPECTIVES IN THE 
DESCRIPTION OF COMMUNICATIVE BEHAVIOUR 
In taking as my research topic utterances rather than beliefs and in suggesting 
that what people say shifts from situation to situation I could be said to have 
displaced the cognitive phenomena by social ones and to have fragmented the 
concept of a person. Although some writers do adopt a non-cognitive stance I 
want to distance myself from such a position. I start from a discussion of some 
of the uses to which terms like "frame" and "script" have been put. Broadly 
speaking, when examining accounts of conversation in the literature there is a 
split between cognitive psychologists and artificial intelligence researchers who 
adopt cognitive models and sociologists and anthropologists who adopt interactive 
accounts. Ironically the term "frame" occurs in both literatures, but is used in 
different ways. 
1.0 Schemata and frames 
There is a view which holds that there is a reality too complex to be understood 
(Plato's cave) or is instrinsically meaningless. In either case it is held that what 
we do ' when we perceive or when we understand is to fit reality to some 
conceptual scheme. Kant examined what he took to be a fundamental system 
of categories through which the "manifold of experience" can be thought. James 
held that the world of the neo-nate is a "blooming buzzing confusion" which the 
child had to learn to perceive. This paradigm of an input which requires 
structuring guides some of the protagonists to be discussed: 
A broad distinction separates some of the positions to be considered. It is this: 
on the one hand 1, the representation of knowledge or the organisation of the 
mind (here we find most work in the cognitive sciences, Minsky, Schank, most 
cognitive psychologists) on the other hand 2, the presentation of the self in the 
world, the organisation of experience (this is the position taken up by most of 
the social scientists which I will consider, Goffman, Garfinkel). The distinction 
is a profound one since it separates students who enquire into how the world 
could be represented from students who would rather ask "what is the social 
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world like? ". 
I think that some psychologists occupy a sort of middle ground where there are 
perspectives which investigate how the world is construed by individuals but 
which neglect 1) the organisation of the cognitive structures and 2) the 
coordination of action in the world. Examples here are Kelly's personal 
construct theory and attribution theory. Both these approaches appear to spring 
from Lewin's influence on American social psychology. I suggested in chapter 
one that this is a strain of phenomenology which has bypassed the work of 
Schutz and Garfinkel. This amounts to idealism in a realist world. Also in the 
middle ground,, though closer to the perspective of "the organisation of 
experience" than "the organization of knowledge" and more concerned with 
action than construct and attribution theory, is symbolic interaction, going back 
to G. H. Mead. 
1.2 Schema 
In the transcendental psychology of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant uses the 
term "schemata" but in a rather different way to its use in psychology. His idea 
of a "category" is more closely related to the idea of a schema as it developed 
below. For Kant the schemata mediate the application of the categories to 
experience. For Kant both schemata and the categories (of which there are 
precisely twelve) are void of empirical content, they are a ri ri, transcendental 
structures which are discovered by Kant in his search to explain how given that 
thought is possible, how it is possible. 
F. C. Bartlett saw recall as a creative and a social process. Bartlett is associated 
with the term "schema", although he gets it from the neurologist Head. In fact 
Bartlett criticises the term saying that it already has many and vague uses and 
he clearly has reservations about using it. Head wished to describe our 
knowledge concerning limb position in the course of his work on afferent nerves. 
Because of the perpetual novelty of different situations he wanted to use a term 
to account for the plasticity of a person's know-how. Bartlett follows him in 
this. He wanted to describe the meaningful errors which occured when a story 
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was recalled by a subject. Bartlett wanted to stress that memory does not 
consist of a set of discrete units. 
The arrival of the term "schema" from physiology is ironic since the term is used 
by Piaget in his genetic account of knowledge - the genesis being in the infant's 
coordination of bodily movement with environmental happenings: the develop- 
ment of sensorimotor schema. The term schema is still common in develop- 
mental psychology. A further irony is that the French word used by Piaget 
could be translated as scheme and that he has subsequently used the term 
"schema" for a slightly different purpose. (Ginsburg & Opper, 1969, p. 20). 
Neither Piaget nor Bartlett set out to offer a detailed account of how schema 
achieve what they do. 
1.3 Frames 
The idea of a "frame" as an organising entity occurs in two different senses. 
1.3.1 Organisation as the representation of knowledge: cognitive science 
The classic text here is Minsky (1975). This paper sets out an outline of a 
theory of frames 
When one encounters a new situation or makes a substantial 
change in ones view of the present problem) one selects from 
memory a substantial structure called a frame. 
He describes this as a remembered framework adapted to fit reality and that it 
is a "data structure for representing stereotypical situations" He claims that his 
frames follow the Bartlett "schema" and Kuhn's "paradigm". I don't see that this 
is so 1, He restricts it to novel situations, not true for Bartlett or Kuhn 2, the 
ideas operate in quite different ways. Anyway, he thus views the frame idea as 
unoriginal but suggests that his idea of a frame system might be original. 
Collections of frames are linked together to form frame systems. 
The effects of important actions are mirrored by transformations 
between frames of a system. These are used to make certain 
kinds of calculations economical, to present changes of emphasis 
and attention... 
I 
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Abelson (a psychologist rather than a computer theoretician) - invokes what he 
calls a script. Abelson (1978 p33): -e 
The theory rests on the idea of a cognitive script. By script I 
mean a coherent sequences of events expected by the individual, 
involving him either as a participant of an observer. Scripts are 
learned throughout the individual's lifetime both by participation 
in event sequences and by observation of event sequences... Because 
individuals have different histories, they may have different scripts, 
although some scripts may be so overlearned that they may be 
universal. I hypothesise different scripts, varying in length of time 
frame, the number of active characters, and whether or not the 
separate events in the scripts are concrete or generic. 
He states that scripts are made up of chains of "vignettes" which "in short, 
represent the raw constituents of remembered episodes in the individual's 
experience". His central claim is that scripts offer a better account of the 
representation of knowledge than propositional networks do. 
The script idea is-developed in Schank and Abelson 1977. To it they add the 
idea of a plan, "A plan is intended to be a repository for general information 
about how actors achieve goals". They do this by setting out the choices 
available to a person in whatever situation is being considered. Invoking a plan 
enables a reader of a narrative to connect disparate parts of a story together. 
The project here is to develop a finite list of "concepts" which if represented in 
a machine would enable the machine to store information arriving in the form 
of a ., narrative and sortable by those concepts. The book raises some 
interesting, but rather obvious questions, about what is involved in understanding 
a narrative about an everyday event. The emphasis is on a simple formal model 
of such phenomena rather than say, a conceptual examination of human action, 
an empirical study of what sort of things people act on and interpret their world 
through, or an examination of the problems involved in interpreting human 
action. These topics are taken up by the researchers discusses below. 
1.3.2 The organisation of experience and action: the behavioural and social 
sciences 
Work in these areas is characterised by two themes: 1, the view that communica- 
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tion involves messages and actions of different types which must be, identified 
as such; 2, this is a problem faced by participants and students of social life. 
In some social scientific writing a radically different conception of "frame" to 
that developed by Minsky, and one that predates his, can be found. Minsky 
thinks of frames in the sense of scaffolding, here we move to frame in the sense 
of a picture-frame, something demarcates or "brackets". 
In "A theory of play and fantasy" Bateson (1955) notes that the communication 
of humans and some animals involves signals about messages or behaviours. 
Thus otters can deliver friendly nips and reconciliation ceremonies contain ritual 
blows. The paper moves from ethological and anthropological examples to 
psychopathology and psychotherapy via logical theory and a consideration of how 
these metacommunicative phenomena operate at a different level . to the 
behaviour to which they refer. Bateson holds that these signals delimit or frame 
behaviour. He does not develop a theory of frames. He is concerned with the 
status of framing signals especially the case of paradoxical messages. His 
attention is on how a disruption of the framing process could be involved in the 
aetiology of psychopathology. This idea is, of course, developed in the Palo Alto 
theory of schizophrenia. 
The theme of signals and messages dove-tails with the idea of construing 
families as systems (of communicating members). The term context is invoked 
here to make the point that an individual's behaviour takes on a different 
meaning when their family situation is grasped. 
Goffman is well known for his "dramaturgical" account of social life (Goffman, 
1955,1969). In Frame Analysis he (1974) draws on Bateson's work though a 
structural element is introduced. Goffman attributes an organising role to 
frames and invokes them to account for the different ways of seeing a situation. 
Incidentally he uses "schemata" and "schemata of interpretation" synonymously 
with "frame". 
And of course much use will be made of Bateson's use of the 
term "frame". I assume that definitions of a situation are built up 
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in accordance with principles of organization which govern events - 
at least social ones - and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements 
as I am able to identify. That is my definition of the term frame. 
My phrase "frame analysis" is a slogan to refer to the examination 
in these terms of the organization of experience. (p. 10-11) 
The book 1, sets out a position on what social reality is, this involves a brief 
critical account of Schutz and James; 2, offers a set of conceptual tools; 3, offers 
empirical data in the form of illustrative accounts culled, in a confessedly 
serendipitous manner, from magazines and newspapers. The disagreement with 
James is that he holds that what is real is what shows itself to be real (the 
classic pragmatist position developed by Dewey as "warranted assertability"). Thus 
we have a plethora of fictive domains or subworlds. Schutz is viewed as 
remaining within this position but adding to it an account of how subjective 
worlds are created and maintained. To this phenomenology of "experience 
structures" Garfinkel, a point that came up briefly in chapter one, is viewed as 
adding the idea that we can discover rules which constitute multiple realities. 
Goffman presents what he calls primary frameworks which he describes as 
follows: 
When the individual in our Western society recognizes a particular 
event, he tends, whatever else he does, to imply in this response 
(and in effect to employ) one or more frameworks or schemata of 
interpretation of a kind that can be called primary. I say primary 
because application of such a framework or perspective is seen by 
those who apply it as not depending on or harking back to some 
prior or "original" interpretation; indeed a primary framework is 
one that is seen as rendering what would otherwise be a meaning- 
less aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful (p. 21) 
Such frameworks are held to vary in their degree of organisation. Some being 
presented as systems of entities, postulates and rules; other having "no apparent 
articulated shape, providing only a lore of understanding, an approach, a 
perspective. " In Frame Analysis 
Goffman invokes the ideas of keys and keyings to give an account for the 
switching of frames (p. 45). This topic is subsequently developed in a paper 
called "Footings": 
1. Participants' alignment, or set, or stance, or posture or projected 
self is somehow at issue. 2. The projection can be held across a 
strip of behaviour that is less long than a grammatical sentence, 
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or longer, so sentence grammar won't help us very much, although 
it seems clear that a cognitive unit of some kind is involved, 
minimally, perhaps, a "phonemic clause". Prosodic not syntactic 
segments are implied. 3, A continuum must be considered, from 
gross changes in stance to the most subtle shifts in tone that can 
be perceived. 4, For most speakers, code switching is usually 
involved, and if not this then at least the sound markers that 
linguists study: pitch, volume, rhythm, stress tonal quality. 5, The 
bracketting of a higher level phase or episode of interaction is 
commonly involved, the new footing having a liminal role, serving 
as a buffer between two more substantially sustained episodes. 
(1981). 
2.0 Cognitive versus interactional Accounts 
Apart from a conflicting use of the term "frame" these two approaches, the 
artificial intelligence and the social scientific one, simply seem independent 
interests but there is a latent conflict between them, depending on how they are 
developed. If in some interaction scene the participants are construed as 
information processing units, then the problem of rescuing this from being a 
highly individualistic account would rest on an ability to elaborate and program 
an immense amount of interactive know-how which would need to be in- 
vestigated precisely by the study of interaction itself. 
Potter and Wetherell make strong claims about the nature of discourse analysis: 
Our focus is exclusively on discourse itself: on how it is construct- 
ed, its functions, and the consequences that arise from different 
discursive organization. In this sense, discourse analysis is a 
radically non-cognitive form of social psychology. (p. 178) 
The position that they wish to adopt is not that mental phenomena are of no 
interest -indeed they demonstrate considerable interest in mental discourse. This 
is the familiar position promulgated by Ryle and Wittgenstein. The sense in 
which their work is non-cognitive is then presumably that the research data and 
theorising remain at the level of traces of discourse. As I indicated earlier, 
despite talking of a tripartite project of discourse analysis involving speech act 
theory, conversation analysis and semiology, and despite talk of an interest in 
how discourse is put together the analyses offerred do not get beyond the 
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identification of variability in accounts. We are dealing with a textual model of 
discourse analysis, taking as its principal tool an issue which has been familiar 
since Aristotle - being on the look out for contradictions in an argument or 
position. My disappointment with Potter and Wetherell's project, as it stands 
in "Discourse analysis and social psychology" is that it doesn't show an interest 
in the potential for analysing discourse moment by moment that we encounter 
in conversation analysis. 
It is ironic that they take this position because the very thrust of ethno- 
methodology, as a reaction to Parsonian structural theories is that it takes a 
cognitive, not a motivation solution to the problem of social order. I will 
elaborate on this in chapter eight. Furthermore in dealing with the meaning 
that phenomena have for members we are adopting a cognitive stance, we are 
looking at their categorizations, their understandings. 
Drew (1986) draws on the phenomenon of letters crossing in the post to 
illustrate the idea of behaviour as involving shared, and in that sense, social 
characteristics. He suggests that both letter writers orient to a reasonable delay 
(since last contact), even without attempting to show how both parties calculate 
when to write, this demonstrated that both shared the same feelings about the 
delay. Drew then proceeds to a conversation analytic finding (since published 
as Jefferson 1989) that pauses during a word search are usually about one 
second, that is to say the pause is interupted by speaker or recipient at that 
point. He points out that in a case such as the following fragment, even though 
neither has come up with an object, both orient to the pause in the same way: 
They share the same interactional competence. 
Emma: We just had a vo: dka Barbara and I: just had a nice 
great double vo: dka and we're having a barbegued 
(1.2) 
Emma: -i U h. 
Bud: 
LSome-J 
Something? 
Such a conversational fragment, Drew argues, shows a practical lay psychology 
in action. Far from being a second order characteristic, one person's under- 
standing of another or their ability to take the attitude of the other is a public 
phenomenon. Such a perspective points to a rapprochement between the 
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interactional and cognitive perspectives since its analyses point to the non- 
individualistic nature of behaviour. In other words, there is an interactionally 
produced structure to the interaction which can be described at a social level 
not an intrapsychic one. 
2.1 Rapprochement 
In chapter one I noted Cicourel's suggestion that a "cognitive sociology" would 
explicate social phenomena in terms of members' knowledge to show how social 
structure is generated, taking social structure in conventional work to be an 
"accountable illusion". Here then, Cicourel points to not merely a rapproche- 
ment between a cognitive and a social approach but indeed a necessary union. 
However despite its relevance to my present concerns, Cicourel does not go the 
whole way since interaction itself does not become the detailed focus of his 
work. 
Tannen and Wallet seek to use both "interactive frames" and "knowledge 
schemas" in their account of a doctor's talk in a pediatric interview. They claim 
that both ideas can be fruitfully used in parallel to describe what they suggest 
are general phenomena, but ones which are particularly clear in their data. In 
the interview which they discuss the doctor has to coordinate interaction with the 
child, the child's mother and with a video camera (a future audience watching 
the recording for teaching purposes. 
Goffman suggested that the "interaction order" was a place for autonomous 
research with its own structure. On the other hand, I don't think that 
interactive phenomena can be thought of as pure emergence, obviously people 
bring things to the interaction scene: the interactions are the interactions of 
people with knowledge, social and otherwise. 
3.0 The interactional dimension to forgetting 
If the occurrence of one's mind "going blank" when an important question is 
asked is a familiar one then so is forgetting as an interactional phenomenon. 
I 
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I want briefly to discuss some attention which as been made to this by 
conversation analysts. 
A candidate non-cognitive stance appears in an interesting paper by Goodwin 
(1987), to which '1 referred in chapter four when discussing the relationship 
between speech and body movement. The datum comes from a "midwestern 
backyard picnic" where three couples are present. Mike is talking about 
something he saw on television: 
Mike: I was watching Johnny Carson one night 
en there was a guy by the na- What was that guy's 
name. -Blake? 
Goodwin remarks that: 
Within both the psychodynamic and -the speech processing 
approaches, such events are effectively treated as being situated 
within the mind of a single individual, the speaker. (p. 115) 
I'm not sure that the way that psychoanalysts understand the analytic situation 
entails Goodwin's interpretation but certainly the analysis which Goodwin offers 
is, I think, highly distinct from anything an analyst might say. Goodwin focuses 
on the consequences of this event as an interactional resource, showing the 
changes that come about in what he calls the participation framework as a 
result of it happening. I can't do justice to Goodwin's detailed analysis here, but 
briefly he discusses 1, how material being searched for is brought into 
prominence, 2, the organisation of participation during the word search, through 
this 3, the social identities invoked. ' 
lt should be pointed out that Goodwin's approach is not so radically anti- 
cognitive as it might appear. He takes the event as a "display of forgetting" and 
cannot of course, analyse its antecedents. He does not suggest that a memory 
failure occured which was socially caused as a floor winning strategy. The 
analysis has to take as its starting point an observable conversational 
phenomenon. Additionally the participants' knowledge is an important feature 
of his analysis since he considers the problem faced by a speaker designing talk 
for an audience with different knowledge. 
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Drew (1989) analyses a report of an inability to recall something and offers an 
explanation emphasising the importance of social factors for cognitive science. 
Victor, an elderly relative visiting from Germany is entering Ivy's appartment 
for her birthday party along with some other visitors. Ivy's daughter, Betty, who 
lives in the appartment with her mother is the speaker on whom Drew's analysis 
focuses. - 
Victor: That's Betty. 
((Betty and victor shake hands)) 
Jim: I haven't seen (r) Debbie no w- 
Victor: `Kennst du mich noch? =Do- 
do you- do you know me r:? 
Jim: Lhehh= 
Ivy: =See heher'hh 
Victor: L°huh? Do you know me? 
(1.9) 
Betty: Unh (0.4) I don't know (h) (h) r (whether I) 
Jim: luh let's go= 
Betty: remember (you) 
Jim: 
[(you) 
'n close the door. 
This forgetting is puzzling at first sight, for it is certain that Betty knew that 
Victor would be coming and it will have been easy for her to pick him out. 
The reason for her forgetting is, Drew suggests, that she is responding to a 
specific understanding of what it is to recall someone, she is interpreting Victor's 
questions not as "do you know who I am" but "Can you recall me? Do you 
have an image of me from the past". Of course the answer to this must be no. 
Betty was very young when she last encountered Victor. To have such a 
recollection, to be able to say "That's Betty" is the prerogative of an adult. 
A basic and important point that is raised here is that our everyday language 
for cognitive phenomena contains a range of meanings which refer back to a 
social realm. 
Conclusion: Cognition or interaction 
I've concentrated on the polarity between cognitive represention of knowledge 
and interactive accounts. It is my impression that perspectives such as 
attribution theory and personal construct theory would benefit from attention to 
how subjectivities are created, maintained and communicated and changed and 
that this points in the direction of interaction rather than represention. 
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Interaction involves the operation of a range of cognitive phenomena but there 
are two objections, I think, to seeing a cognitive account as primary. Firstly the 
interactive phenomena themselves need to be understood, secondarily the 
representational account, independently of whatever philosophical objections 
there are to it, and however "flexible" or "dynamic" it may be, can ossify how 
people in interaction might be studied. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
When introducing the idea of constraints in communicative situations, I stated 
that I did not wish to lose sight of the sense of a constraint as a coercive force. 
In studying explanations as social phenomena I have found that the central 
issues that concern me here have been handled in an interesting way by the 
ethnomethodologists and I have drawn heavily on their work, particularly in 
connection with conversation analysis. I want to conclude with some reflections 
evaluating the approach that I have adopted by 1, remarking on points of 
relevance for type of work carried out under the name of attribution theory and 
2, developing some criticisms of the explanatory and descriptive power of the 
ethnomethodological approach by a consideration of the place, where meaning 
fuses with power: ideology. ,. 
1.0 Ethnomethodology and attribution theory. 
Though both have as their starting point a concern with everyday understanding 
this topic becomes embedded in research orientations of rapidly diverging 
character, To make some obvious points attribution theory restricts its subject 
matter by concentrating on understanding of causation whereas ethno- 
methodology, though certainly involving reasoning about causes, involves a whole 
range of issues of which causation is just a chapter. Secondly, such a statement 
of difference, though of course substantial, is utterly masked by the completely 
different understanding that students who formulate day-to-day reasoning as lay 
psychology have from those who formulate it as ethnomethodology. In 
connection with issues such as the expression of beliefs about causation in 
naturally occurring interaction there are a number of areas in the conversation 
analytic literature which are relevant, and hence address a project such as the 
coding of attributional statements. 
1, The inductive style of work carried out in conversation analysis might be 
applicable to teasing out relationships of affiliation and distance amongst the 
members of a family, in particular by identifying the detailed way in which 
speakers respond to each other and what the interactional consequences are of 
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this. Such an approach might make concrete the interactional ideas that are 
widely held and applied by students of the family. 
2, Attending to changes in the way in which things are formulated might tell us 
more about the nature of the beliefs that people hold. Construing beliefs as 
argumentatively held positions, as for example Billig has suggested (1987) would 
go some way towards acknowledging the integrity of people's beliefs and to 
understanding changes in them and acknowledge their situated character without 
adopting a position of situational determinism. Such a position is at least latent 
in the ethnomethodological idea of the "morality of cognition" which I sketched 
in chapter one. I hope to explain below how this also makes research of 
conduct - behaviour as meaningful action possible. Such a position could be one 
way of reconciling the apparent validity of the dimension of causes discussed in 
attribution theory with my finding in chapter two that a variety of styles are 
possible over and above the "depressive attributional style" and that people do 
not appear to hold fixed styles of attributing causes in these terms. Such an 
approach links up with: 
3, Perhaps the most central area of interest to how therapy is conducted might 
be topic organisation. For this area explores a key feature of how the structure 
of a conversation constrains what can be said by the participants. Of related 
interest here is the way in which the precise formulations of some matter differ 
in their rectitude and a speaker's understanding of other's speech. This was a 
phenomenon which I tried to look at in chapter five, where in addition to the 
sheer fact that speakers routinely have command of a range of expression for 
some matter, I tried to point to the relevance of the conversational environment 
in explicating what such changes respond to and achieve. This idea links up 
with the remarks I made in one above. 
, 
Rather than seeing changes in a 
speaker's way of apprehending some matter as situationally determined or 
haphazard studying the data with an eye to the speakers' concern with making 
sense of what is taking place and being intelligible in some way reveals a latent 
rationality. 
4, In connection with attribution theory in particular a couple of papers by 
Pomerantz (1978b, 1986) show how the formulation of accounts in conversation 
might be of interest in studying causal beliefs. In her brief report "Attributions 
of responsibility: blamings" she shows how blaming is often done in turns 
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subsequent to one where an "unhappy incident" of some kind is reported. She 
suggests that this format may be organized in such a way as to allow blaming 
self rather than other. Such a study suggests a supplement to my simple survey 
of the range of causal expressions detected in a sample of talk (chapter three) 
by adopting an interactional perspective in order to look at the work done by 
different sequences of causal attributions. In "Extreme case formulations: a way 
of legitimizing claims" Pomerantz shows how formulations such as "everyone", 
"brand new", "he was driving perfectly" may be used: 
ti (1) to assert the strongest case in anticipation of non-sympathetic 
hearings, 
(2) to propose the cause of a phenomenon, 
(3) to speak for the rightness (wrongness) of a practice. 
Pomerantz's analysis shows a striking relevance to the dimensions of causes 
which attribution theory has fastened itself to but rarely explored (to offer a 
moderate formulation) in naturally occuring interaction. She shows how a 
speaker can take what she calls an adversarial or defensive stance. In a study 
of `a small-claims court a plaintiff formulates a dress which she claims was 
damaged by a dry-cleaner as not just "new" but as new as possible (brand new): 
Adj: And, you state that- the dress (. ) was new 
Pla: It was brand new. 
In attributing a cause to an object: Here a speaker is talking about some 
fruitcakes that she was selling. In accounting for why she priced and sold 
fruitcakes in the way that she did she invokes a description of a situation which 
is formulated as recurrent (every time): 
C: ... well I'm doing it to the few people that I know because 
ever'time I say three twenty five they look at me like 'hh (. ) 
you must be nuts woman, 
Frequency of occurrence in connection with rectitude. In the following fragment 
a patient has gone to get some laboratory results. When it turns out that they 
haven't come in the receptionist asks the patient to telephone a few days later. 
When the patient checks on the regularity of making such a call the receptionist 
describes such behaviour in terms of frequency (all the time): 
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Patient: , 
That's not a problem? 
Receptionist: No. People do it all the time. 
A significant divergence between the conversation analytic approach and the kind 
of work to which attribution theory has been applied is that the latter has 
tended to be about exploring differences between people whereas such an 
approach in principally and methodologically distant from conversation analysis 
in so far as this fastens on recurrent patterns which are assumed to be general 
features of human interaction. The difference is perhaps not so great if two, 
rather, different, considerations are taken into account. Firstly, CA has been 
applied to cases of a single episode in an interaction. Secondly CA, in taking 
interaction as its subject matter reformulates rather than negates considerations 
which would otherwise have been pursued as differences between individuals. 
In the remainder of this essay I propose to focus on some criticisms which have 
been made of the perspective of ethnomethodology in order to examine the 
sense in which interactional phenomena are social ones and to explicate where 
I think the principles embodied in the practice of studying ethnomethodology 
lead. 
2 .0 Criticism of the 
formulation of social life as "ethnomethodology 
Two criticisms which are raised against ethnomethodology are that 1, the 
approach does not address the autonomous and traditional sociological concern 
of. social facts and 2, the approach is relativistic and does not therefore equip 
the student of social life to criticise the phenomena that are studied. I think 
that these criticisms are interesting and important. That I consider them 
important is a value judgement on my part, but one that I hold since because 
I hold that any action is embedded in a backdrop which is always already there 
it follows that the idea of a neutral statement is problematic. I am therefore 
committed to the view that descriptions are prescriptions. Incidentally I think 
that this view-is entailed by the principles from which ethnomethodology starts 
off - it is simply a reflexive application of them to the student of social life. 
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As I shall show, below, some statements of ethnomethodology indicate not a 
relativist position but an absolutist one. It is however relativism that most 
frequently crops up as a target of criticism, for example Billig (1977). 
Before I go any further with this I had better indicate what I mean by 
relativism. Relativism can be a powerful palliative for whiggism in the context 
of history and for chauvinism of other kinds in the social and cultural realms 
too. Relativism can occur in a variety of forms which should be distinguished. 
Primarily, relativism in the context of the social sciences involves a suspension 
of the student's own notion of truth and acceptability in order to give free reign 
to those of the people being studied. It is not difficult to see the moral grounds 
on which objections can be made to such a position. A relativistic study of 
some morally abhorent activity would not enable the student to call into 
question the acceptability of what is going on. Now such a position, though it 
may follow from the premises which I have coarsely sketched, is not inevitable. 
It depends on the strength of relativism embraced by the student. A 
methodological stance might detachedly try to reveal the intricacies of the 
situation and then having done that use such material in a criticism of that 
behaviour. The issue of relativism itself would seem to me to be independent 
of the adequacy of a research programme to take on morally problematic topics. 
However there is a principled variety of relativism which prohibits a student 
holding it consistently to adopt it as a research attitude but come back with a 
critical one. This would be the position that does not adopt relativism as a 
research attitude but as a moral principle. I think that there are desirable 
aspects to relativism but that these can be incorporated into a consistent picture 
which articulates how a student can simultaneously avoid adopting an imperious 
standpoint, that is remain sensitive to the concerns of the participants under 
study but at the same time be thoroughly and inescapably critical of it. 
I will try and present such an account via a discussion of ideology, but first I 
briefly want to address the issue of ethnömethodology and social facts. 
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2.1 What about social facts? r 
I have already mentioned (chapter one) that the micro-sociologies in general, 
though contrasting with macro-sociology should not be indentified with 
methodological individualism so ethnomethodology does not involve a principled 
rejection of collective phenomena as subject matter, indeed I hope it is clear 
that conversation, for example is construed as a thoroughly social phenomenon. 
In so far as an implicit critique of macro-sociology can be found in eth- 
nomethodological work it is as cautioning against making claims on the basis of 
decontextualised evidence. For example Smith (1974) reformulates the recipe 
for creating an ideology in "the German Ideology" and uses it to argue for 
attending to the importance of concrete, situational details of the social process 
under study. This is also the path that Cicourel takes in his study of how 
juvenile crimes are coded. The argument is, it seems to me, a double-edged 
one since it is problematic how, in general, the contextualisation of some 
research topic could be exhaustively reported, let alone studied. 
Heritage closes a review of conversation analysis with the following interesting, 
and perhaps unexpected remark: 
However, it is also " likely that the kinds of observation which are 
presently being made will both require and stimulate new theoretical 
work and it may well be that, since the ultimate object of investigation 
is a major dimension of social organisation, the explanatory theory will 
not be reducible without residue to the properties of rational agents. 
It may, after all, be unwise to exclude a Durkheimian sociological 
perspective from the analysis of what he himself pronounced as a prime 
instance of a social fact and from a domain in which institutionalised 
conventions are so intricately tied to the exercise of human agency. 
But what could a research perspective which takes as its concern local details 
say about ideology? How could the meaning which members find and construct, 
which they offer accounts of and require of each other grasp a societal 
phenomenon such as power? 
An opening response could be that precisely those local phenomena have to be 
invoked in an account of power or any other society wide phenomenon since 
whatever its pedigree as social fact it issues in, or is experienced through, 
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concrete, datable events. Furthermore, language or meaning must surely play a 
role in such a phenomenon. 
Sociologists have been alert to the role that language plays in the organisation 
of society, the role that language plays in the coordination of action. After all 
what is -a society but a coordinated group? To understand a society would 
surely, involve grasping just how action is coordinated, how communication 
operates. Anyone using the concept of ideology is in a certain sense plying this 
tack. To cite an ideology as an explanation for how a society does what it does 
is to draw on, a model of a belief system within which that society's members 
formulate, their strategies. 
Barry Barnes's study The nature of power attempts to explain power in terms 
of the concrete practices of the members of a society. He repudiates a 
functionalist approach to power as a matter of principle. A functionalist account 
reasons in terms of structures in society on the analogue of a biological organ. 
Barnes dismisses such accounts as inherently teleological and holds that-they 
must be abandoned. His point is that such an account makes appeals to 
mysterious forces, Foucault's account of power would be an example. t What 
would an empiricist account of power look like? 
Barnes develops his account of power from a consideration of the fundamental 
problem of social theory: the problem of social order. Hobbes sketched this 
problem as follows: how do people living in close proximity to each other and 
each pursuing their own ends not fall into a war of all against all? The 
American social theorist Talcott Parsons took the problem up and reasoned that 
the conceptual apparatus of sociology developed in Weber and Durkheim could 
furnish a solution. Barnes and incidentally Garfinkel both react against Parson's 
solution. I want to sketch Parson's motivational solution and the cognitive 
alternative to it. 
Parsons rejects individualistic accounts of social order. Drawing on Durkheim's 
criticisms of nineteenth century economic theory he argued that individuals 
internalise norms through socialisation. Economic theory considers society as an 
aggregate of self interested individuals who interact in order to exchange goods 
204 
and services. Such interactions carry on because they are rational and profitable 
and hence society persists. Durkheim showed that any such interactions involve 
non-contractual elements; even the most basic economic transaction cannot be 
understood merely by reference to the means-end reasoning of the participants. 
As an example Barnes considers the case of ownership. Ownership is presumed 
by, the economic account just sketched, but objects do not occur with given 
ownership labels tied by God's hands. Ownership is more puzzling than this. 
Any analysis of it must point to an interesting set of social relations within 
which economic transactions occur. Ownership of property is a shorthand for 
the discretion which a person has over the use of some object. Such discretion 
has to be profoundly social since it can be challenged by such things as 
commandeering. A person only owns something in so far as they are recognised 
by other people to have discretion over what they do with it. ' 
Parson's solution to the social order problem is to seek an explanation for why 
individuals carry out actions which are orderly and consistent with social order. 
His solution is to claim that societal norms are internalised. This means that 
the desires'to which agents apply their reasoning abilities and even the modes 
of reasoning themselves will be just those that are parallel to the persistence 
of an ordered society. 
But there are insuperable objections to this "normative determinism". Barnes 
summarises: 
Norms and values are not implanted stably in individual minds; they 
persist in the public realm not the private, the social context not the 
individual psyche. Norms and values have no inherent implications 
which enforce and sustain a social order; on the contrary they are 
provided with implications by interacting human beings, so that what 
norms imply can in no sense explain how people interact. Accordingly, 
we can conclude without equivocation or qualification that normative 
determinism fails. 
A cognitive alternative to Parson's motivational position can be introduced by 
claiming a priority for it. In his study of Garfinkel, Heritage argues that no 
appeal to motivational phenomena, however ingenious, can explain coordinated 
action, whether it be deviant or pro-social. Therefore a theory of social order 
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must be sought, at - the cognitive 
level. Barnes's method is to argue that the 
process of socialisation cannot be appealed to as the place where sociability is 
launched because socialisation is necessarily already social. Barnes seeks to 
establish this by. remarking that in learning a child is trusting and cooperative. 
Incidentally, I don't think that such a claim is required. Barnes can be more 
parsimonious: all he needs to say is that socialization, whatever else it is, 
involves grasping a pattern of conduct, if you like, getting the hang of- a form 
of life. It is irrelevant whether or not that form of life is knavish or virtuous. 
Barnes continues, in the style of Heritage, that it would not benefit an individual 
to deviate from established patterns of meaning - language is a solution to a 
coordination problem. And it is in the interests of members of a society to 
coordinate their actions. Now an individual may be knowledgable and 
calculating, ? but that knowledge and those. calculating abilities are those of the 
society of which that individual is, ,a member. On this account any calculation 
or use of knowledge is a kind of conformity: social order is the use of 
cooperative routines. 
Having sketched the cognitive account of social order I want to look at Barnes's 
cognitive account of power. Considering society as a distribution of knowledge 
means that knowledge of norms is included. Barnes offers the example of 
obeying a traffic light on the basis of one's knowledge of what other people 
know. 
From this we get to Barnes's redescription of power: 
A society is a distribution of knowledge, part of which knowledge is 
self referring knowledge of the nature of society itself: the self referring 
knowledge of the society includes the normative order of the society. 
Power, therefore, that is to say social power, must be an aspect or a 
characteristic of a distribution of knowledge, and indeed this is how I 
propose to define and conceive of it. Any specific distribution of 
knowledge confers a generalised capacity for action upon those 
individuals who carry it and constitute it, and that capacity for action is 
their social power, the power of the society they constitute by bearing 
and sharing the knowledge in question. Social power is the added 
capacity for action that accrues to individuals through constituting a distribution of knowledge and thereby of society. 
I 
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In a'sense 'Barnes is arguing that a group of people, or an individual has power 
because of their position in the distribution of knowledge. To put it bluntly, 
that they have power because they are believed to have it. He illustrates this 
by considering what a successful revolution does: it brings about a shift in 
knowledge. Although the Shah of Iran had lots of fire power, tanks and 
weapons and the mullahs had very little, the Shah had power only through a 
knowledge structure, not directly. On Barnes's account that is the nature of 
power. 
In passing it seems to me that in Barnes's- account, even if it is true that an 
account of power can be given at the level of detail of individual beliefs, the 
distribution of knowledge is demonstrably not the belief of any individual. 'I feel 
that an account of society at this level creates scope for an account in terms of 
social systems which in a sense may be functional. I don't want to go into this 
here. 
On one level this kind of account is, however, clearly correct. However complex 
the collective or even merely aggregate action in a society is it is the result of 
people acting on the basis of the understanding of the situations that they find 
themselves in. One objection to the adequacy of such an account is that whilst 
it may be correct it is not appropriate for the study of such things for there is 
an emergent complexity which is best captured by some other formulation. 
Perhaps an analogy could be drawn between accounts of heat in the physics. 
Kinetic theory pitching its explanation in terms of the behaviour of particles held 
to constitute the volume of gas under consideration and thermodynamic theories 
which reason in terms of macro properties. The theory is however vulnerable 
to internal criticisms on the grounds that social power, as opposed to brute 
force, remains unanalysed in the case of a face-to-face interaction. Can the 
feelings that a person might have in a confrontation with an authority figure, or 
even the power holder who stands behind the power that is transmitted through 
bearers of authority, be wholly explained in terms of a cognitive model? I shall 
try to argue later that this criticism can be met without moving far from 
Barnes's premises. 
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2.2 Ideology 
I want to discuss these criticisms via a discussion of the realm which more than 
any other must link them: ° ideology. I propose to do this by considering an 
account of ideology which at first sight must appear to be fundamentally at odds 
with anything that a student of social life in the ethnomethodological tradition 
might want to say: an, account which tries to fuse the depth hermeneutics of 
Freud and'Marx. '~ - 
It may ý seem, surprising that anyone should have attempted to integrate Freud 
and Marx but this was the ambition of one group of social researchers, the 
Frankfurt School, for whom the emancipation of society and the autonomy of 
the ego were inseparable. Freud is remembered for the development, of what 
was for 'him a medical procedure for: the treatment of certain psychological 
disorders. Although he spent his life in the treatment of patients psychoanalysis 
is now studied as a theory of mind as well as a method of therapy. In a way 
this reception is accurate. Psychoanalysis sees the disorders that it concerns 
itself with as due to conflict between parts of the mind; conflict which the 
sufferer is not insightful into but which finds confused expression in neurotic and 
hysterical symptoms, parapraxes ("Freudian slips"), and paradigmatically, in 
dreams. Discovering the conflict requires the interpretation of such phenomena. 
This interpretation is coordinated with a model of the adult mind and an 
account of its development through childhood. Drives enter the picture because 
Freud sees there being certain inevitable needs which people demand. Conflict 
results because these demands simply cannot be met. Freud came to suggest 
that demands flow from the id which operates according to "the pleasure 
principle" but are related to the world by a structure which grows out of it, the 
ego, which operates according to "the reality principle". The super ego - later 
develops: it houses societal demands, which on this model are usually mediated 
through the child's parents. 
Freud's model of the mind contains another tripartite division: conscious, 
preconscious and unconscious. The conception: of the mind as split into an 
introspectible part and a part hidden from introspection is of course not Freud's 
invention. It is not difficult to see his reasons for taking on such a picture. As 
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a young neurologist he encountered cases of paralysis which could not be 
explained in terms of -neurological disorder. The disorder must then, he 
concluded, have some mental cause. (See, for example, "Some points for a 
comparative study of organic and hysterical motor paralysis". ) But if this is true 
then it must be mental in an extraordinary sense for the patients were not 
apparently willing the paralysis. -Thus the idea of the force of an unconscious 
part to the mind became established. The "thoughts" here cannot be brought 
to consciousness by the person. The preconscious contains those thoughts which 
we may have, though do not happen to be aware of at the moment. The 
aetiology of other disorders as unconscious goings on followed; the classic case 
being the repression of traumatic events. The task of the analyst is to work out 
the nature of the repressed phenomena, hence the attention to the manifestation 
of unconscious phenomena and the need for interpretion. The way to cure is 
the abreaction of such repressed thoughts in the psychoanalytic session. 
Freud was a learned man with a passionate interest in archaeology. He 
modelled the task of interpretation, on classical philology and wrote a number 
of works relating to mythology and religion. In addition he treated of more or 
less sociological topics. The Standard Edition (vol. 13, p. 162) lists some 
twenty, six works of this 'kind, for example, Totem and Taboo, Moses and 
Monotheism, Civilization and its Discontents, and The Future of an Illusion. 
The social theory which I want to consider does not follow Freud's lead here, 
it takes up the concerns at the very centre of psychoanalysis. 
Marx offers an account of the evolution of human societies which takes as its 
guiding thread the way in which people produce things, that is labour. We may 
expect such an account to be fundamentally at odds with the perceptions of 
people in society, for societal change is not the result of individual intentional 
action. In his account Marx develops a critique of the contemporary social 
formation: the way society is now is not the only possibility. The structure-of 
society, the organisation of the means of production, have resulted in the placing 
of certain values over others. His account of the development of capitalism and 
his criticisms of capitalist society has as an allied project the explanation of two 
related phenomena: how are the contingent social practices which are constitu- 
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tive of capitalism justified and how it is that people comply with them? Taking 
up these concerns is the business " of a critique of ideology. We have an 
example of such -a project in "ne German Ideology" written by Marx' and 
Engels in about 1844. 
In common with Freud, Marx - presents his work as not merely a theory but a 
tool for action. Although Marx deals with phenomena which are both individual 
states of mind and social phenomena, (for example "alienation") and although 
Freud locates societal demands in his account (the punishing power of the super 
ego) there seems little in common between the work of these two people. 
One way of seeing Marx and Freud as engaged in related tasks is to adopt the 
perspective that both took the phenomena which they dealt with to be 
problematic in the important sense of demanding special critical tools for their 
elucidation. Both paid special attention to the complicity of the people involved. 
Both held that knowledge grasped through the methods they advocated would 
be emancipatory. In "the fetishism of commodities and the secret thereof' Marx 
examines the role of commodities in capitalist societies and claims that the 
categories of bourgeois economics are incapable of grasping the true nature of 
commodities. Contemporary economic self-understanding is placed in a model 
of societal development. As we have seen Freud develops a method of enquiry 
seeking to explain phenomena which cannot be grasped by the person in whom 
they are held to occur; the origins of such a failure of self knowledge being 
located in a phase specific model of individual development. Ricoeur (1970) has 
termed Marx and Freud (along with Nietzsche) masters of "the school of 
suspicion". 
Habermas offers a reading of Freud which departs from the emphasis placed on 
the theory of drives by the earlier "Frankfurt School" theorists. He also differs 
from them in his concern with language. In his Knowledge and H man 
Interests, Habermas makes the point which Ricoeur made: that Freud moves 
beyond the conventional concerns of interpretation theory (hermeneutics), the 
explication of a text whose meaning is in some way unclear. Freud's step in 
considering dreams,, and behaviours as text"analogues with some confused 
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meaning is ' to - insist on and to offer an account for the' mechanism which 
produced the distortion. From this reading of Freud Habermas (1970a) develops 
the idea that neurotic behaviour is systematically distorted communication. That 
is, behaviour distorted at source, not at the stage of transmission but at, the 
stage of production. In contrast to archaeological fragments, where interpreta- 
tion is essentially about the production of a translation lexicon and the discovery 
of grammatical rules, the psychoanalytic patient is seen as the victim of 
distorting forces which operate within themselves, forces which have power 
precisely because they are not seen through. This account of the operation of 
such unseen powers, powers which the patient cannot articulate yet which 
dominate his or her life suggest a paradigm for explaining ideology. Habermas 
suggests that we construe ideology as the systematic distortion of communication 
at the societal level. 
Ideology involves the legitimation of a certain system of norms. What is 
pernicious about ideology is that it inhibits thought, not merely that it places 
certain norms over others but that it somehow precludes their. dethronement 
from the privileged, positions which they occupy. The claim is, that ideology 
somehow prevents rational communication within society. The goal of 
psychoanalysis is to free its patients from the repetitive patterns of thought, and 
behaviour in which they are trapped through the re-integration of the mind. 
The ways of being which the patients took up, ways which they could not 
understand, are made to be mysterious to themselves no longer. They can now 
live openly with themselves; their minds now transparent to their own reflection: 
the patient is now free to act rationally. "Where there is id, there shall be ego. " 
There are at least two, problems in trying to base an account of ideology on 
such a picture, or some variant of it. Habermas has to respond to the following 
two problems. Firstly it is by no means clear that a rational society, should such 
a thing be possible, would share analogous benefits to those which are claimed 
for the fully analysed person. Weber reminds us that the increased rationaliza- 
tion of public life during the enlightenment had negative effects. We became 
increasingly bureaucratized. The exorcism of . superstition brought about 
disenchantment in the sense of making the world spiritless, emptied of meaning. 
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Secondly the methodology by which analysis reaches its depth interpretations is 
far from unproblematic: how can we be sure-that the construal of utterances as 
distorted by unseen power is a project free from correlated problems, that is, 
can Habermas justify the particular critique of ideology which he professes? 
Habermas argues that Weber's view of rationality is too narrow. He claims that 
Weber restricted himself to means- end rationality, failing to note that the 
human ability to communicate - itself a prerequisite of society - reveals 
"communicative rationality". In his inaugural lecture he stated: 
The human interest in autonomy and responsibility is not mere fancy, 
for it can be apprehended a priori. What raises us out of nature is the 
only thing whose nature we can know: language. Through its structure, 
autonomy and responsibility are. posited for us. Our first sentence 
expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained 
consensus. (1972, Appendix, p. 314) 
The claim is that the fact of language shows that humans have the ability to 
achieve consensus, to acknowledge each other as rational beings. But doesn't 
language also reveal our capacity for deception? Does every utterance aim at 
unconstrained consensus, what of jokes, deception, deliberately cryptic utterances, 
formal styles of speech, cant, technical language? Doesn't Habermas' claim that 
autonomy and responsibility are not utopian dreams itself rest on a romantic 
fiction? Habermas could parry this by claiming that the orientation to a shared 
understanding is the basic ingredient of speech and that although speakers 
clearly deviate from this in specific circumstances this fact does not affect his 
claim that "I take speech aimed at reaching understanding to be fundamental. " 
I'll defend this in a preliminary way now by remarking that intentional deception 
requires insight into sincere communication. That is, far from having nothing 
to do with unconstrained consensus, deception has to utilize the possibility of 
consensus precisely to ensure that it remains latent. Habermas talks of such 
abilities as communicative competence. That is the ability to place utterances 
in appropriate contexts: to use language. We may contrast this with the 
narrower scope of Chomsky's idea of linguistic competence which is the mastery 
of an abstract system of rules. Habermas refers to a research programme called 
universal pragmatics which aims at the construction of the requirements of 
I 
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communicative competence. It is universal in the sense that it deals, with 
abstract properties of communicative acts, properties which are held to operate 
in any speech situation whatsoever. - The starting point for this project are 
presuppositions which Habermas claims all speakers make: 
I shall develop the thesis that anyone acting communicatively must, in 
performing any speech action, raise universal validity claims and suppose 
that they can be vindicated (or redeemed). Insofar as he wants to 
participate in a process of reaching understanding, he cannot avoid 
raising the following - and indeed precisely the following - validity 
claims. He claims to be: a. Uttering something understandably; b. 
Giving (the hearer) something to understand; c. Making himself hereby 
understandable; and d. Coming to an understanding with another 
person. (1979) 
I think that the critical potential of this position can be illustrated vividly by 
contrasting Habermas with the position adopted by students of ethnomethodol- 
ogy. In so far as the ethnomethodologists argue that all that sociology can have 
as its subject matter is the everyday practical reasoning processes which people 
engage in, talk of 'ideology'; ý 'power' - the traditional concerns of academic 
sociology - are dismissed as reification. They are only of interest to sociology, 
the ethnomethodologists argue, in so far as people use them to structure their 
experience and organise their actions. Like the ethnomethodologists Habermas 
notes that there is a "given" background in our understanding of the world, an 
"always already". But a sharp difference emerges when we look at how 
communication is to be construed. For the ethnomethodologists, claims to 
rationality or universality by people in conversations are not universal, they are 
merely taken to be universal (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 33). Habermas responds to this 
by pointing out that if the ethnomethodologists really want to follow this through 
then their own observations of people in conversation have a strange status. 
The ethnomethodologists could claim that their observations have no theoretical 
status at all, and are merely the local management of actions of a bunch of 
academics. - The alternative is to claim that their observations have a status 
beyond the mundane because the ethnomethodologist has a disinterested position 
and can watch how the participants go about making their claims comprehensible 
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(Garfinkel and Sacks, 1986, p. ' 166) But this is to claim that the ethno- 
methodologist enjoys some standards of validity beyond ordinary speakers. No 
such problem for Habermas. If we' hold that speech involve's making universal 
validity claims then Habermas can state: 
The social scientific interpreter, in the role of an at least virtual 
participant, must in principle orient himself to the same validity claims 
to which those immediately involved also orient themselves; for this 
reason, and to this extent, he can start from the always implicitly shared, 
immanent rationality of speech, take seriously the rationality claimed by 
the participants for their utterances and at the same time critically 
examine it. In thematizing what the participants merely presuppose and 
assuming a reflective attitude to the interpretandum, one does not place 
oneself outside the communication context under discussion; one 
deepens and radicalizes it in a way that is in principle open to all 
participants. In natural contexts this path from communicative action 
to discourse is often blocked; but is always engrained in the very 
structure of action oriented to reaching understanding. (1984, p. 130) 
Before commenting on this position I want to pause to consider the mechanism 
which Habermas appeals to in order to argue that movement into the realm of 
what he calls "discourse" secures a special validity. What has yet to be shown 
is how entry into a dialogue could lead us to the truth as opposed to say, some 
endpoint secured by the, slick dogma of a middle class intellectual critical 
sociologist, that is, the operation of yet another ideology. Here Habermas 
introduces a consensus theory of truth. When truth claims are called into 
question they can be settled only through, argument. Consensus here cannot 
mean any contingently reached agreement. What is required is a notion of a 
justified consensus. What could such criteria be? To find out Habermas argues 
that we must go back to examine the very structure of discourse itself - at the 
very notion of providing rational grounds for a belief. 
If we enter into a discussion with a view to reaching an agreement (a rational 
agreement) then we must suppose that the agreement is to be reached without 
coercion. We must suppose that the result will be reached through force of 
better argument alone. Such discourse is clearly an ideal case, nevertheless 
there is merit in looking at what would have to be the case for such an outcome 
to be possible. Such a discussion would require equal chance for all the 
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participants to raise claims and call claims into question, equal chance to 
perpetuate discussion. Habermas calls discourse having this structure an ideal 
speech situation. Where Chomsky considers an idealisation of a speaker's 
competence; a speaker without constraints on memory, who has the capacity and 
attention to understand infinitely long sentences, Habermas considers an ideal 
situation where consensus worthy of the name can be reached. Of course this 
is a fiction. Power is usually mobilized to win arguments, the way to consensus 
is usually blocked. For Habermas these are contingent issues; due to, and 
constitutive of, the society which we live in. Habermas' idealisation must be 
sharply distinguished from Chomsky's. The ideal speech situation results from 
the structure of speech: it is a reciprocal requirement of speakers when they act 
with the intention to communicate, it is neither an empirical finding nor an 
approximation made for the sake of a research programme. Habermas claims 
it is anticipated by all speakers. "This anticipation alone is the warrant that 
permits us to join to an actually attained consensus the claim of a rational 
consensus. At the same time it is a critical standard against which every actually 
realised consensus can be called into question and tested. " (xviii, 1973) 
2.3 Implicit rationality and universal rationality 
The difference between Habermas's position and the ethnomethodological train 
of thought (I use this expression because of course I am constructing a position 
based on their views rather than reporting) is interesting because as I noted they 
do actually start from standpoints which are similar in a crucial respect. The 
idea that human conduct is always situated in a context which is already 
established and which is renewed by such conduct is a shared idea. For both 
theories the phenomenological idea of the "lifeworld" is drawn on in articulating 
this. Habermas, in the second volume of The theory of communicative action 
qualifies the adequacy of such a position, linking up with the remarks which I 
made above in connection with social facts. I shall not attempt to take this 
further. Furthermore both approaches allocate rationality, in a wider sense 
than the `term often has, a place of fundamental importance. 
I propose to point out. a way of reconciling the ideas on truth which Habermas 
and the ethnomethodologists propose. That they should be reconcilable is 
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something which in principle seems possible to me for both incorporate what 
strike me as profound points about human interaction. On the = one hand, 
Habermas's position exhibits an idea which I consider fundamental to the 
concept of truth: 
(a) Whatever else truth may mean, ° if a proposition is true then everyone, in 
principle assents, to it. 
On the other hand the ethnomethodological position also makes a fundamental 
assertion about truth: 
(b) What is taken as true is ineluctably tied to a determinate context, a certain 
"here and now". 
So on the one hand truth claims are universal, but on the other they are local. 
I shall argue that these positions are but opposite sides of the same coin. 
Firstly, whether or not a truth claim is local or not depends on one's view of 
language. I think that the only intelligible interpretation of Habermas's position 
has to acknowledge that in so far as an expression only means something 
determinate in a given context then to be sure truth is highly local in that sense. 
I am sure that Habermas must hold such a view. 
As Davidson remarks, the mandate for' interpreting someone's speech can be 
thought of as holding a theory of what their words mean. Any theory of 
interpretation presupposes rationality on the part of the person being interpreted, 
since without the assumption of a shared pattern there could be no consistencies 
within which the attribution of beliefs to a person or the interpretation of their 
utterances could start. Stressing the contingency of whether or not an 
interpretation can be reached and a rationality discerned is the ethno- 
methodological position. This is a sceptical version of Habermas's position. The 
perspective adopted is that the local rationality is presupposed, a condition for 
the action having a meaning at all, but the generality of claims made by the 
participants are denied since their rationality, prior to critical engagement by the 
investigator, is what is sought. These two subtlely but importantly different 
positions are, as I understand them methodological bases. I think that it can be 
shown that the ethnomethodologist subscribes to a version of the thesis that 
speech has a universal validity base since the theme of the accountability of 
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conduct suggests that any action is accountable to an indefinite range of 
demands for an account. Furthermore, it seems to me impossible that a person 
could design some conduct to be specifically unaccountable. So the universal 
validity basis of speech has its counterpart in the accountability of conduct. 
Indeed the fact that ethnomethodological studies occur at all indicates that 
students of ethnomethodology reckon that there are at least reasonable odds of 
an interpretable action taking place, that is, one whose rationality can be 
grasped. 
2.4 Social power and communicative constraints 
In the light of the idea of the 'ideal speech situation' Habermas's appeal to a 
psychoanalytic account can be re-evaluated. The fact that the ideal truth 
situation is counterfactual means that it requires an account of communication 
distortion as its counterpart. 
At this level of I think it transpires that the appeal to a psychoanalytic account 
is rather abstract. It amounts to the claim that 1, there are internal barriers to 
communication, which fulfills the requirement that ideology as a limit on what 
is thinkable is accounted for, and 2, that the distortions are depth-hermeneutic 
in nature, that is to uncover the mechanism producing the distortion is to 
exorcise it. 
It is ironic that whilst Habermas visualises a profoundly social sense of 
rationality the account of ideology as distortion as I have sketched it here is 
oddly individualistic. Of course an unplayed card is the two sided nature of the 
psychoanalytic formulation itself. Within this account intrapsychic goings on have 
a social dimension in so far as they are modelled on, and, on this account, have 
their genesis in, relationships with other people. Despite this, this whole account 
represents a formidable obstacle to reconciliation with the concepts of 
ethnomethodology. What could an ethnomethodological account of ideology be 
like? 
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Earlier I criticised Barnes for failing to address the communication of the 
knowledge on which his account rests. Latent in this account, however, lies a 
suggestion which can relate the normativity of knowledge, communicative 
constraints and power, in short it can furnish an account of ideology. If the 
knowledge in Barnes's account includes communicative knowledge, or better, 
communicative know-how then the meanings written into language, since the 
meaning of a word is socially defined, are the basic ones within which values are 
contained. To use language or engage in interpretable activity is to exercise 
one's social knowledge, so whenever a person speaks or interprets what is going 
on they do so on the basis of their knowledge, their knowledge of the meaning. 
This can, I think, go some way towards explaining an apparent difference in the 
constraints which I discussed in chapter four. The constraint which a question 
places on possible answers has a logical character to it whereas the "constraint 
system" impinging on someone responding to a compliment, though patterns of 
inference are clearly relevant has a much more normative character. Adopting 
the view that patterns of inference are social draws together the constraints 
evident in logical reasoning with those relating to giving offense or passing as 
a member of a certain group. They are to do with practical knowledge of how 
things are. Which, given the creativity required in the application of such 
knowledge and the capacity to criticise which goes with reason, could also be 
knowledge of how things might be, and even how to make them so. 
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Appendix' 1: Computional Procedure used for the studies of attributional style 
in chapter two. 
The computing procedure which I finally used to calculate the binomial 
probabilities involved a SAS program. I am indebted to Paul Nicholson of the 
computing services for writing the core of this program. The original routine 
consisted of of three parts. 1, calculation of the frequency of occurrence of each 
attribution pattern, 2, calculation of the frequency required for that to be 
significant, 3, a comparison of the observed frequency with the critical value. 
1, An SPSSX command file which picks up a file of codings, defines them and 
calculates the frequency of each style considered as well as each dimension 
separately. The frequencies are then cross-tabulated by speaker. This part 
therefore shows how many attributions of all the patterns possible within a given 
model each speaker has. The result is thus a table which is 2" columns wide, 
where n is the number of dimensions in the model being investigated. The 
table is as deep as there are people involved. In the study the table are 
therefore either 32 or 8 columns wide and either 24, or typically 77 rows deep. 
Note that under some of the selections, for example considering only negative 
outcomes, some of the speakers with few ättribütions overall may have non at 
all. 
2, The second part calculated the critical values for the number of cases of a 
given combination of the model under required for it to be called a style. Since 
., 
is a function of the probability of that combination the , critical 
value, call it r, 
occurring and the number of attributions present for that person a new value 
needs to be calculated for each combination for each person. I have taken as 
the probability for each combination the product of the proportions of each 
component dimension from the group of subjects as a whole. This means that 
any styles shown are significant differences within that group. I wrote a BASIC 
program which calculated the critical value of r at both the 5% and 1% levels 
as a two tailed test. Given the starting probabilities the program takes each 
person, cycles through all the combinations possible giving the lower bound 
critical values and then continuing with r+1 until the upper bound values are 
reached. In the case of a five dimension model for 77 subjects the program 
yields 32 x 77 =1474 sets of critical values. (The program is written in Waterloo 
Basic). 
00010 DIM S(77) 
00020 LET S(1) =6 
00021 LET S(2) = 16 
00022 LET S(3) =4 
00094 LET S(75) - 5 
00095 LET S(76) a 6 
00096 LET S(77) a 0 
00210 
00220 LET NN - 77 
00230 OPEN 16, 'BIN', OUTPUT 
00240 LET Q -0 
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00250 LET C =0 
00260 FOR J=1 TO NN 
00270 FOR PRY =0 TO 7 STEP 1 
00280 GOSUB 880 
00290 
00300 IF PRA =1 THEN LET PRA = 0.600 ELSE PRA = 0.400 
00310 IF PRB =1 THEN LET PRB = 0.625 ELSE PRB = 0.375 
00320 IF PRC =1 THEN LET PRC = 0.311 ELSE PRC = 0.689 
00350 
00360 LET P= PRA*PRB*PRC 
00370 LET N= S(J) 
00380 
00390 LET Q=0 
00400 LET C=0 
00410 LET Z=0 
00420 LET R1L = -1 
00430 LET R5L = -1 
00440 LET Q1L = -1 
00450 LET Q5L = -1 
00460 FOR R=0 TO 50 STEP 1 
00470 LET E= R*LOG1O(P) + (N-R)*LOG10(1-P) 
00480. LET X=N 
00490 GOSUB 780 
00500 LET F=C 
00510 LET X=R 
00520 GOSUB 780 
00530 LET G=C 
00540 LET X= (N-R) 
00550 GOSUB 780 
00560 LET H=C 
00570 LETM=F-G-H+E 
00580 LET T= 10**M 
00590 LET QQ =Q 
00600 LET Q=Q+T 
00610 IF Z >= 1 THEN GOTO 650 
00620 IF Q <= 0.005 THEN LET Q1L = Q 
00630 IF Q <= 0.005 THEN LET R1L = R 
00640 IF Q>0.005 THEN LET Z=1 
00650 IF Z >= 2 THEN GOTO 690 
00660 IF Q <= 0.025 THEN LET Q5L = Q 
00670 IF Q <= 0.025 THEN LET R5L - R 
00680 IF Q>0.025 THEN LET Z=2 
00690 IF Z >= 3 THEN GOTO 730 
00700 IF'Q >= 0.975 THEN LET Q5U = Q 
00710' IF Q >= 0.975 THEN LET R5U - R 
00720 IF Q-T >= 0.975 THEN LET Z= 3 
00730 IF Q >= 0.995 THEN LET Q1U - Q 
00740 IF Q >= 0.995 THEN LET R1U = R 
00750 IF Q-T >= 0.995 THEN GOTO 980 
00760 GOTO 860 
00770 REM WORKS OUT LOG10(X) 
00780 LET C=0 
00790 LET A-X 
00800 -FOR K=1 TO X STEP 1 
00810 LET B= LOG10(A) 
00820 LET C=C+B 
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00830 LET A=A-1 
00840 NEXT K 
00850 RETURN 
00860 NEXT R 
00870 GOTO 980 
00880 LET PRA = IP(PRY/4) 
00890 LET PRX = REM(PRY, 4) 
00900 LET PRB = IP(PRX/2) 
00910 LET PRC = REM(PRX, 2) 
00960 RETURN 
00970 
, 
00980 PRINT #6, N; R1L; R5L; R5U; R1U; Q1L; Q5L; Q5U; Q1U 
00990 NEXT PRY 
01000 NEXT J 
01010 CLOSE #6 
01020 END 
3, The final stage decides whether or not the number of each pattern worked 
out in stage one has only a 1% chance or a 5% chance of occuring. Such 
patterns are considered to be attributional styles. In effect, this stage compares 
the results of the each entry in the cross-tabulation table with the critical values. 
This results in a file showing the patterns which were significant, which speaker 
produced it, how many attributions they made altother, what the critical value 
is and how many of that pattern they produced. 
To achieve the results presented in the chapter this routine had to be run 
separately for each of the selections, negative outcome, where the speaker is the 
target and so on. This meant running it twelve times. I used a mainframe 
computer to carry out all these operations. BASIC is not really the appropriate 
language for this kind of operation and the procedure is slow requiring a lot of 
computer central processing time. It was mandatory to run each job BASIC 
program as a batch job. Another problem is that having separate procedures 
means that several files are in play at any one time: the procedure is messy and 
the chance of error must be high and is difficult to check. 
This is a listing of the SAS program written by Paul Nicholson and modified by 
me. 
cms fi inl disk jprl dat; 
cms fi out disk ray sas; 
cms fi outl disk ray saslog; 
cros fi outp disk ray output; 
* read raw data and compute score; 
data raw; 
infile inl; 
input sp 1 @2 (xl-x5)(1. ) 
goodout 7 sigout 8 
agent 10 @11 (a3-a5)(l. ) 
target 15 @16 (t3-t5)(1. ) 
speaker 19-20; 
score=10000*xl+1000*x2+100*x3+10*x4+x5; 
if target=. then target=sp; 
if sp^=target then delete; 
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if'goodout"=0 then delete; 
run; 
*proc print; run; 
* compute empirical p values 
proc summary; 
var xl x2 x3 x4 x5; 
output out=empps mean=pl p2 
and store in data set empps; 
p3 p4 p5; 
run; 
*proc print; run; 
* generate r values from tabulation - save in data set rvalsl; 
proc freq data=raw; 
tables speaker*score/noprint norow nocol nopercent 
sparse out=rvalsl; 
run; 
*proc print; run; 
* delete empty cells; 
data rvals2 (keep=speaker score count rename=(count=r)); 
set rvalsl; 
if count > 0; 
run; 
*proc print; run; 
* generate row totals separately and store in data set nvals; 
proc summary data=rvalsl; 
var count; 
by speaker; 
output out=nvals sum=n; 
run; 
*proc print; run; 
* Need to identify all unique score patterns; 
proc sort. data=raw; 
by score; 
run; 
data scores; 
set raw; 
by score; 
if first. score; 
run; 
*proc print; run; 
* now compute composite P value for each unique 
data pscores; 
if 
_n_=1 
then set empps; 
retain pl p2 p3 p4 p5; 
array p(i) pl p2 p3 p4 p5; 
array x(i) xl x2 x3 x4 x5; 
set scores; 
pscore=l; 
do i=1 to 5; 
pscore=pscore*(p*x+(1-p)*(1-x)); 
end; 
* put pl p2 p3 p4 p5; 
run; 
*proc print; run; 
score pattern; 
* merge r and n values for each speaker into data set rn ; 
proc sort data=rvals2; 
by speaker; 
run; 
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proc sort data=nvals; 
by speaker; 
run; 
data rn(keep=speaker score r n); 
merge rvals2 nvals; 
by speaker; 
run; 
*proc print; run; 
* merge P value with result and save in RNP; 
proc sort data=rn; 
by score; 
run; 
proc sort data=pscores; 
by score; 
run; 
data rnp; 
merge rn pscores; 
by score; 
run; 
*proc print; run; 
proc sort; 
by speaker; 
run; 
* now compute binomial probabilities; 
* for r-1 - to give top end; 
data ufinal; 
set rnp; 
rb=r-l; 
if rb>=l then ubprob=probbnml(pscore, n, rb); 
* put speaker score ubprob pscore r n; 
run; 
*proc print; run; 
* select small tails; 
data siggs; 
set ufinal; 
if ubprob >=0.995; 
file print; 
put speaker 1-2 score 4-9 @ 11 ubprob @ 25 pscore r 38-40 n 
;! l 
42-46; 
*print frequency with which diff. sig models occurred; 
proc freq data=siggs; 
tables score; 
run; 
proc print; run; 
* now compute binomial probabilities for lower end; 
data final; 
set rnp; 
bprob=probbnml(pscore, n, r); 
* put speaker score bprob pscore r n; 
run; 
data sigls; 
set final; 
if bprob <0.005; 
file print; 
put speaker 1-2 score 4-9 @ 11 bprob @ 21 pscore r 34-36 n 
38-41; 
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run; 
. T***print lower end 
frequencies; 
proc freq data=sigls; 
tables score; 
run; 
proc print; run; 
The advantages of the SAS routine are considerable. Primarily it is more 
reliable as it operates directly on the raw data. In addition it is much faster. 
On a portion of the data which I knew to be accurately submitted to the old 
routine the two methods yield exactly the same results. 
234 
Appendix 2: OCP Program to select certain candidate causal connectives in 
chapter three. 
The program shows the words and phrases which were selected. 
*input 
references cocoa. 
*words 
ignore '!? " :1_:: :={}^\/; 1. 
ALPHABET "` A=a=a4=a5 B=b C=c=c5 D=d E=e=el=e2=e3=e4 
F=f G=g H=h I=i J=j K=k L=1 M=m N=n O=o=ol P=p 
Q=q R=r S=s T=t U=u=ul V=v W=w X=x Y=y Z=z 
@- al 012345678 9". 
padding '(( )) (]*+'. 
*action 
pick words "COS BECAUSE SINCE SO FOR AS THEREFORE WHY" 
or phrases "DUE TO", "IN ORDER TO", "BY VIRTUE OF", "IN THE 
LIGHT OF", 
"IN VIEW OF", "OWING TO", "DUE TO". 
do concordance . 
maximum context 50 letters. . 
REFERENCES T=6, A=5, S =5. 
*FORMAT 
REFERENCES LEFT. 
*go 
) 
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Appendix, 3: Ti anscription Notation 
Vocal features 
Particularly in Chapter five, but elsewhere too, I have used the transcription 
notation devised by Gail Jefferson. As I discuss in chapter four, where I 
introduced the approach of conversation analysis within which this method was 
developed, the notation is oriented to capturing the sequential structure of 
spoken discourse. 
Goodwin (1981) warns his readers that transcribed fragments require reading in 
a special way and are as different to ordinary text as tables and graphs. The 
following is based on Atkinson and Heritage (1984). 
Transcribed fragments usually start with a reference entry. Turns are written 
across the page continuing onto to a new line below if necessary. Turns by new 
speakers follow below. The left hand margin names the speakers, followed by 
a colon. Line numbers, to enable reference to details in the fragment, may be 
added to the left margin. An arrow may be placed in the left margin to 
indicate some detail. Reporting of part of a conversation may be shown, as is 
usual elsewhere, with three stops spaced horizontally to show that material has 
been omitted from an utterance. Where an utterance is, or utterances are, 
omitted three dots spaced vertically may be used. 
Standard orthography is used with modifications intended to capture aspects of 
pronunciation. This practice has been criticised by linguists, and indeed must 
appear shocking to anyone with expertise in phonology. Nevertheless, given the 
amount of material routinely transcribed and the analysis to which it is put the 
convention seems adequate to me. The transcript should be viewed as a tool 
for either helping analysis along or reporting findings. Nothing here precludes 
detailed phonological analysis and indeed some very interesting findings have 
been made through attention to such detail (Local and Kelly, 1989). 
A range of symbols are included, some of which take on a novel use, as follows: 
1, Overlapping utterances '[' and ']' are placed at the start and end of the 
overlapping portion. 
2, Simultaneous utterances '[[' 
3, Latched utterances '=' placed at the end of an utterance and at the start of 
the- next one when the second follows the first with no gap. 
4, Timings '(0.0)', (), (-----) 
Silences and pauses are times to tenths of a second and shown in parentheses. 
Untimable pauses, in practice, less than two tenths of a second are shown by 
aa stop in parentheses, '(. )'. This is often called a "micro pause". 
As an alternative to giving the time as a figure the number of tenths of a 
second may be shown by giving that number of dashes in parenthesis. This 
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method is useful when nonvocal activity is to be recorded. For example, a 
pause of six tenths of a second may be shown as '(0.6)' or as '(------)'. When 
using this method, every tenth dash, that is each whole second is marked by 
a '+'. So, for example, '(1.1)', '(-----------)' and '(---------+-)' 
are all equivalent. 
5,, Aspects of speech delivery 
Punctuation marks are used DQI to show grammitical features but to capture the 
way something is spoken. Goodwin (1981, p. 48) remarks that this is not a new 
convention. Apparently, commas, full stops and question marks were used to 
show pitch changes in a rule for liturgical recitation in medieval Munster. 
II stopping fall in tone 
', ' continuing intonation 
'? ' rising inflection 
weaker rising intonation 
'! ' animated tone 
'- abrupt cut off 
't' rising shift in intonation 
'4' falling shift in intonation 
T. I am however (0.2) very 1 fortunate 
(0.4) in having (0.6) at mar: vlous 
depIuty 
underscoring show emphasis 
Capitalisation shows loudness 
Degree signs show quietness 
'hh' aspiration 
"hh' inhalation 
'gh' guttural quality 
Subscribed dot shows hardening 
'>', '<' Flank part of an utterance to show that it is quickened. 
6, 
Double parentheses contain descriptions of aspects of speech or details of the 
scene, or of vocalisations which can't be captured easily. 
Single parentheses containing material other than numbers or dashed, used to 
show timings as discussed above, are used to show uncertain hearings. Mulitiple 
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possibilities are shown one above another. Empty parenthesis show that a 
hearing of the material couldn't be achieved. 
Non-vocal features 
When I look at nonvocal goings on in chapter six I recorded details following 
extensions to the Jefferson system described above which have been used by 
Goodwin and Heath. Basically, nonvocal features are added onto a transcript 
of vocal ones. 
Usually speaker's activities are shown above the utterance and recipient's below. 
Gaze at other is shown by a solid line parallel to the speech with which the 
gaze is simultaneous. Transition to gaze at other is shown with a series of 
stops, onset of gaze marked with an 'X' and dropping of gaze with a series of 
commas. 
Other details may be shown by square brackets parallel to the text with which 
they correspond with verbal desriptions. 
In the environment on which chapter six is based, a computing advisory centre, 
where an advisor and a user sit side by side at a desk I found it usefull to 
extend the gaze details to include gaze at printed matter, on the desk, and gaze 
at computer screen. 
ýýý--ýý----ý gaze at screen 
gaze at desk. 
khý 
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Appendix 4: Letter sent to the head of computing services 
1ZIB CW ' OIF 1J T1n 
Head of Department: 
Professor A. J. Chapman 
Department of Psychology 
Leeds ! S2 9! T 
United Kingdom 
Telephone (0532) 431751 
3rd March 1988 
Dr. A. A. Hock 
Computing Services 
University of Leeds 
Dear Dr. Hock 
As part of my doctoral research on communication I would 
like to make, and analyse, video recordings of consultations 
in the User Access advisory. Like all studies taking place 
in the Psychology Department I have submitted a proposal to 
our Departmental Ethics. Committee. The project which I 
propose has been considered and approved; so I am 
writing to you now to ask your permission. 
I propose to be in the advisory for about ninety minutes 
per day with advisors who have agreed to take part. I would 
like to record on about ten days. Users entering the advisory 
would be handed a brief explanation of the study and given 
the opportunity to decline. The recording would therefore 
not be surreptitious: I would mount a portable video camera 
on a tripod in the corner of the room. T_ would seek to 
cause a minimum of obstruction to the operation of the 
advisory and to the progress of the consultations. 
Much of the work in my field has used somewhat artificial 
data, often from rather contrived situations. In my work I am 
trying to break from this. Briefly, I am interested in the 
structure of conversations and constraints on communication. 
I have recently been working on video recordings of 
doctor-patient interactions from St. James' University Hospital. 
I am keen to start the project as soon as possible. Please 
let me know whether or not you see any difficulties or have 
any objections. Should you consent, please let me know 
whether or not I may consult the advisory staff directly myself. 
I must emphasise that I am not a "social skills" researcher and I 
do not seek to cast any judgement on the advisory staff, or the 
users. 
Yours sincerely 
J. P. Rae 7% 
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Appendix 5: Explanation handed to users of the advisory 
Hcad of Dcpartmcnt: 
Profcssor A. J. Chapman 
Ucpartmcnt of Psychology 
Lccds LS2 9JT 
Unitcd Kingdom 
Tclcphonc min) 43$7$I 
As a part of my PhD research on communication I am making and 
analysing video recordings from a variety of situations. In the 
past; research in my field has tended to use data from rather 
artificial situations; I am trying to break from this in my work. 
Please let we know if you are prepared to me let video-record 
your consultation session. The material will only be used 
anonymously. 
Are you prepared to allow me to give other researchers access 
to the recordings, to the soundtrack alone, or to transcripts? 
I must emphasise that I am not a "social-skills" researcher; I 
am not interested in passing judgment on you or the computing staff. 
J. P. Rae 
240 
Appendix 6: Summary details of advisory sessions discussed in chapter 5 
Day Session Approx. Advisor Some details of the users 
code time code 
1. - . UAA. 
1 3: 30 1 man home 
UAA. 2 5: 45 1 man home (me) 
2 UAA. 4 3: 00 2 man home (me) 
UAA. 5 6: 15 2 man 
3 UAA. 7 1: 15 3 man 
4 UAA. 8 22: 30 4 man 
UAA. 81 1: 00 4 woman home 
UAA. 811 1: 00 4 man home 
UAA. 9 15: 15 4 man 
5 UAA. 10 7: 00 1 man home 
UAA. 11 3: 30 1 two women home 
7 UAA. 15 5: 30 3 woman home 
UAA. 16 1: 00 3 man 
UAA. 18 4: 30 3 woman home 
UAA. 19 5: 30 3 man 
UAA. 20 7: 30 3 man home 
UAA. 21 15: 30 3 man home 
UAA. 21i 1: 30 3 woman home 
8 UAA. 22 11: 30 2 man 
UAA. 23 1: 15 2 man home 
This table is intended to indicate how different advisors correspond to the 
sessions reported in the chapter and to show the range of times that the 
consultations take. Although my analysis says nothing of the sex or country of 
origin of the speakers I have given some details in case they are felt to be 
important since I have not assigned names in the transcripts which would 
indicate such things. I have only marked speakers as "home" if I am confident 
that they are "home students". I made no formal attempt to find out where the 
users were from or whether or not they were native speakers of English. The 
advisors were all men, with the exception of the second advisor who is called 
in UAA. 20. The days on the left-hand side simply show occasions when I went 
to the advisory and came away with a recording. 
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Appendix 7: Summary details of advisory sessions discussed in chapter 6 
Day Session Approx. Advisor Some details of the users 
code time code 
2 UAA. 3 7: 00 2 man home 
3 UAA. 6 10: 45 3 man 
UAA. 8 22: 15 4 man 
6 UAA. 14 11: 00 5 man home 
8 UAA. 15 5: 30 3 man home 
UAA. 17 15: 00 3 man home 
UAA. 19 5: 00 3 man 
UAA. 20 7: 30 3 man home 
UAA. 21 15: 00 3 man home 
8 UAA. 22 11: 30 2 man 
